Also known as:inherently suspect classification · inherently suspect classifications · suspect classification · strict scrutiny trigger
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A classification that the Supreme Court has identified as warranting strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause because it rests on a characteristic such as race or alienage that historically has been used to disadvantage discrete and insular minorities.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Police Retirement Age Challenge
Isaac Irving, a physically fit fifty-one-year-old officer, challenged a city rule requiring retirement at age fifty. The court applied rational basis review because age is not a characteristic that triggers strict scrutiny. The rule survived because it was rationally related to maintaining a capable force.
School Assignment by Race
Isla Ireland's children were assigned to schools based solely on their race to achieve demographic balance. The court subjected the policy to strict scrutiny because racial classifications are inherently suspect and require a compelling interest and narrow tailoring.
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1551 U.S. 701, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 168 L. Ed. 2d 508 (2007)
In the late 1990s the Seattle School District No. 1 adopted a student assignment plan for its ten regular public high schools. Incoming ninth graders ranked preferences among schools. The district applied a series of tiebreakers when schools were oversubscribed. The second tiebreaker classified students as white or nonwhite.
It selected students whose race would bring an integration-positive school within ten percentage points of the district-wide balance of 41 percent white and 59 percent nonwhite. The plan affected assignments at five oversubscribed schools in the 2000-2001 school year. Petitioner Parents Involved in Community Schools filed suit in the Western District of Washington in July 2000 alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause.
Jefferson County Public Schools had been under a 1975 federal desegregation decree. The decree was dissolved in 2000 after a finding of unitary status. The district adopted a voluntary assignment plan in 2001. The plan required all nonmagnet schools to maintain black enrollment between 15 and 50 percent. The plan grouped elementary schools into clusters.
It assigned kindergartners and new students within clusters according to space and racial guidelines. It denied transfer requests that would push a school outside the guidelines. Approximately 34 percent of the district's 97,000 students were black. When Crystal Meredith moved into the district in August 2002 she sought to enroll her son Joshua in kindergarten at Bloom Elementary one mile from their home.
The district denied the intercluster transfer from Young Elementary because it would adversely affect desegregation compliance at Young which was then 46.8 percent black. Meredith filed suit in the Western District of Kentucky alleging an Equal Protection violation. The Seattle District Court granted summary judgment to the district in 2001. The Ninth Circuit en banc affirmed the federal constitutional ruling in 2005. The District Court found that Jefferson County had asserted a compelling interest in maintaining racially diverse schools, and that the assignment plan was in all relevant respects narrowly tailored to serve that compelling interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in a per curiam opinion relying upon the reasoning of the District Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases in 2006.
India Inoue sued after the city authorized a cable company to install equipment on her building without consent. The court treated the permanent physical occupation as a per se taking rather than evaluating it under an equal protection framework that would require an inherently suspect classification.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982)
In 1970, Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. obtained a permit from New York City to operate a cable television system in Manhattan. It entered into an agreement with the prior owner of a five-story apartment building at 303 West 105th Street to install cables on the roof in exchange for a flat fee of $50 per year.
The installation included a cable slightly less than one-half inch in diameter and approximately 30 feet in length running along the roof about 18 inches above the surface. It also included directional taps measuring approximately 4 inches by 4 inches by 4 inches on the front and rear of the roof. Two large silver boxes were placed along the roof cables. Additional cable was extended another 4 to 6 feet. All components were attached by screws or nails penetrating the masonry at approximately two-foot intervals.
In 1971, Jean Loretto purchased the building. At the time of purchase the cable installation was already in place as part of a larger network serving adjacent buildings, though Loretto did not discover its existence until after she took possession. Two years later Teleprompter connected a noncrossover line by dropping a cable down the front of the building to serve Loretto's own tenants.
In 1973 the New York Legislature enacted section 828 of the Executive Law, effective January 1, 1973, which prohibited landlords from interfering with cable television installations on their property, barred landlords from demanding payment from tenants for permitting service, and limited any payment from a cable company to an amount the State Commission on Cable Television determined to be reasonable; the Commission later set the presumptive fee at a one-time $1 payment.
