Also known as: indigent defendants · indigent person · poor defendant
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A criminal defendant who lacks sufficient financial resources to retain private counsel. The status triggers constitutional entitlements to appointed representation at trial for felonies and to other basic tools necessary for an adequate defense when the state initiates the proceeding.
Ivan Ivanov was charged with felony theft in federal court and told the magistrate he had no money for a lawyer. The court denied appointed counsel and proceeded to trial. Ivanov was convicted. The conviction must be reversed because the Sixth Amendment requires appointed counsel for indigent defendants at felony trials.
Imani Idowu faced civil contempt for nonpayment of child support and risked jail time. The opposing parent appeared without counsel and the court gave clear notice about ability to pay plus an opportunity to present evidence. The state did not appoint counsel. Due process did not require appointment under these circumstances.
Ilana Isaacs was charged with murder and her sanity was seriously in question. She could not afford a psychiatrist. The court denied funds for an examination. The denial violated due process because an indigent defendant must receive the basic tools to prepare an effective defense when mental condition is at issue.
Late in 1979, Glen Burton Ake was arrested and charged with murdering a couple and wounding their two children. He was arraigned in the District Court for Canadian County, Oklahoma, in February 1980. His behavior at arraignment and in other prearraignment incidents at the jail was so bizarre that the trial judge, sua sponte, ordered him to be examined by a psychiatrist for the purpose of advising with the Court as to his impressions of whether the Defendant may need an extended period of mental observation. The examining psychiatrist reported that at times Ake appeared to be frankly delusional and claimed to be the sword of vengeance of the Lord. He diagnosed Ake as a probable paranoid schizophrenic and recommended a prolonged psychiatric evaluation to determine whether Ake was competent to stand trial. In March 1980, Ake was committed to a state hospital to be examined with respect to his present sanity. On April 10, the chief forensic psychiatrist informed the court that Ake was not competent to stand trial. The court held a competency hearing at which a psychiatrist testified that Ake was a psychotic with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia chronic with exacerbation, that he was dangerous, and that he required a maximum security facility. The court found Ake to be a mentally ill person in need of care and treatment and incompetent to stand trial, and ordered him committed to the state mental hospital. Six weeks later, the chief forensic psychiatrist informed the court that Ake had become competent to stand trial while receiving 200 milligrams of Thorazine three times daily. At a pretrial conference in June, Ake's attorney informed the court that his client would raise an insanity defense. Counsel requested that a psychiatrist examine Ake with respect to his mental condition at the time of the offense or that the court provide funds for such an examination. The trial judge denied the motion. Ake was tried for two counts of murder in the first degree and two counts of shooting with intent to kill. At the guilt phase, defense counsel called the psychiatrists who had examined Ake at the state hospital, but none testified about his mental state at the time of the offense. The jury rejected the insanity defense and returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. At the sentencing proceeding, the prosecutor relied on the testimony of the state psychiatrists that Ake was dangerous to society. Ake had no expert witness to rebut this testimony or to introduce evidence in mitigation. The jury sentenced Ake to death on each of the two murder counts and to 500 years' imprisonment on each of the two counts of shooting with intent to kill. On appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseIgor Ito was convicted after a jury trial and filed a notice of appeal as of right. He had no funds to hire counsel for the appeal. The state refused appointed counsel. The refusal violated equal protection and due process because an indigent defendant is entitled to counsel on the first appeal as of right.
Bennie Will Meyes and William Douglas were jointly tried and convicted in a California court on an information charging them with thirteen felonies including robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and assault with intent to commit murder. A single public defender was appointed to represent both men. The defender moved for a continuance at the start of trial, citing the complexity of the case, his daily handling of different defenses, and a conflict of interest between the defendants. The motion was denied. The defendants dismissed the defender and renewed their motions for separate counsel and a continuance, but these requests were also denied. A jury convicted both defendants on all thirteen counts, and each received a prison term. Meyes and Douglas appealed as of right to the California District Court of Appeal. That court affirmed their convictions. They then petitioned the California Supreme Court for further review, but the petitions were denied without a hearing. The defendants requested the assistance of counsel on appeal to the District Court of Appeal. The court denied their requests after reviewing the record and concluding that appointment of counsel would serve no useful purpose. The defendants were indigent at the time of these requests. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the case.
View caseIris Irons was convicted after appointed counsel failed to investigate key alibi witnesses. She later showed both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. The conviction was set aside because the Sixth Amendment guarantees effective assistance even when counsel is appointed for an indigent defendant.
