Also known as: inconvenient forums · forum non conveniens
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A doctrine permitting a court that possesses jurisdiction to decline to exercise it when the forum is seriously inconvenient for trial and a more appropriate forum is available to the plaintiff.
Imperial Motors filed its contract suit against Ivy Investments in a New Jersey federal court where venue was proper but distant from most witnesses and documents. After realizing the inconvenience, Imperial moved under section 1404(a) to transfer to Delaware. The Delaware court applied New Jersey choice-of-law rules to the claims rather than its own.
Imani Idowu sued Parklane Hosiery in a distant federal court that later proved inconvenient. When the defendant later faced a second action, the court weighed whether the first forum's inconvenience undermined the fairness of applying collateral estoppel from the earlier judgment.
Parklane Hosiery Company, Inc., and eleven of its officers and directors issued a proxy statement in connection with a merger between Parklane and another corporation. Leo Shore, a stockholder of Parklane, filed a class action on behalf of stockholders in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against Parklane and the individual defendants. The complaint alleged that the proxy statement was false and misleading in violation of sections 14(a), 10(b), and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and related SEC rules. The complaint sought damages for the class, rescission of the merger, and recovery of costs. Before Shore’s action came to trial, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed a separate suit against the same defendants in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The SEC complaint alleged that the proxy statement that had been issued by Parklane was materially false and misleading in essentially the same respects as those that had been alleged in the respondent's complaint. After a four-day trial, the District Court found that the proxy statement was materially false and misleading in the respects alleged, and entered a declaratory judgment to that effect. The court permanently enjoined the defendants from further violations of the securities laws and ordered them to offer rescission to shareholders who had tendered shares. The defendants did not appeal this judgment. Shore then moved for partial summary judgment in the Eastern District of New York action, asserting that the defendants were collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues resolved against them in the SEC action. The District Court denied the motion on the ground that application of collateral estoppel would deny the defendants their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that a party who has had issues of fact determined against him after a full and fair opportunity to litigate in a nonjury trial is collaterally estopped from obtaining a subsequent jury trial of these same issues of fact. Because of an intercircuit conflict with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Rachal v. Hill, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseIvan Ivanov was served while briefly passing through California and argued that litigating there would be seriously inconvenient given his permanent residence elsewhere. The court considered whether the transient contact justified retaining jurisdiction despite the availability of a more appropriate forum.
Dennis Burnham married Francie Burnham in 1976 in West Virginia. In 1977 the couple moved to New Jersey, where their two children were born. In July 1987 the Burnhams separated. Mrs. Burnham, who intended to move to California, was visiting her parents in that State when she filed for divorce in New Jersey on grounds of extreme cruelty, seeking spousal and child support, custody of the children, and possession of the family home. In early August 1987 petitioner visited Mrs. Burnham in California to discuss the children and the separation. He took the children to San Francisco for a few days. Upon returning the children to Mrs. Burnham, petitioner was served with a summons and complaint for divorce filed in California Superior Court that also sought custody of the children. After being served, petitioner returned to New Jersey. In January 1988 petitioner made a special appearance in the California action and moved to quash service of process on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The Superior Court denied the motion, and the State Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the state and federal courts.
View caseImran Iyer challenged a Delaware court's exercise of jurisdiction over corporate directors by arguing that the sequestration procedure created an inconvenient forum unrelated to the underlying fiduciary claims. The court examined whether another state offered a more appropriate venue for the dispute.
On May 22, 1974, appellee Heitner, a nonresident of Delaware who owned one share of stock in the Greyhound Corporation, filed a shareholder's derivative suit in the Court of Chancery for New Castle County, Delaware. The complaint named as defendants Greyhound Corporation, its wholly owned subsidiary Greyhound Lines, Inc., and twenty-eight present or former officers and directors of one or both corporations. Heitner alleged that the individual defendants had violated their fiduciary duties by causing the corporations to engage in activities that resulted in a private antitrust judgment of over thirteen million dollars and a criminal contempt fine of six hundred thousand dollars, both arising from events in Oregon. The individual defendants resided primarily in Arizona and conducted their business there. Simultaneously with the complaint, Heitner filed a motion for sequestration of the Delaware property of the individual defendants pursuant to Del. Code Ann., Tit. 10, § 366. The Court of Chancery granted the motion the same day and appointed a sequestrator who seized approximately eighty-two thousand shares of Greyhound common stock belonging to nineteen defendants, along with options belonging to two others and certain debentures, warrants, and stock unit credits. The stock certificates were not physically present in Delaware, but Del. Code Ann., Tit. 8, § 169 deemed the situs of ownership of all stock in Delaware corporations to be in the state, allowing the sequestrator to place stop-transfer orders on the corporation's books. The value of the sequestered stock was approximately one point two million dollars. All twenty-eight defendants received notice of the suit by certified mail to their last known addresses and by publication in a New Castle County newspaper. The twenty-one defendants whose property had been seized entered special appearances and moved to quash service of process and vacate the sequestration order. They argued that the ex parte sequestration procedure violated due process and that they lacked sufficient contacts with Delaware to sustain jurisdiction. The Court of Chancery rejected these arguments in a letter opinion, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A. 2d 225 (1976). The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and heard argument on February 22, 1977. The individual defendants whose property was seized became the appellants before the Court. Greyhound Corporation and its subsidiary appeared in the action and moved to dismiss on the ground that the sequestration statute was unconstitutional. The sequestration order remained in effect pending resolution of the constitutional questions presented.
