Also known as:incite · incites · incited · inciting · incitee · inciter · inciteful
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
1
in constitutional law
Speech advocating the use of force or law violation that is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. Mere abstract advocacy of violence or illegality remains protected.
2
in criminal law
Sense 1
1
in constitutional law
Speech advocating the use of force or law violation that is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. Mere abstract advocacy of violence or illegality remains protected.
See Our Sources· 1 primary source
Cases
Examples
Sense 2
2
in criminal law
The act of persuading another person to commit a crime by inciting, counseling, advising, inducing, urging, or commanding the conduct with specific intent that the solicited person actually commit the crime. The offense is complete upon the solicitation regardless of any response.
The act of persuading another person to commit a crime by inciting, counseling, advising, inducing, urging, or commanding the conduct with specific intent that the solicited person actually commit the crime. The offense is complete upon the solicitation regardless of any response.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
5
Protest Speech at Rally
Ivy Ibarra addressed a crowd and urged listeners to immediately storm a government building that afternoon to disrupt an ongoing proceeding. She provided maps and timing details that made the unlawful entry likely. The speech meets the requirements for unprotected incitement.
Contraceptive Distribution Talk
Iris Irons handed out contraceptive samples while discussing resistance to restrictive laws. The statements did not direct listeners to commit imminent unlawful acts. The speech therefore receives First Amendment protection.
Eisenstadt v. Baird405 U.S. 438 (1972)
On April 6, 1967, William R. Baird delivered a lecture on birth control at Boston University. As part of the presentation, he showed a film, displayed contraceptive devices in their original packages, and at the conclusion invited members of the audience to take contraceptive articles from the stage. A young woman requested and received a package of Emko vaginal foam from Baird, after which he was arrested and charged with exhibiting and giving away a contraceptive device in violation of Massachusetts General Laws, c. 272, § 21.
Baird was convicted following a bench trial in the Massachusetts Superior Court. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts set aside the conviction for exhibiting the contraceptives on First Amendment grounds but upheld the conviction for giving away the foam by a four-to-three vote. Baird then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, which dismissed the petition.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the dismissal and remanded with directions to grant the writ discharging Baird. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and heard the appeal brought by the Sheriff of Suffolk County, Massachusetts.
The Massachusetts statute, as interpreted by the state courts, makes it a felony for anyone other than a registered physician or pharmacist to dispense contraceptives intended for the prevention of pregnancy, with distribution authorized only to married persons upon prescription.
Imani Idowu burned a cross on private property while expressing racial animus. The act was evaluated under fighting-words and true-threat doctrines rather than incitement standards. The display was treated as low-value speech subject to content-based limits.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota505 U.S. 377 (1992)
In the predawn hours of June 21, 1990, petitioner R.A.V., then a juvenile, and several other teenagers assembled a crudely made cross by taping together broken chair legs and burned the cross inside the fenced yard of a black family that lived across the street from the house where R.A.V. was staying. Although this conduct could have been punished under several Minnesota statutes carrying significant penalties, the City of St. Paul chose to charge R.A.V. under the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance.
The ordinance provides that whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including but not limited to a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
R.A.V. moved to dismiss the charge on the ground that the ordinance was substantially overbroad and impermissibly content-based and therefore facially invalid under the First Amendment, and the trial court granted the motion. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, construing the ordinance to reach only fighting words and concluding that it was not impermissibly content-based. This Court granted certiorari.
Parody Advertisement
Ideal Solutions published a parody advertisement that ridiculed a public figure. The content contained no call for imminent lawless action. The publication therefore remained protected expression.
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell485 U.S. 46 (1988)
Hustler Magazine, Inc., a magazine of nationwide circulation, and its publisher Larry Flynt published a parody of a Campari Liqueur advertisement in the November 1983 issue. The parody featured respondent Jerry Falwell and suggested that his first time sampling the liqueur occurred during a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse. The parody included a disclaimer in small print that it was an ad parody not to be taken seriously.
Falwell filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia seeking damages for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The District Court directed a verdict against Falwell on the privacy claim. The jury found against respondent on the libel claim but awarded Falwell $100,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages from each petitioner on the emotional distress claim.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari given the importance of the constitutional issues involved.
Indigo Textiles circulated an article accusing a private citizen of serious misconduct. The statements were evaluated under defamation standards rather than incitement rules. Liability turned on fault and harm rather than any call to immediate violence.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1974)
In 1968, Chicago police officer Richard Nuccio shot and killed a youth named Nelson. State authorities prosecuted Nuccio and obtained a conviction for second-degree murder. The Nelson family retained petitioner Elmer Gertz, a Chicago attorney, to represent them in civil litigation against Nuccio.
Respondent Robert Welch, Inc., publishes American Opinion, a monthly magazine expressing the views of the John Birch Society. In March 1969, the magazine published an article titled "FRAME-UP: Richard Nuccio And The War On Police." The article accused Gertz of participating in a Communist conspiracy to discredit local law enforcement, described him as a "Leninist" and "Communist-fronter," and claimed he had been an officer of the National Lawyers Guild, which it portrayed as a Communist organization involved in planning attacks on Chicago police during the 1968 Democratic Convention. The article contained numerous inaccuracies, including the false implication that Gertz had a criminal record.
Gertz had served as an officer of the National Lawyers Guild approximately fifteen years earlier but had no involvement in planning the 1968 demonstrations. He had never been a member of the Marxist League for Industrial Democracy or the Intercollegiate Socialist Society. The managing editor of American Opinion made no effort to verify the charges against Gertz before publication and appended an editorial introduction stating that the author had conducted extensive research.
Gertz filed a diversity action for libel in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The district court ruled that the statements constituted libel per se under Illinois law. After a trial, the jury awarded Gertz $50,000 in compensatory damages. The district court later entered judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict, applying the New York Times standard. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the application of constitutional standards to defamation of a private individual.
1 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
What distinguishes incitement from protected advocacy under the First Amendment?
The government may criminalize advocacy only when it is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to do so. Abstract advocacy of violence or illegality remains protected speech.
Supporting sources
1
Cash Offer for Assault
Isabella Ingram offered cash to Idris Ives and supplied detailed instructions on how to start a fight with a critic at a specific location. She spoke in a serious tone and conditioned payment on successful ejection of the target. The statements constitute common-law solicitation.
3 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
Does common-law solicitation require the solicited person to agree or act?
No. The offense is complete at the moment the defendant makes the solicitation. The law does not require agreement, any step toward commission, or any response from the person solicited.
Supporting sources
Is factual impossibility a defense to common-law solicitation?
No. Culpability is measured by the circumstances as the solicitor believed them to be even if the solicitation could not in fact have succeeded.
Supporting sources
Does later withdrawal or renunciation excuse a completed solicitation?
No. Once the defendant has made the solicitation, subsequent withdrawal or renunciation ordinarily does not constitute a defense.
Supporting sources
418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1974)
…the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or fighting' words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth…