/in-EK-spli-kuh-bul by AN-ee-thing but AN-i-mus/·phrase
Also known as:inexplicable except by animus · animus · bare animus
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A description of a classification or government action for which no legitimate purpose can be identified. Courts then conclude that the measure rests on impermissible prejudice or hostility rather than any rational basis.
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How its tested
Common Examples
6
Visa Restrictions Challenged
Alpha Framing, a construction firm, challenged an executive order temporarily barring skilled workers from several majority-Muslim nations. The order recited national-security concerns tied to infrastructure projects in State A. Because the stated rationale aligned with legitimate vetting needs and the order applied only temporarily, the court found the measure rationally related to security and rejected the claim that it was inexplicable by anything but animus.
Baker Refuses Custom Order
Masterpiece Cakeshop declined to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple. State officials then pursued enforcement with evident hostility toward the baker's religious beliefs. The commission's treatment of the case revealed comments and procedures showing the decision was inexplicable by anything but animus toward religion.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)
In the summer of 2012, Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins, a same-sex couple planning to marry legally in Massachusetts and host a reception in Denver, visited Masterpiece Cakeshop in Lakewood, Colorado, owned and operated by Jack Phillips. Phillips, an expert baker and devout Christian who had owned the shop for twenty-four years, informed the couple that he would not create a wedding cake for their same-sex wedding because of his religious opposition to same-sex marriage. He offered to sell them other baked goods such as birthday cakes, shower cakes, cookies, and brownies. Craig and Mullins filed a discrimination complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights Division alleging that they had been denied full and equal service because of their sexual orientation in violation of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act.
The Division investigated the complaint. It found probable cause that Phillips had violated the Act. The Division determined that on multiple occasions he had turned away potential customers on the basis of sexual orientation. Phillips had declined to sell custom wedding cakes to about six other same-sex couples. The matter was referred to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The Commission sent the case to a state Administrative Law Judge for a formal hearing.
The ALJ granted summary judgment in favor of Craig and Mullins after rejecting Phillips' constitutional claims. The Commission affirmed the decision in full. It ordered Phillips to cease and desist from discriminating against same-sex couples. The Commission also required comprehensive staff training on the public accommodations provisions of the Act. Phillips had to submit quarterly compliance reports for two years documenting patrons denied service.
Phillips appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Commission's legal determinations and remedial order in 2016. The Colorado Supreme Court declined to hear the case. During public hearings before the Commission in May and July 2014, some commissioners stated that religious beliefs cannot legitimately be carried into the public sphere or commercial domain. They described Phillips' invocation of his sincerely held religious beliefs as one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use. They compared it to defenses of slavery and the Holocaust. In three separate cases decided while Phillips' proceedings were pending, the Civil Rights Division concluded that other bakers had acted lawfully in declining to create cakes with decorations or messages that demeaned gay persons or gay marriages.
Phillips petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which the Court granted in 2017.
After a guilty verdict, two jurors reported that a fellow juror had made explicit statements invoking racial stereotypes about the defendant. The trial court considered affidavits showing the statements reflected racial animus as a significant motivating factor in the vote. Because the comments could not be explained by any legitimate view of the evidence, the court found the verdict inexplicable by anything but animus.
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado137 S. Ct. 855, 861 (2017)
In 2007, two teenage sisters were sexually assaulted in the bathroom of a Colorado horse-racing facility. The girls identified the assailant as a racetrack employee, and police arrested Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez. Each girl separately identified him as the man who assaulted her. State prosecutors charged Peña-Rodriguez with harassment, unlawful sexual contact, and attempted sexual assault on a child.
Before the jury was empaneled, members of the venire received a written questionnaire asking if anything would make it difficult to be a fair juror. The court and defense counsel repeatedly asked prospective jurors whether they could be fair and impartial. None of the empaneled jurors expressed reservations based on racial bias. After a three-day trial, the jury convicted Peña-Rodriguez of unlawful sexual contact and harassment but failed to reach a verdict on the attempted sexual assault charge.
When the jury was discharged, the court gave the mandated instruction that whether jurors discussed the case was their own decision. Following discharge, two jurors remained in the jury room to speak privately with defense counsel. They reported that during deliberations another juror, identified as H.C., had expressed anti-Hispanic bias toward Peña-Rodriguez and his alibi witness. With the trial court's supervision, counsel obtained sworn affidavits from the two jurors.
The affidavits stated that H.C. said Mexican men had a bravado that caused them to believe they could do whatever they wanted with women. The affidavits further stated that nine times out of ten Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive toward women and young girls. H.C. believed Peña-Rodriguez was guilty because he is Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want. H.C. did not find the alibi witness credible because the witness was an illegal.
The trial court acknowledged H.C.'s apparent bias. It denied Peña-Rodriguez's motion for a new trial on the ground that Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b) generally prohibits a juror from testifying about statements made during deliberations in a proceeding inquiring into the validity of the verdict. A divided panel of the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the statements did not fall within an exception to the rule. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed by a 4-3 vote.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether there is a constitutional exception to the no-impeachment rule for instances of racial bias.
Mississippi University for Women maintained a policy excluding men from its nursing program. The state offered no credible justification tied to educational quality or privacy that explained the exclusion. The Supreme Court concluded the single-sex rule was inexplicable by anything but animus toward men seeking the same professional training.
