Also known as: intermediate scrutiny test · intermediate scrutiny · intermediate scrutiny standard
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A standard of constitutional review requiring the government to demonstrate that a classification or regulation serves an important governmental objective and is substantially related to achieving that objective.
Ingrid Innes and her husband Mark co-own farmland. A state statute automatically names the husband head of household and lets him pledge the joint assets alone. Ingrid sues after Mark encumbers the property without her consent. The court applies intermediate scrutiny and invalidates the statute because the gender line lacks an exceedingly persuasive justification substantially related to any important objective.
Interlink Communications operates a cable system. A federal order requires it to carry local broadcast channels on designated tiers, displacing some of its own programming. Interlink challenges the rule as burdening speech. The court subjects the content-neutral regulation to intermediate scrutiny and upholds it after finding the mandate advances important interests in broadcast access without burdening substantially more speech than necessary.
Ines Ibarra, a married state-university professor, seeks to license jointly owned course materials. A statute lets married male professors act unilaterally but requires wives to obtain spousal consent. Ines sues after her husband withholds approval. The court applies intermediate scrutiny, finds the gender classification rests on stereotypes rather than a genuine important interest, and strikes the statute down.
Ibrahim Iqbal seeks support for his nonmarital child six years after birth. A statute imposes a six-year limit on paternity actions for nonmarital children while allowing marital children to sue at any time. Ibrahim challenges the distinction. The court subjects the illegitimacy classification to intermediate scrutiny and invalidates the shorter limit because the state failed to show a substantial relationship to preventing stale claims.
Iris Irons posts directional signs for her church services on public property. A town ordinance treats ideological signs differently from directional signs and imposes stricter limits on the latter. Iris sues after the town removes her signs. The court determines the distinction is content-based and applies strict scrutiny rather than intermediate scrutiny, striking the ordinance.
The Town of Gilbert, Arizona, maintains a comprehensive Sign Code that categorizes outdoor signs by the type of information they convey and imposes different restrictions on each category. Ideological signs communicating messages or ideas for noncommercial purposes may be up to 20 square feet and displayed without time limits. Political signs designed to influence elections may be up to 32 square feet and displayed up to 60 days before a primary and 15 days after a general election. Temporary directional signs relating to qualifying events, such as meetings of nonprofit groups, are limited to 6 square feet, may be displayed no more than 12 hours before and 1 hour after the event, and are restricted in placement. Petitioners Good News Community Church and its pastor Clyde Reed are small nondenominational churches that hold services at various temporary locations in the Town. To advertise their services, the Church posts 15 to 20 temporary signs around the Town early on Saturday mornings displaying the Church name and the time and location of the next service, removing them around midday on Sunday. The Town's Sign Code compliance manager cited the Church twice for violating the time limits on temporary directional signs and for failing to include an event date on the signs. Town officials confiscated one sign, which Reed retrieved from municipal offices. Reed contacted the compliance department to reach an accommodation, but the manager informed the Church there would be no leniency and promised to punish future violations. The Churches filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging the Sign Code violated the First Amendment, and sought a preliminary injunction. The District Court denied the motion. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding the Sign Code was content neutral. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseInertia Dynamics holds copyrights in classic films. A federal statute extends copyright terms by twenty years for existing works. Inertia sues after competitors exploit works whose terms would have expired. The court reviews the extension under rational-basis review and upholds it without applying intermediate scrutiny.
In 1998 Congress enacted the Copyright Term Extension Act, which extended the duration of all federal copyrights by twenty years. For works created by identified natural persons the new term runs from creation until seventy years after the author's death. For anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and works made for hire the term is ninety-five years from publication or one hundred twenty years from creation, whichever expires first. The statute applied these extended terms both to copyrights already in existence and to works created after its effective date. Petitioners are individuals and businesses whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have gone into the public domain. They filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a declaration that the extension of existing copyrights exceeded Congress's power under the Copyright Clause and violated the First Amendment. On cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings the district court entered judgment for the Attorney General. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. A majority of the panel upheld the statute against both challenges, while Judge Sentelle dissented in part on the Copyright Clause issue. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the extension of existing copyrights exceeds Congress's power under the Copyright Clause and whether the extension violates the First Amendment.
View caseThe government must show an exceedingly persuasive justification that the classification serves an important governmental objective and is substantially related to achieving that objective. The justification must be genuine and may not rely on overbroad generalizations about gender roles.
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Yes. Content-neutral regulations such as must-carry rules for cable operators are subject to intermediate scrutiny. The government must demonstrate that the regulation advances important interests unrelated to the suppression of speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary.
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Classifications based on illegitimacy receive intermediate scrutiny and must be substantially related to an important governmental objective. A statute imposing a shorter limitations period on paternity suits for nonmarital children fails the test when the state cannot show the limit actually prevents stale or fraudulent claims.
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The statute creates a facial gender classification subject to intermediate scrutiny. Courts strike it down because the classification rests on outdated assumptions about household roles and is not substantially related to any important governmental objective such as administrative efficiency.
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…holding attempted by RFRA. Even assuming RFRA would be interpreted in effect to mandate some lesser test, say, one equivalent to intermediate scrutiny, the statute nevertheless would require searching judicial scrutiny of state law with the attendant likelihood of invalidation. This is a considerable congressional intrusion into the…