Also known as: initial aggressor · aggressor rule
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A principle in self-defense doctrine providing that a person who initiates unlawful force against another forfeits the right to claim self-defense unless the person first withdraws from the encounter and communicates that withdrawal. The rule applies even in jurisdictions that otherwise eliminate any duty to retreat from a dwelling or workplace.
India Inoue angrily confronted her coworker inside their shared barn office over work assignments. She shoved him backward into a desk and advanced while raising a heavy chain. When he grabbed a pitchfork to defend himself, she claimed self-defense at trial. Because she had initiated the physical aggression, the court held that she retained a duty to retreat from the workplace before using force.
Ivy Ibarra angrily confronted the bank security guard in the lobby about her car being booted. She shoved the guard first. When the guard stepped forward with a baton, she drew a handgun and shot him. Because she had started the physical encounter and could have safely exited through a nearby door, her self-defense claim failed under the initial aggressor rule.
Judy Norman was tried at the 16 February 1987 Criminal Session of Superior Court for Rutherford County upon a proper indictment charging her with the first degree murder of her husband, John Thomas Norman. The jury found the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, and the trial court sentenced her to six years imprisonment. The Court of Appeals granted a new trial, and the Supreme Court of North Carolina granted review. On the night of 12 June 1985, Deputy Sheriff R.H. Epley of the Rutherford County Sheriff's Department was called to the Norman residence. He found John Thomas Norman lying on a bed with his face toward the wall. He was dead from three gunshot wounds to the back of the head, two of which caused fatal brain injury. His blood alcohol level was .12 percent. Later that night the defendant told Epley, after waiving her rights, that her husband had beaten her all day and made her lie on the floor while he slept on the bed. After he fell asleep she carried her grandchild to her mother's house. She took a pistol from her mother's purse, returned, fixed the gun after it jammed, and shot her husband three times in the back of the head. The defendant presented evidence of a long history of physical and mental abuse by her husband due to his alcoholism over the nearly twenty-five years of their marriage. Her husband frequently assaulted her by slapping, punching, kicking, striking her with objects, throwing glasses and beer bottles at her, putting her cigarettes out on her, throwing hot coffee on her, breaking glass against her face, and crushing food on her face. He forced her to make money through prostitution, called her "dog," "bitch," and "whore," made her eat pet food and bark like a dog, made her sleep on the floor, deprived her of food, and threatened numerous times to kill or maim her. On 10 June 1985 the husband, while intoxicated, assaulted the defendant at a rest area off I-85 near Kings Mountain where she was engaging in prostitution. He was arrested for driving while impaired. He was released the next morning on bond paid by the defendant's mother and resumed drinking and abusing her. On 11 June, sheriff's deputies responded to calls at the residence after the defendant said her husband had been beating her all day. She later took a bottle of pills and was taken to the hospital for treatment. While there, she expressed anger toward her husband and threatened to kill him. On 12 June the defendant went to the mental health center to discuss filing charges and possible commitment of her husband. She confronted him with that possibility. Her husband followed her to the social services office where he interrupted her interview. That evening after her husband fell asleep the defendant took their grandchild to her mother's house, returned with the pistol, and shot him. Two expert witnesses in forensic psychology and psychiatry who examined the defendant after the shooting testified that she fit the profile of battered wife syndrome. They testified that she believed she was unable to escape or expect help from others. They also testified that killing her husband appeared reasonably necessary to her at the time.
View caseIbrahim Iqbal cornered a crew member on the cargo ship, shouted in his face, and jabbed him repeatedly in the ribs with the stated intent to teach him a lesson. When the crew member shoved him away, Iqbal fired a flare gun into the crew member's chest. Because Iqbal had purposely provoked the use of force in the same encounter to create a pretext for serious harm, the initial aggressor rule barred his self-defense justification.
On December 22, 1984, Troy Canty, Darryl Cabey, James Ramseur, and Barry Allen boarded an IRT express subway train in The Bronx. The four youths rode together in the rear portion of the seventh car. Two of them, Ramseur and Cabey, carried screwdrivers inside their coats to break into video machine coin boxes. Bernhard Goetz boarded the same train at 14th Street in Manhattan and sat in the rear section of that car while carrying an unlicensed .38 caliber pistol loaded with five rounds. Canty approached Goetz and said “give me five dollars.” Goetz stood up, pulled out his handgun, and fired four shots in rapid succession. The first shot hit Canty in the chest. The second struck Allen in the back. The third went through Ramseur’s arm and into his left side. The fourth was fired at Cabey but missed. Goetz then fired a fifth shot at Cabey, who was sitting on a bench, and the bullet severed Cabey’s spinal cord. Goetz told the conductor that the four youths had tried to rob him. Goetz then fled between cars onto the tracks. On December 31, 1984, Goetz surrendered to police in Concord, New Hampshire. After receiving Miranda warnings, he gave two tape-recorded statements in which he admitted carrying the handgun illegally in New York City for three years. Goetz described the incident in detail, stating that he had established a pattern of fire from left to right with the intention to murder the four youths and make them suffer as much as possible. Goetz also stated that if he had had more bullets he would have shot them again and again. A first Grand Jury in January 1985 indicted Goetz only on three weapons-possession counts and dismissed all charges arising from the shootings. After the People obtained an order authorizing resubmission, a second Grand Jury heard testimony from Canty and Ramseur plus four passengers and received the tapes of Goetz’s statements. On March 27, 1985, the second Grand Jury returned a ten-count indictment charging four counts of attempted murder, four counts of assault in the first degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. On October 14, 1985, Goetz moved to dismiss the second indictment. While the motion was pending, a New York Daily News column reported an interview in which Cabey stated that the other three youths had approached Goetz intending to rob him. A police officer informed the prosecutor that Canty had told him at the scene “we were going to rob [Goetz].” On January 21, 1986, Criminal Term dismissed all counts of the second indictment except reckless endangerment. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal.
View caseNo. Harsh words or prior mocking do not constitute initial aggression under the rule. Physical initiation of force, such as shoving or cornering another person, is required before the disqualification applies.
Supporting sources
Yes. An initial aggressor may regain the defense by withdrawing from the conflict and successfully communicating that withdrawal to the other person before using force in response.
Yes. Even though a person generally need not retreat from a place of work, the rule restores the duty to retreat when the actor was the initial aggressor in that location.
Supporting sources
Conduct such as arming oneself in advance, issuing physical dares, or systematically escalating a dispute with the intent to create an excuse for using deadly force qualifies as purposeful provocation that bars self-defense.
Supporting sources
…Subdivision (1) contains certain exceptions to this general authorization to use force, such as where the actor himself was the initial aggressor. : Section 35.15 (2) (a) further provides, however, that even under these circumstances a person ordinarily must retreat “if he knows that he can with complete safety as to himself…