In 1976 Loretto filed a class action against Teleprompter in New York Supreme Court on behalf of all owners of real property in the state on which Teleprompter had placed cable components, alleging trespass and a taking without just compensation and seeking damages and injunctive relief; the City of New York, which had granted Teleprompter an exclusive franchise for parts of Manhattan, intervened as a defendant.
The Supreme Court, Special Term, granted summary judgment to Teleprompter and the city. The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the statute. The Supreme Court of the United States noted probable jurisdiction.
Ilana Isaacs challenged a property-tax system that produced lower funding in poorer districts. The court applied rational basis review because wealth is not an inherently suspect classification and education is not a fundamental right.
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez411 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 127, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1973)
In the summer of 1968 Mexican-American parents whose children attended elementary and secondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School District in San Antonio Texas brought a class action. They sued on behalf of schoolchildren throughout the state who were members of minority groups or who were poor and resided in school districts having a low property tax base. Named as defendants were the State Board of Education the Commissioner of Education the State Attorney General and the Bexar County Board of Trustees. The complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. A three-judge court was impaneled in January 1969.
The Texas system of financing public education originated with the state's first constitution in 1845. It evolved through constitutional amendments permitting local school districts to levy ad valorem taxes for school buildings and maintenance. These local revenues were supplemented by distributions from the state's Permanent School Fund established in 1854 and the Available School Fund.
In the late 1940s the legislature enacted the Minimum Foundation School Program. Under the program the state supplies approximately 80 percent of the cost of teacher salaries operating expenses and transportation. Each district contributes the remaining 20 percent through a Local Fund Assignment. The assignment is calculated by an economic index reflecting relative taxpaying ability. Every district also levies additional local property taxes beyond the assignment to supplement its foundation grant.
For the 1967-1968 school year the Edgewood Independent School District had an average assessed property value of $5960 per pupil and a median family income of $4686. It raised $26 per pupil through local taxation at a rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed valuation. It received $222 per pupil from the Foundation Program and obtained $108 in federal funds for a total of $356 per pupil. By comparison the Alamo Heights Independent School District had an assessed property value exceeding $49000 per pupil and a median family income of $8001. It raised $333 per pupil locally at a rate of $0.85 per $100 received $225 from the Foundation Program and $36 in federal funds for a total of $594 per pupil. Similar disparities in per-pupil expenditures existed throughout the state. They were largely attributable to differences in the amount of taxable property within each district.
In December 1971 the three-judge District Court rendered judgment holding the Texas school finance system unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The State appealed. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1972 to consider the constitutional questions presented.
Ike Ingram was denied admission after a public program automatically awarded substantial points to applicants from favored racial groups. The court applied strict scrutiny because racial classifications are inherently suspect and the mechanical point system failed narrow tailoring.
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke438 U.S. 265, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 57 L. Ed. 2d 750 (1978)
The Medical School of the University of California at Davis opened in 1968 with an entering class of 50 students. In 1971 the size of the entering class was increased to 100 students, a level at which it remains. The first class contained three Asians but no blacks, no Mexican-Americans, and no American Indians. Over the next two years the faculty devised a special admissions program to increase the representation of disadvantaged students in each Medical School class. The special program consisted of a separate admissions system operating in coordination with the regular admissions process.
Under the regular admissions procedure candidates whose overall undergraduate grade point averages fell below 2.5 on a scale of 4.0 were summarily rejected. About one out of six applicants was invited for a personal interview. Following the interviews each candidate was rated on a scale of 1 to 100 by his interviewers and four other members of the admissions committee. The ratings were added together to arrive at each candidate's benchmark score. Since five committee members rated each candidate in 1973 a perfect score was 500. In 1974 six members rated each candidate so that a perfect score was 600. The full committee then reviewed the file and scores of each applicant and made offers of admission on a rolling basis.
The special admissions program operated with a separate committee a majority of whom were members of minority groups. Special candidates did not have to meet the 2.5 grade point average cutoff applied to regular applicants. The special committee continued to recommend special applicants until a number prescribed by faculty vote were admitted. While the overall class size was still 50 the prescribed number was 8. In 1973 and 1974 when the class size had doubled to 100 the prescribed number of special admissions also doubled to 16. From the year of the increase in class size through 1974 the special program resulted in the admission of 21 black students 30 Mexican-Americans and 12 Asians for a total of 63 minority students. Over the same period the regular admissions program produced 1 black 6 Mexican-Americans and 37 Asians for a total of 44 minority students. Although disadvantaged whites applied to the special program in large numbers none received an offer of admission through that process.
