Also known as: lays · laid · laying · lay witness · lay opinion
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
A constitutional power by which Congress imposes taxes, duties, imposts, and excises to pay public debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States, subject to a uniformity requirement throughout the nation.
An assertion or allegation of damages, venue, or other facts in a pleading or complaint.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
A constitutional power by which Congress imposes taxes, duties, imposts, and excises to pay public debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States, subject to a uniformity requirement throughout the nation.
An assertion or allegation of damages, venue, or other facts in a pleading or complaint.
Leo Lynch files a contract action in federal court and includes a paragraph laying venue in the district where the defendant maintains its principal place of business. The defendant moves to dismiss for improper venue. The court denies the motion because the complaint adequately lays the facts supporting venue under the governing statute.
Congress enacts a statute requiring importers to pay a five percent duty on foreign electronics. Legacy Motors, a domestic manufacturer, challenges the law as nonuniform because it exempts certain Pacific Rim goods. The court upholds the measure because Congress properly exercised its power to lay and collect duties for the general welfare.
State A enacts a statute requiring exporters of agricultural products to pay a two percent fee on all shipments leaving its ports. Lone Peak Energy, an energy exporter, sues to enjoin collection. The court strikes down the fee because the state may not lay any impost or duty on exports without congressional consent.
Congress passes a revenue bill that imposes a flat tax on all wheat exported from any state. Lakeshore Industries, a grain exporter, seeks a declaratory judgment. The court invalidates the tax because no tax or duty may be laid on articles exported from any state.
3 common questions
The Constitution grants Congress the power to impose and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises to pay debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare, provided the levies are uniform throughout the United States.
Supporting sources
No state may lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports without the consent of Congress, except for inspection laws whose net proceeds go to the federal treasury.
Supporting sources
No tax or duty may be laid on articles exported from any state.
Supporting sources
International Shoe Co. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. The company manufactured and sold shoes and other footwear. During the years 1937 to 1940 the company employed eleven to thirteen salesmen who resided in Washington and whose principal activities were confined to that state. These salesmen were compensated by commissions totaling more than $31,000 each year. The salesmen displayed samples to prospective purchasers. On occasion they rented permanent sample rooms in business buildings or rented rooms in hotels or business buildings temporarily for that purpose. The cost of such rentals was reimbursed by the company. The authority of the salesmen is limited to exhibiting their samples and soliciting orders from prospective buyers, at prices and on terms fixed by appellant. The salesmen transmit the orders to appellant's office in St. Louis for acceptance or rejection. When accepted the merchandise for filling the orders is shipped f. o. b. from points outside Washington to the purchasers within the state. Washington state maintained a comprehensive unemployment compensation scheme. The costs of the scheme are defrayed by contributions required to be made by employers to a state unemployment compensation fund. The contributions are a specified percentage of the wages payable annually by each employer for his employees' services in the state. The assessment and collection of the contributions and the fund are administered by appellees. For the years in question notice of assessment for delinquent contributions was personally served upon a sales solicitor employed by appellant in the State of Washington. A copy of the notice was mailed by registered mail to appellant at its address in St. Louis, Missouri. Appellant appeared specially before the office of unemployment and moved to set aside the order and notice of assessment on the ground that the service upon appellant's salesman was not proper service upon appellant. Appellant also asserted that it was not doing business within the state and that it is not an employer and does not furnish employment within the meaning of the statute. The motion was heard on evidence and a stipulation of facts by the appeal tribunal which denied the motion and ruled that appellee Commissioner was entitled to recover the unpaid contributions. That action was affirmed by the Commissioner. Both the Superior Court and the Supreme Court affirmed. The company appealed to the United States Supreme Court under section 237(a) of the Judicial Code. The facts found by the appeal tribunal and accepted by the state courts showed that the company had no office in Washington and makes no contracts either for sale or purchase of merchandise there. It maintains no stock of merchandise in that state and makes there no deliveries of goods in intrastate commerce. All the merchandise shipped into Washington is invoiced at the place of shipment from which collections are made. No salesman has authority to enter into contracts or to make collections.
View caseLance Lee sues a carrier for breach of a shipping contract and lays special damages arising from an unusually large lost shipment. The carrier argues the damages are unforeseeable. The court permits the claim to proceed because the complaint properly laid the facts giving rise to the claimed losses.
The plaintiffs carried on the business of millers and mealmen in copartnership at the City Steam-Mills in Gloucester and operated a steam-engine there to clean corn, grind it into meal, and dress it into flour, sharps, and bran. A crank shaft of the steam-engine broke, stopping the mill. The plaintiffs ordered a new crank shaft from W. Joyce & Co. at Greenwich, who required the broken shaft to be sent as a pattern so the replacement would fit the uninjured parts of the engine. On 13 May the plaintiffs' servant delivered the broken shaft to the defendants, who traded as Pickford & Co. and acted as common carriers, at their Gloucester office. The servant told the clerk the mill was stopped and the shaft must be sent immediately. The clerk stated that if the shaft were sent by twelve o'clock that day it would be delivered at Greenwich the following day. The defendants took the shaft before noon and the plaintiffs paid £2 4s. for its carriage the whole distance. The defendants delayed delivery of the shaft to Greenwich through neglect. As a result, the plaintiffs did not receive the new shaft until several days later than they otherwise would have. Their mill remained idle for five days beyond the time they otherwise would have been prevented from working. During that period the plaintiffs were unable to supply many customers with flour, sharps, and bran, were obliged to buy flour for some customers, lost the opportunity to sell their products, and had to pay wages to workmen they could not employ. The defendants paid £25 into court in satisfaction of the claim under the second count. At trial before Crompton, J., at the Gloucester Assizes the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs with £25 damages in excess of the amount paid into court. A rule nisi for a new trial was obtained on the ground of misdirection.
View caseLucy Liu files a complaint challenging a state statute and lays the facts establishing that the law burdens a fundamental right. The state moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court denies the motion because the pleading sufficiently lays the basis for the constitutional challenge.
Estelle Griswold served as Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Dr. C. Lee Buxton served as the League's Medical Director and was a professor at Yale Medical School. Together they opened and operated a center in New Haven that was open from November 1 to November 10, 1961. At the center they gave information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons as to the means of preventing conception. They examined the wife and prescribed the best contraceptive device or material for her use. Fees were usually charged, although some couples were serviced free. The statutes involved were sections 53-32 and 54-196 of the General Statutes of Connecticut (1958 rev.). Section 53-32 made it a crime to use any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception. Section 54-196 punished accessories as principals. The appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each. The Appellate Division of the Circuit Court affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut affirmed that judgment in State v. Griswold, 151 Conn. 544, 200 A. 2d 479. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The appellants asserted standing to raise the constitutional rights of the married persons with whom they had a professional relationship. A criminal conviction for serving married couples removes doubts about case or controversy. The rights of husband and wife would be diluted unless considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them.
View case1 common questions
In pleading, to lay means to allege or assert particular facts, damages, or jurisdictional elements in a complaint or declaration.
…of their commissions which request had not been complied with; and that their commissions were withheld from them. A rule was laid to show cause on the fourth day of the term and duly served. Mr. Lee, in support of the rule, observed it was important to know on what ground a justice of the peace in the District of…