legal detriment

Mr. and Mrs. Comunale were struck in a marked pedestrian crosswalk by a truck driven by Percy Sloan. Mr. Comunale was seriously injured, and his wife suffered minor injuries. Sloan was insured by defendant Traders and General Insurance Company under a policy that contained limits of liability in the sum of $10,000 for each person injured and $20,000 for each accident. Sloan notified Traders of the accident and was told that the policy did not provide coverage because he was driving a truck that did not belong to him. When the Comunales filed suit against Sloan, Traders refused to defend the action, and Sloan employed competent counsel to represent him. On the second day of the trial Sloan informed Traders that the Comunales would compromise the case for $4,000, that he did not have enough money to effect the settlement, and that it was highly probable the jury would return a verdict in excess of the policy limits. Traders refused, and the trial proceeded to judgment in favor of Mr. Comunale for $25,000 and Mrs. Comunale for $1,250. Sloan did not pay the judgment, and the Comunales sued Traders under a provision in the policy that permitted an injured party to maintain an action after obtaining judgment against the insured. In that suit judgment was rendered in favor of Mr. Comunale for $10,000 and in favor of Mrs. Comunale for $1,250. This judgment was satisfied by Traders after it was affirmed in Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 116 Cal.App.2d 198 [253 P.2d 495]. Comunale obtained an assignment of all of Sloan's rights against Traders and then commenced the present action to recover from Traders the portion of his judgment against Sloan which was in excess of the policy limits. The jury returned a verdict in Comunale's favor, but the trial court entered a judgment for Traders notwithstanding the verdict.

On July 28, 1955, plaintiff, a licensed general contractor, was preparing a bid on the Monte Vista School Job in the Lancaster school district with bids due before 8 p.m. It was customary in that area for general contractors to receive the bids of subcontractors by telephone on the day set for bidding and to rely on them in computing their own bids. Plaintiff's secretary received between 50 and 75 subcontractors’ bids by telephone that day and recorded them on special forms for plaintiff to post on a master cost sheet. Late in the afternoon, defendant's estimator telephoned and submitted a bid of $7,131.60 for the paving work according to the plans and specifications. Plaintiff listened to the bid over an extension telephone and posted it on the master sheet, where it was the lowest bid for the paving. Plaintiff computed his own bid of $317,385 accordingly, submitted it naming defendant as the subcontractor for the paving, and was awarded the contract when his bid proved the lowest. The next morning, plaintiff stopped at defendant's office and was told by defendant's construction engineer that they had made a mistake in their bid and could not do the work for the price bid. Plaintiff informed the engineer that he expected defendant to carry through with the original bid since he had used it in compiling his bid. Defendant subsequently refused to perform the paving work for less than $15,000. Plaintiff obtained figures from other subcontractors. After several months, he engaged L & H Paving Company to do the work for $10,948.60. The trial court found that defendant made a definite offer to do the paving for $7,131.60 and that plaintiff relied on the bid in computing his own bid and naming defendant as the subcontractor. It entered judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $3,817, the difference between defendant's bid and the cost of the paving to plaintiff, and defendant appealed from that judgment.

Mary Armendariz and Dolores Olague-Rodgers were hired by Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. in July and August of 1995 for positions in the Provider Relations Group and were later promoted to supervisory roles with annual salaries of $38,000. As a condition of their employment, the employees signed application forms and separate arbitration agreements that required binding arbitration of any dispute arising from termination of employment. The arbitration clause provided that the employees' exclusive remedies would be limited to back wages from the date of discharge until the arbitration award and expressly excluded other remedies such as reinstatement and injunctive relief. On June 20, 1996, the employees were informed that their positions were being eliminated and that they were terminated. During their employment, they alleged that supervisors and coworkers engaged in sexually based harassment and discrimination, and they claimed the termination occurred because of their perceived or actual sexual orientation. The employees filed a complaint against the employer and its parent company alleging a cause of action for violation of the FEHA as well as tort and contract claims for wrongful termination, seeking general damages, punitive damages, injunctive relief, and attorney fees and costs. The employer filed a motion to compel arbitration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, supported by declarations. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the arbitration agreement was an adhesion contract containing provisions so one-sided as to shock the conscience, including the requirement that only employees arbitrate claims and the limitation of damages to backpay. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order, holding that the damages provision was unconscionable but that the remainder of the agreement should be enforced after severance. The Supreme Court granted review of the case.

Nine years before the events in question, the plaintiff suffered a severe burn from contact with an electric wire, resulting in substantial scar tissue on the palm of his right hand. The defendant, a surgeon, repeatedly solicited the plaintiff's father for the opportunity to perform an operation to remove the scar tissue and graft skin from the plaintiff's chest in its place. Before the operation, the plaintiff and his father visited the defendant's office, where the defendant responded to a question about the hospital stay by stating that the boy would be in the hospital three or four days, not over four, after which the boy could go home and return to work with a perfect hand in just a few days thereafter. The defendant further stated that he would guarantee to make the hand a hundred per cent perfect hand or a hundred per cent good hand. Following the operation, a trial was held in which the jury awarded damages to the plaintiff. The trial court subsequently set aside the verdict to the extent it exceeded five hundred dollars, determining those amounts to be excessive. The case reached the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.