A direct personal verbal attack likely to provoke an immediate violent response. Such language receives no First Amendment protection when it constitutes fighting words.
2
Grossly offensive speech or conduct inflicted by a public utility employee on a patron. The utility is subject to tort liability for such insults.
3
Sense 1
1
Sense 1
A direct personal verbal attack likely to provoke an immediate violent response. Such language receives no First Amendment protection when it constitutes fighting words.
See Our Sources· 1 primary source
Cases
Examples
Sense 2
2
Sense 2
Grossly offensive speech or conduct inflicted by a public utility employee on a patron. The utility is subject to tort liability for such insults.
See Our Sources· 1 source
Restatements
Examples
Sense 3
3
Sense 3
Insulting or taunting speech uttered with purpose to harass another in a manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response.
Insulting or taunting speech uttered with purpose to harass another in a manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
2
Viewpoint-Based Ordinance Struck Down
Isabella Ingram shouted racial epithets at a passerby during a protest. City police arrested her under an ordinance that punished only insults based on race or religion. The court dismissed the charge because the ordinance singled out disfavored viewpoints within the fighting-words category.
Race-Conscious Admissions Upheld
Idris Ives, a white applicant, challenged a medical school's admissions program that considered race to remedy past discrimination. The court upheld the program because it did not demean or insult any racial group.
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke438 U.S. 265, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 57 L. Ed. 2d 750 (1978)
The Medical School of the University of California at Davis opened in 1968 with an entering class of 50 students. In 1971 the size of the entering class was increased to 100 students, a level at which it remains. The first class contained three Asians but no blacks, no Mexican-Americans, and no American Indians. Over the next two years the faculty devised a special admissions program to increase the representation of disadvantaged students in each Medical School class. The special program consisted of a separate admissions system operating in coordination with the regular admissions process.
Under the regular admissions procedure candidates whose overall undergraduate grade point averages fell below 2.5 on a scale of 4.0 were summarily rejected. About one out of six applicants was invited for a personal interview. Following the interviews each candidate was rated on a scale of 1 to 100 by his interviewers and four other members of the admissions committee. The ratings were added together to arrive at each candidate's benchmark score. Since five committee members rated each candidate in 1973 a perfect score was 500. In 1974 six members rated each candidate so that a perfect score was 600. The full committee then reviewed the file and scores of each applicant and made offers of admission on a rolling basis.
The special admissions program operated with a separate committee a majority of whom were members of minority groups. Special candidates did not have to meet the 2.5 grade point average cutoff applied to regular applicants. The special committee continued to recommend special applicants until a number prescribed by faculty vote were admitted. While the overall class size was still 50 the prescribed number was 8. In 1973 and 1974 when the class size had doubled to 100 the prescribed number of special admissions also doubled to 16. From the year of the increase in class size through 1974 the special program resulted in the admission of 21 black students 30 Mexican-Americans and 12 Asians for a total of 63 minority students. Over the same period the regular admissions program produced 1 black 6 Mexican-Americans and 37 Asians for a total of 44 minority students. Although disadvantaged whites applied to the special program in large numbers none received an offer of admission through that process.
Allan Bakke is a white male who applied to the Davis Medical School in both 1973 and 1974. Despite a strong benchmark score of 468 out of 500 Bakke was rejected. His total was 549 out of 600. Again Bakke's application was rejected. In both years applicants were admitted under the special program with grade point averages MCAT scores and benchmark scores significantly lower than Bakke's.
After the second rejection Bakke filed the instant suit in the Superior Court of California. He sought mandatory injunctive and declaratory relief compelling his admission to the Medical School. He alleged that the Medical School's special admissions program operated to exclude him from the school on the basis of his race in violation of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Art. I § 21 of the California Constitution and § 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. The trial court found that the special program operated as a racial quota because minority applicants in the special program were rated only against one another and 16 places in the class of 100 were reserved for them. The court refused to order Bakke's admission however holding that he had failed to carry his burden of proving that he would have been admitted but for the existence of the special program. The California court accepted the findings of the trial court with respect to the University's program. On this basis the court initially ordered a remand for the purpose of determining whether under the newly allocated burden of proof Bakke would have been admitted to either the 1973 or the 1974 entering class in the absence of the special admissions program. In its petition for rehearing below however the University conceded its inability to carry that burden. The California court thereupon amended its opinion to direct that the trial court enter judgment ordering Bakke's admission to the Medical School. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the important constitutional issue.
Direct personal insults that constitute fighting words receive no protection because they are likely to provoke immediate violence. Viewpoint-based restrictions within that category remain invalid even though the speech itself is unprotected.
Supporting sources
Are mere words ever adequate provocation for voluntary manslaughter?
No. Common law treats insults and verbal taunts as legally insufficient provocation regardless of how enraging they may be. Only serious battery, adultery, or similar acts qualify as adequate provocation.
Supporting sources
1
Utility Employee Insults Patron
Isabella Ingram boarded a city bus. The driver repeatedly shouted personal insults at her in front of other riders. The court held the transit authority liable for the gross insults inflicted by its employee within the scope of employment.