View caseInterlink Communications sued American Dredging in a Louisiana state court for a maritime injury that occurred offshore. The defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the chosen forum was seriously inconvenient and that a federal court would provide a more appropriate venue.
In 1987, William Robert Miller, a resident of Mississippi, moved to Pennsylvania to seek employment. He was hired by American Dredging Company, a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey, to work as a seaman aboard the MV John R., a tug operating on the Delaware River. During the course of that employment Miller was injured. After receiving medical treatment in Pennsylvania and New York, he returned to Mississippi where he continued to be treated by local physicians. On December 1, 1989, Miller filed this action in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana. He sought relief under the Jones Act, which authorizes a seaman who suffers personal injury in the course of his employment to bring an action for damages at law. State and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over such claims. Miller also requested relief under general maritime law for unseaworthiness, for wages, and for maintenance and cure. The trial court granted American Dredging Company's motion to dismiss the action under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, holding that it was bound to apply that doctrine by federal maritime law. The Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Fourth District affirmed. The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed, holding that Article 123(C) of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, which renders the doctrine of forum non conveniens unavailable in Jones Act and maritime law cases brought in Louisiana state courts, is not preempted by federal maritime law. American Dredging Company filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the United States Supreme Court granted.
View caseIsrael Irving filed an insurance coverage action in Minnesota despite stronger connections to Wisconsin. After the court indicated it might find the forum inconvenient, the parties discussed transfer and the effect on which state's law would govern the policy interpretation.
Ralph Hague, a Wisconsin resident who had been employed in Red Wing, Minnesota, for the fifteen years preceding his death, died of injuries suffered when a motorcycle on which he was a passenger was struck from behind by an automobile. The accident occurred in Pierce County, Wisconsin, immediately across the Minnesota border from Red Wing. The operators of both vehicles were Wisconsin residents, as was the decedent, who resided with respondent in Hager City, Wisconsin. Mr. Hague held a policy issued by petitioner Allstate Insurance Co. covering three automobiles owned by him. The policy contained an uninsured motorist clause insuring him against loss incurred from accidents with uninsured motorists. The uninsured motorist coverage was limited to $15,000 for each automobile. After the accident, respondent moved to Red Wing, Minnesota. She subsequently married a Minnesota resident and established residence with her new husband in Savage, Minnesota. At approximately the same time, a Minnesota Registrar of Probate appointed respondent personal representative of her deceased husband’s estate. Following her appointment, she brought this action in Minnesota District Court seeking a declaration under Minnesota law that the $15,000 uninsured motorist coverage on each of her late husband’s three automobiles could be stacked to provide total coverage of $45,000. Allstate defended on the ground that whether the three uninsured motorist coverages could be stacked should be determined by Wisconsin law. Allstate pointed out that the insurance policy was delivered in Wisconsin, the accident occurred in Wisconsin, and all persons involved were Wisconsin residents at the time of the accident. The Minnesota District Court interpreted Wisconsin law to disallow stacking. Nevertheless, the court concluded that Minnesota’s choice-of-law rules required the application of Minnesota law permitting stacking. The court refused to apply Wisconsin law as inimical to the public policy of Minnesota and granted summary judgment for respondent. The Minnesota Supreme Court, sitting en banc, affirmed the District Court. The court interpreted Wisconsin law to prohibit stacking and applied Minnesota law after analyzing the Minnesota contacts and interests within the analytical framework developed by Professor Leflar. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Full Faith and Credit Clause bars the Minnesota Supreme Court’s choice of substantive Minnesota law.
View caseThe court must determine both that the present forum is seriously inconvenient for trial and that a more appropriate forum is available to the plaintiff.
No. The transferee court must still apply the same state law and choice-of-law rules that the transferor court would have applied.
Yes. Under the UCCJEA, a court may decline jurisdiction on its own motion if it finds the forum inconvenient and another state more appropriate.
Full faith and credit does not require a state to recognize a sister-state injunction that bars suit on the ground that the recognizing state's courts are an inconvenient forum.
…entitled to accept jurisdiction nonetheless remains free to arrange for the transfer of the litigation under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See, e. g. , Broderick v. Rosner , 294 U. S. 629, 643 (1935); Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert , 330 U. S. 501, 504 (1947).