Allan Bakke is a white male who applied to the Davis Medical School in both 1973 and 1974. Despite a strong benchmark score of 468 out of 500 Bakke was rejected. His total was 549 out of 600. Again Bakke's application was rejected. In both years applicants were admitted under the special program with grade point averages MCAT scores and benchmark scores significantly lower than Bakke's.
After the second rejection Bakke filed the instant suit in the Superior Court of California. He sought mandatory injunctive and declaratory relief compelling his admission to the Medical School. He alleged that the Medical School's special admissions program operated to exclude him from the school on the basis of his race in violation of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Art. I § 21 of the California Constitution and § 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. The trial court found that the special program operated as a racial quota because minority applicants in the special program were rated only against one another and 16 places in the class of 100 were reserved for them. The court refused to order Bakke's admission however holding that he had failed to carry his burden of proving that he would have been admitted but for the existence of the special program. The California court accepted the findings of the trial court with respect to the University's program. On this basis the court initially ordered a remand for the purpose of determining whether under the newly allocated burden of proof Bakke would have been admitted to either the 1973 or the 1974 entering class in the absence of the special admissions program. In its petition for rehearing below however the University conceded its inability to carry that burden. The California court thereupon amended its opinion to direct that the trial court enter judgment ordering Bakke's admission to the Medical School. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the important constitutional issue.
Idina Iverson's children were barred from public school because of their immigration status. The court applied heightened review because the classification burdened a discrete group in a manner that implicated equal protection concerns beyond ordinary rational basis.
Plyler v. Doe457 U.S. 202, 231 (1982)
Since the late 19th century the United States has restricted immigration into this country. Unsanctioned entry is a crime and those who enter unlawfully are subject to deportation, yet a substantial number of persons have succeeded in unlawfully entering and now live within various States including Texas.
In May 1975 the Texas Legislature revised its education laws to withhold state funds from local school districts for the education of children not legally admitted into the United States. The revision also authorized local districts to deny enrollment to such children under Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.031.
In September 1977 a class action was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas on behalf of school-age children of Mexican origin residing in Smith County who could not establish legal admission. The suit challenged their exclusion from the Tyler Independent School District schools, and the State of Texas intervened as a defendant.
After certifying a class of all undocumented school-age children of Mexican origin in the district, the court held an extensive hearing in December 1977. It found that the statute had neither the purpose nor effect of keeping illegal aliens out of Texas, that enrollment increases stemmed primarily from legal residents, and that barring undocumented children would save money but would not necessarily improve education quality.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the injunction. During 1978 and 1979 additional suits were filed in other Texas districts. The Judicial Panel on Multi-district Litigation consolidated them in the Southern District of Texas. After a hearing the district court held the statute violated equal protection, the Court of Appeals summarily affirmed, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and consolidated the cases.
Which classifications does the Court treat as inherently suspect?
The Court treats classifications based on race, alienage, and national origin as inherently suspect and therefore subject to strict scrutiny. Sex-based classifications receive intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny.
Does age qualify as an inherently suspect classification?
No. Age is not an inherently suspect classification, so age-based distinctions receive only rational basis review even when they affect physically fit individuals.
What level of scrutiny applies once a classification is deemed inherently suspect?
Strict scrutiny applies. The government must show that the classification serves a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.
Is wealth an inherently suspect classification?
No. Wealth-based distinctions receive rational basis review, as do disparities in school funding that result from local property taxes.
How does the term function in an equal protection challenge to a facially neutral law?
A facially neutral law that produces a disparate impact on a suspect class does not trigger strict scrutiny unless the plaintiff proves discriminatory purpose. The classification itself must be inherently suspect to invoke that standard.
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
…protection claim must fail, since it is not to be judged by the strictscrutiny standard employed when a fundamental interest or suspect classification is involved, see, e. g. , Dunn v. Blumstein , 405 U. S. 330 (1972), and Korematsu v. United States , 323 U. S. 214 (1944), or by the somewhat less strict standard of Craig v. Boren ,…