1 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
When may a public utility be liable for insults?
A common carrier or public utility faces liability to patrons for gross insults inflicted by its employees acting within the scope of employment. The rule protects users of public facilities from offensive conduct by those who serve them.
Supporting sources
3
Police Conduct During Search
Isaac Irving's home was raided at night by officers who forced him to stand naked while they ransacked his belongings. The court found that the calculated degradation and insult during the unlawful entry violated due process.
Monroe v. Pape365 U.S. 167, 174
On October 29, 1958, at approximately 5:45 a.m., thirteen Chicago police officers entered the apartment of James Monroe and his family without a search warrant or arrest warrant. The officers roused the Monroes from bed using flashlights and forced them at gunpoint to stand naked in the living room while ransacking every room, emptying drawers, and ripping mattress covers. Detective Pape struck Mr. Monroe several times with his flashlight and called him "nigger" and "black boy." Other officers hit and kicked several of the children and pushed them to the floor.
Mr. Monroe was then taken to the police station and detained on open charges for ten hours. During this period he was interrogated about a murder, exhibited in lineups, and not permitted to call his family or attorney, although he was not brought before a magistrate despite their availability. He was released without any criminal charges being filed against him.
The complaint alleged that these actions occurred under color of the statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs, and usages of Illinois and Chicago, and that the City had no rules or controls over its police officers, permitting them to act without restraint. The Monroes claimed deprivations of rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and sought compensatory and punitive damages from the officers and the City.
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgment.
Isaiah Ishikawa was fired after his supervisor repeatedly insulted his work in front of clients. The court held that the insults did not create an independent tort claim outside the employment contract.
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.47 Cal. 3d 654, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373
Interactive Data Corporation hired John Foley in June 1976 as an assistant product manager at a starting salary of $18,500. As a condition of employment Foley signed a confidential and proprietary information agreement. The company's president told Foley that if he performed his job well he would have a long and rewarding employment with the firm.
Over the next six years and nine months Foley received steady salary increases, promotions, bonuses, awards, and superior performance evaluations, rising to branch manager of the Los Angeles office with an annual salary of $56,164 plus a merit bonus. In January 1983 Foley learned that his new supervisor, Robert Kuhne, was under investigation by the FBI for embezzlement from his former employer, Bank of America. Foley reported the information to Vice President Richard Earnest because he was worried about working for Kuhne in a supervisory position.
Earnest told Foley not to discuss rumors and to forget what he had heard. In early March 1983 Kuhne informed Foley that the company had decided to replace him for performance reasons and offered a transfer to another division. Foley was later told he could continue as branch manager if he agreed to a performance plan, but when Kuhne met with him the next day Kuhne instead gave Foley the choice of resigning or being fired. Foley was discharged on March 13, 1983.
Foley filed suit against Interactive Data Corporation alleging three causes of action: tortious discharge in violation of public policy, breach of an implied-in-fact contract to terminate only for good cause, and tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The superior court sustained the company's demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the action. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court granted review.
Disclosure of Intercepted Call
Ian Iverson broadcast a recorded phone conversation containing private remarks. The court held that the disclosure added the insult of publication to the original invasion of privacy.
Bartnicki v. Vopper532 U.S. 514 (2001)
In the fall of 1992 and spring of 1993 the Pennsylvania State Education Association engaged in collective-bargaining negotiations with the Wyoming Valley West School District board. Petitioner Anthony Kane was president of the local union. Petitioner Gloria Bartnicki served as the union's chief negotiator and a teacher in the district.
On the evening of May 15, 1993, Bartnicki used a cellular telephone in her car to call Kane. During the conversation they discussed the status of the negotiations, the possibility of a strike, and the board's offer of a three-percent raise. Kane suggested that if the board did not increase its offer the union should reject it and go on strike. He made statements about blowing off front porches and doing work on some of the board members. Bartnicki responded that they would have to do some nasty things.
An unidentified person intercepted and recorded the cellular telephone conversation using an electronic device. The unknown interceptor gave the tape to respondent Jack Yocum, president of a local taxpayers' organization that had been critical of the union's demands. Yocum in turn gave the tape to respondent Frederick W. Vopper, a radio talk show host operating in the area.
On May 31, 1993, Vopper played the tape of the intercepted conversation on his public affairs talk show. He played the tape again on August 23, 1993, during a news broadcast on a local television station. The same day the Wilkes-Barre Times Leader published a transcript of a portion of the tape. Bartnicki and Kane filed suit against Vopper, Yocum, and other media defendants seeking damages under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act.
After discovery the District Court granted the petitioners' motion for summary judgment as to liability. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
1 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
Does the Model Penal Code treat insults as harassment?
Yes. A person commits a petty misdemeanor by insulting or taunting another in a manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response when done with purpose to harass.
Supporting sources
497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990)
…invasive treatment may perpetuate human existence through a merger of body and machine that some might reasonably regard as an insult to life rather than as its continuation. But those same advances, and the reorganization of medical care accompanying the new science and technology, have also transformed the political and…