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan458 U.S. 718 (1982)
In 1884, the Mississippi Legislature created the Mississippi Industrial Institute and College for the Education of White Girls of the State of Mississippi, now the oldest state-supported all-female college in the United States and known today as Mississippi University for Women (MUW). The school has limited its enrollment to women since its founding.
In 1971, MUW established a School of Nursing initially offering a 2-year associate degree. Three years later the school added a 4-year baccalaureate program in nursing and today also offers a graduate program. Joe Hogan is a registered nurse who does not hold a baccalaureate degree in nursing. Since 1974 he has worked as a nursing supervisor in a medical center in Columbus, the city where MUW is located.
In 1979 Hogan applied for admission to the MUW School of Nursing's baccalaureate program. Although otherwise qualified, he was denied admission solely because of his sex. School officials informed him that he could audit courses but could not enroll for credit. Hogan filed an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi claiming that the single-sex admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He sought injunctive and declaratory relief as well as compensatory damages.
Following a hearing, the District Court denied preliminary injunctive relief. When Hogan offered no further evidence, the District Court entered summary judgment in favor of the State. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the admissions policy discriminates on the basis of gender. On rehearing the State contended that Congress in enacting section 901(a)(5) of Title IX expressly authorized MUW to continue its single-sex admissions policy. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
City officials discarded the results of a firefighter promotion exam because minority candidates had not performed as well. No evidence showed the test was invalid or that discarding the results served any legitimate nondiscriminatory goal. The decision was therefore inexplicable by anything but animus toward the higher-scoring applicants.
Ricci v. DeStefano557 U.S. 557 (2009)
In 2003, the City of New Haven hired Industrial/Organizational Solutions, Inc. to develop and administer promotional examinations for lieutenant and captain positions in its fire department pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement that required a written component weighted at 60 percent and an oral component weighted at 40 percent.
IOS performed job analyses that deliberately oversampled minority firefighters to avoid unintentional bias favoring white candidates. The examinations were administered in November and December 2003.
Seventy-seven candidates completed the lieutenant examination. Forty-one candidates completed the captain examination. The results showed pass rates of 58.1 percent for white candidates, 31.6 percent for Hispanic candidates, and 31.6 percent for black candidates on the lieutenant exam. Pass rates on the captain exam were 64.3 percent for white candidates, 37.5 percent for Hispanic candidates, and 0 percent for black candidates.
Under the rule of three, the top ten candidates eligible for lieutenant promotion were all white. The top nine candidates eligible for captain promotion were seven whites and two Hispanics. After the results were released, the City held five public hearings before its Civil Service Board between January and March 2004.
At those hearings, IOS vice president Chad Legel described the test-development process. Testing consultant Christopher Hornick criticized the 60/40 weighting and recommended assessment centers. Retired fire captain Vincent Lewis reviewed the content. Boston College professor Janet Helms discussed possible cultural bias in the job-analysis questionnaires. City officials including corporation counsel Thomas Ude and human-resources director Tina Burgett urged non-certification on the ground that the statistical disparity would expose the City to liability. Several candidates who had passed the exams urged certification. The Board deadlocked 2-2 and declined to certify the results.
Seventeen white firefighters and one Hispanic firefighter who had passed the examinations sued the City, Mayor John DeStefano, and other officials in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, alleging violations of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in a per curiam opinion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
During jury selection in a paternity and child-support case, the state used peremptory challenges to remove all male jurors. The prosecutor offered no explanation linked to the facts of the case that justified striking every man. The pattern was inexplicable by anything but animus on the basis of gender.
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.511 U.S. 127 (1994)
The State of Alabama filed a complaint for paternity and child support against J. E. B. on behalf of T. B., the mother of a minor child, in the District Court of Jackson County, Alabama. On October 21, 1991, the matter was called for trial and jury selection began with a panel of 36 potential jurors, 12 males and 24 females. After the court excused three jurors for cause, only 10 of the remaining 33 jurors were male.
The State then used 9 of its 10 peremptory strikes to remove male jurors, while petitioner used all but one of his strikes to remove female jurors, resulting in an all-female jury. Before the jury was empaneled, petitioner objected to the State's peremptory challenges on the ground that they were exercised against male jurors solely on the basis of gender. The court rejected the objection and empaneled the all-female jury, which found petitioner to be the father of the child and ordered him to pay child support.
On postjudgment motion, the court reaffirmed its ruling. The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment at 606 So. 2d 156 (1992), and the Supreme Court of Alabama denied certiorari.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari at 508 U. S. 905 (1993) to resolve the question of whether the Equal Protection Clause forbids peremptory challenges on the basis of gender.
When does a policy become inexplicable by anything but animus?
A policy meets this description when no legitimate governmental interest can be identified to support it. Courts then infer that the measure rests on prejudice rather than any rational basis.
Supporting sources
Does evidence of animus automatically invalidate an otherwise legitimate policy?
No. When the policy text supplies a legitimate purpose and the action is rationally related to that purpose, courts uphold it even if stray statements suggest animus.
Supporting sources
How does the standard apply in immigration and foreign-affairs cases?
Courts apply at most rational-basis review and defer to the political branches. A facially neutral national-security rationale ordinarily defeats a claim that the action is inexplicable by anything but animus.
Supporting sources
576 U.S. 644 (2015)
…Clause protects intimate personal choices. Lawrence v. Texas , 539 U. S. 558. The Court has also invalidated laws based on the animus toward a class of people. See Romer v. Evans , 517 U. S. 620. Against this background, the legal question of same-sex marriage must be addressed. Pp. 10–15. (2) The nature of marriage is…