A three-judge panel appoints attorney Lisa Grant to probe only one White House advisor's meetings with lobbyists. Grant receives authority to subpoena records and interview witnesses but holds no broad policymaking role. The advisor challenges the appointment under the Appointments Clause. The panel's selection stands because Grant's narrow duties qualify her as an inferior officer.
Double-Layer Removal Protection Invalidated
Congress creates an accounting oversight board whose members can be removed only for cause by commissioners who themselves enjoy for-cause protection from the President. The board members challenge their removal restrictions. The structure violates separation of powers because the President lacks sufficient control over executive officers.
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board561 U.S. 477, 489, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3150, 177 L. Ed. 2d 706 (2010)
In 2002 Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board as a five-member entity appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Board oversees audits of public companies and possesses authority to inspect registered accounting firms, initiate investigations, and issue sanctions. Beckstead and Watts, LLP, a Nevada accounting firm, registered with the Board. The Board inspected the firm, released a report critical of its auditing procedures, and began a formal investigation.
Free Enterprise Fund, a nonprofit organization of which the firm is a member, and Beckstead and Watts sued the Board and its members, the Commission, and the United States in federal district court. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that the Board's structure violated the Constitution. The district court determined it had jurisdiction and granted summary judgment to the defendants.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in full. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Congress establishes an agency led by a single director removable only for cause and vested with broad rulemaking and enforcement power. A regulated party challenges the director's insulation from presidential oversight. The removal restriction is unconstitutional because the director exercises significant executive authority without adequate presidential supervision.
Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020)
Following the 2008 financial crisis, Congress created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. The agency was tasked with implementing and enforcing a large body of federal consumer financial protection statutes, including the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and the Truth in Lending Act, along with a new prohibition on unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices in the consumer-finance sector. The CFPB is led by a single Director appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate for a five-year term, during which the President may remove the Director only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. The agency receives its funding directly from the Federal Reserve rather than through the annual appropriations process.
In 2017, the CFPB issued a civil investigative demand to Seila Law LLC, a California-based law firm that provides debt-related legal services to clients. The demand sought information and documents related to the firm’s business practices to determine whether Seila Law had engaged in unlawful acts or practices in the advertising, marketing, or sale of debt relief services. Seila Law asked the CFPB to set aside the demand on the ground that the agency’s single-Director structure with for-cause removal protection violated the separation of powers. When the CFPB declined, Seila Law refused to comply, and the CFPB filed a petition in federal district court to enforce the demand.
The district court rejected Seila Law’s constitutional challenge and ordered the firm to comply with the demand. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that Seila Law’s arguments were foreclosed by Humphrey’s Executor v. United States and Morrison v. Olson. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the constitutionality of the CFPB’s structure and, if necessary, the severability of the Director’s removal protection from the remainder of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Immunity Order Blocks Document Use
An independent counsel obtains a subpoena for documents from a witness who invokes the Fifth Amendment. The court grants immunity and compels production. The independent counsel later seeks to use the documents to prepare charges. The Fifth Amendment bars that use because the act of production itself conveys incriminating information.
United States v. Hubbell530 U.S. 27, 35–36 (2000)
In August 1994, an Independent Counsel was appointed to investigate possible violations of federal law relating to the Whitewater Development Corporation.
In December 1994, Webster Hubbell pleaded guilty to charges of mail fraud and tax evasion arising out of his billing practices as a member of an Arkansas law firm from 1989 to 1992.
He was sentenced to 21 months in prison.
As part of the plea agreement, Hubbell promised to provide the Independent Counsel with full, complete, accurate, and truthful information about matters relating to the Whitewater investigation.
While Hubbell was incarcerated in October 1996, the Independent Counsel served him with a subpoena duces tecum calling for the production of 11 categories of documents before a grand jury sitting in Little Rock, Arkansas.
Hubbell appeared before the grand jury and initially invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege.
After being granted immunity pursuant to an order under 18 U.S.C. § 6003(a), he produced 13,120 pages of documents and records.
The documents provided the Independent Counsel with information that led to a second prosecution.
On April 30, 1998, a grand jury in the District of Columbia returned a 10-count indictment charging Hubbell with tax-related crimes and mail and wire fraud.
The District Court dismissed the indictment on the ground that the Independent Counsel's use of the subpoenaed documents violated 18 U.S.C. § 6002.
The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings to determine the extent of the Government's independent knowledge of the documents.
On remand, the Independent Counsel acknowledged that he could not satisfy the reasonable particularity standard and entered into a conditional plea agreement with Hubbell.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the precise scope of a grant of immunity with respect to the production of documents in response to a subpoena.
Sentencing Commission Appointment Upheld
Congress creates a sentencing commission whose members are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. A defendant challenges the commission's composition as an improper delegation. The appointments satisfy the Constitution because the commission members are principal officers selected through the standard process.
Mistretta v. United States488 U.S. 361 (1989)
In 1984, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act to address widespread criticisms that federal sentencing was a national scandal marked by unwarranted disparities and uncertainty. The legislation created the United States Sentencing Commission as an independent commission in the judicial branch consisting of seven voting members. The President appoints the members with the advice and consent of the Senate, and at least three members must be federal judges selected after consideration of recommendations from the Judicial Conference of the United States, while the Attorney General serves as an ex officio nonvoting member.
Petitioner John M. Mistretta was indicted in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri on three counts centering on a cocaine sale. He pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The district court sentenced him under the Guidelines to 18 months' imprisonment to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release, along with a $1,000 fine and a $50 assessment.
Mistretta appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, challenging the constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission and the Guidelines. Both Mistretta and the United States petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari before judgment in the Eighth Circuit. The Court granted the petitions because of the imperative public importance of the issue and the disarray among the federal district courts.
1 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
When is an independent counsel considered an inferior officer under the Appointments Clause?
An independent counsel qualifies as an inferior officer when duties are limited to investigating a narrow range of persons and subjects. Congress may therefore vest appointment in the judiciary rather than requiring presidential nomination and Senate confirmation.
Supporting sources
Examples1
Malpractice Cover-Up Triggers Discipline
Attorney Patel misses a filing deadline on client Ramirez's claim and pays Ramirez personally to conceal the error. Patel never discloses the potential malpractice claim or recommends that Ramirez consult separate counsel. The state bar pursues discipline. The concealment and failure to advise separate representation constitute serious misconduct beyond simple negligence.
2 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
What professional misconduct arises when a lawyer fails to recommend independent counsel after a mistake?
Missing a deadline, paying the client personally to hide the error, and omitting any advice to seek separate counsel for a malpractice claim constitutes serious misconduct. The concealment and conflict of interest justify discipline beyond ordinary negligence.
Supporting sources
How does the presence of independent counsel affect enforceability of a premarital agreement?
Independent counsel helps demonstrate that the waiving spouse understood the rights being altered and entered the agreement voluntarily. Its absence is a significant factor weighing against voluntariness but is not an absolute prerequisite to enforcement.
Supporting sources
487 U.S. 654 (1988)
…constitutional structure. The Framers vested the executive power in a single President to ensure accountability. By creating an independent prosecutor who is not fully accountable to the President, the Act dilutes that accountability. The majority's holding that the independent counsel is an inferior officer cannot be reconciled with the…
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