In September 1976, respondent David Washington committed a series of crimes over a ten-day period in the Miami area that included three brutal stabbing murders along with torture, kidnapping, severe assaults, attempted murders, attempted extortion, and theft. After his two accomplices were arrested, Washington surrendered to police and gave a lengthy statement confessing to the third criminal episode. The State of Florida indicted him for kidnapping and murder and appointed an experienced criminal lawyer to represent him. Washington waived his right to a jury trial against counsel's advice and pleaded guilty to all charges, including the three capital murder counts. In the plea colloquy he stated that he had committed a string of burglaries but had no significant prior criminal record and that he had been under extreme stress caused by his inability to support his family. Counsel spoke with Washington about his background, contacted his wife and mother by telephone, but did not seek out character witnesses or request a psychiatric examination. At the sentencing hearing before the trial judge, counsel's strategy relied primarily on the plea colloquy to convey remorse and emotional stress and argued that these factors justified sparing Washington the death penalty. Counsel successfully moved to exclude Washington's rap sheet and decided not to request a presentence report because it would have included his criminal history. The trial judge found multiple aggravating circumstances for each murder and no mitigating circumstances, sentencing Washington to death on each of the three murder counts. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Washington sought collateral relief in state court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on six grounds including failure to request a psychiatric report, investigate and present character witnesses, and seek a presentence investigation report. He submitted fourteen affidavits from friends, neighbors, and relatives willing to testify and two reports from a psychiatrist and psychologist. The state trial court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. Washington then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. After an evidentiary hearing at which trial counsel testified, the District Court denied relief, concluding that although counsel made errors in judgment by failing to investigate mitigating evidence further, no prejudice resulted. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for application of a new framework it developed for analyzing ineffectiveness claims. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the proper standards for judging claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a capital sentencing proceeding.
View caseIsaiah Ishikawa was convicted of a misdemeanor and sought to appeal. He could not afford the trial transcript needed to show error. The state supplied only a partial record. Equal protection required the state to furnish a complete transcript so the indigent defendant's appeal would be as effective as one pursued by a paying defendant.
Griffin and Crenshaw were tried together and convicted of armed robbery in the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois. Immediately after their conviction, they filed a motion in the trial court asking that a certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the proceedings, be furnished to them without cost. They alleged that they were poor persons with no means of paying the necessary fees to acquire the transcript and court records needed to prosecute an appeal. These allegations were not denied. Under Illinois law, full direct appellate review of alleged errors by a writ of error requires the defendant to furnish the appellate court with a bill of exceptions or report of proceedings at the trial certified by the trial judge. As Illinois concedes, it is sometimes impossible to prepare such bills of exceptions or reports without a stenographic transcript of the trial proceedings. Indigent defendants sentenced to death are provided with a free transcript at the expense of the county where convicted. In all other criminal cases, defendants needing a transcript, whether indigent or not, must themselves buy it. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. Griffin and Crenshaw then filed a petition under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Only questions arising under the Illinois or Federal Constitution may be raised in proceedings under this Act. A companion state act provides that indigent petitioners under the Post-Conviction Act may, under some circumstances, obtain a free transcript. The effect is that indigents may obtain a free transcript to obtain appellate review of constitutional questions but not of other alleged trial errors such as admissibility and sufficiency of evidence. In their Post-Conviction proceeding, petitioners alleged that there were manifest nonconstitutional errors in the trial which entitled them to have their convictions set aside on appeal. The only impediment to full appellate review was their lack of funds to buy a transcript. These allegations have not been denied. This petition, like the first, was dismissed without hearing any evidence. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal solely on the ground that the charges raised no substantial state or federal constitutional questions. Counsel for Illinois concedes that these petitioners needed a transcript in order to get adequate appellate review of their alleged trial errors. There is no contention that petitioners were dilatory in their efforts to get appellate review, or that the Illinois Supreme Court denied review on the ground that the allegations of trial error were insufficient. We must therefore assume for purposes of this decision that errors were committed in the trial which would merit reversal. The petitioners could not get appellate review of those errors solely because they were too poor to buy a stenographic transcript. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseNo. The right applies at trial for felonies and at other critical stages where incarceration is possible. It does not automatically extend to every misdemeanor or to civil contempt proceedings even when jail is a possible outcome.
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The court must inquire into the changed circumstances and appoint counsel if the defendant can no longer afford representation. A prior waiver does not remain effective once the factual basis for it disappears.
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Yes. When an indigent defendant's mental condition is seriously in question, due process requires the state to provide psychiatric examination and assistance necessary to prepare an effective defense.
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An indigent defendant is entitled to appointed counsel on the first appeal as of right. The state must also supply a free transcript when it is necessary for effective appellate review.
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No. Imprisoning an indigent defendant beyond the statutory maximum solely because of inability to pay a fine or costs violates equal protection.
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…and paying him enough to ensure he prepares thoroughly, usually can obtain better representation than that available to an indigent defendant, who must rely on appointed counsel, who, in turn, has limited time and resources to devote to a given case. Is a "reasonably competent attorney" a reasonably competent adequately paid…