Also known as: knowing falsehood · reckless falsehood · actual malice
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A fault standard in defamation actions requiring proof that the defendant published a false statement with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity.
Khadija Khan, a prominent public official, gave an interview to a reporter. The published article changed several of her statements in a way that reversed their meaning on a key policy issue. Khadija sued for defamation. Because the changes materially altered the meaning conveyed, the court held that the alteration could support a finding of knowing or reckless falsehood.
Kieran Kelly owned a small private company. A credit reporting agency circulated a report to a handful of subscribers stating that the firm faced imminent insolvency. The report contained false statements. Because the report addressed a matter of private concern, the court permitted recovery of presumed damages without requiring proof of knowing or reckless falsehood.
Kelvin Kimura, a private citizen, was falsely accused in a local newsletter of committing fraud in his personal business dealings. The publisher had failed to verify basic facts. Because Kelvin was a private figure, the court allowed recovery upon a showing of negligence and did not require proof of knowing or reckless falsehood.
Kiana Kwan, a well-known public figure, sued a television network after a satirical sketch portrayed her in an outrageous manner. The sketch caused emotional distress but contained no statement a reasonable viewer would take as fact. The court dismissed the claim because Kiana could not show a false statement of fact made with knowing or reckless falsehood.
Kenneth King, the police chief of a major city, sued a newspaper over an advertisement criticizing his official conduct. The statements contained factual errors. Because Kenneth was a public official, the court required him to prove that the newspaper published the statements with knowing or reckless falsehood before he could recover damages.
Kylie Kerr, a public figure, sued a magazine after it printed quotations she never made. The published statements materially changed the meaning of her actual remarks. The court held that the material alteration could establish knowing or reckless falsehood sufficient to support liability.
Jeffrey M. Masson served as Projects Director of the Sigmund Freud Archives until his termination. In 1983, Janet Malcolm published a two-part article in The New Yorker magazine detailing the circumstances of Masson's departure from the Archives and his disputes with board members including Dr. Kurt Eissler and Dr. Anna Freud. The article drew primarily from tape-recorded interviews Malcolm conducted with Masson and was subsequently published in book form by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. Masson claimed that several quotations attributed to him in the article did not appear on the tape recordings of his conversations with Malcolm. Among the challenged passages were statements that he changed his middle name because it sounded better, that he was viewed as an intellectual gigolo, that Freud's theory was the product of moral cowardice, that Anna Freud's house would have been a place of sex, women, fun, and that he would be considered the greatest analyst who ever lived after Freud. On November 29, 1984, Masson filed a diversity action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against Malcolm, The New Yorker Magazine, Inc., and Knopf. He alleged that the defendants had libeled him and placed him in a false light by fabricating quotations and by misleadingly editing his statements to portray him as unscholarly, irresponsible, vain, and lacking in honesty and moral integrity. Masson further alleged that The New Yorker and Knopf knew of Malcolm's misconduct prior to publication. The district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the ground that Masson had failed to establish actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. Masson appealed the district court's order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which heard argument on June 16, 1988, and issued its decision on August 4, 1989.
View caseA public official must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant published a false statement with knowing or reckless falsehood. This standard protects robust debate on public issues while allowing recovery when the publisher acted with actual knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.
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No. Private figures need not prove knowing or reckless falsehood to recover for defamation. States may impose liability based on negligence so long as they do not impose liability without fault. Private plaintiffs may recover presumed or punitive damages only upon a showing of knowing or reckless falsehood.
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Alteration establishes the standard only when the change results in a material change in the meaning conveyed by the statement. Trivial or non-material changes will not suffice to show knowledge of falsity.
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Yes. A public figure cannot recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on a publication absent a false statement of fact made with knowing or reckless falsehood. Outrageous parody or opinion that no reasonable person would interpret as stating actual facts does not give rise to liability.
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…award of punitive damagesas distinguished from "general" damages, which are compensatory in natureapparently requires proof of actual malice under Alabama law, and the judge charged that "mere negligence or carelessness is not evidence of actual malice or malice in fact, and does not justify an award of exemplary or punitive…