Also known as: legislative courts · Article I court · Article I courts
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A federal tribunal created by Congress under its Article I powers. Such a body is not subject to the life tenure and salary protection requirements of Article III and may combine administrative rulemaking with adjudication of disputes closely tied to federal regulatory programs or public rights.
Levi Lowe, owner of a manufacturing firm, sues a private supplier in state court for breach of a supply contract. After the supplier files bankruptcy, a new statute routes the entire dispute to a non-Article III bankruptcy court for final judgment. The assignment violates Article III because the claim is a traditional state-law contract action between private parties that Congress may not wholesale transfer to a legislative court.
Lars Lindstrom challenges a decision by an agency tribunal inside the Department of Agriculture that both sets subsidy rules and awards payments under a federal crop program. The tribunal's judges serve fixed terms without life tenure. The structure is constitutional because Congress may establish legislative courts that perform both administrative and judicial functions as part of implementing its legislative powers.
Lakewood Manufacturing contests a penalty imposed by a federal environmental board for violating pollution standards. The board, whose members lack Article III protections, also promulgates the standards it enforces. The adjudication is permissible because the dispute arises within a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme rather than a traditional private-rights action.
The Chase & Sanborn Corporation filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in 1983. A plan approved by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida then vested in respondent Nordberg, the trustee in bankruptcy, causes of action for fraudulent conveyances. In 1985 respondent filed suit against petitioners Granfinanciera, S. A., and Medex, Ltda., in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging that petitioners had received $1.7 million from Chase & Sanborn's corporate predecessor within one year of the bankruptcy petition without receiving consideration or reasonably equivalent value. The complaint sought to avoid the transfers and recover damages under 11 U. S. C. §§ 548(a)(1) and (a)(2), 550(a)(1) (1982 ed. and Supp. V). The District Court referred the proceedings to the Bankruptcy Court. Over five months later respondent served a summons on petitioners in Bogota, Colombia shortly before the Colombian Government nationalized Granfinanciera. In their answer both petitioners requested a trial by jury on all issues so triable. The Bankruptcy Judge denied petitioners' request for a jury trial, deeming a suit to recover a fraudulent transfer a core action that originally, under the English common law, as I understand it, was a non-jury issue. Following a bench trial, the court dismissed with prejudice respondent's actual fraud claim but entered judgment for respondent on the constructive fraud claim in the amount of $1,500,000 against Granfinanciera and $180,000 against Medex. The District Court affirmed without discussing petitioners' claim that they were entitled to a jury trial. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also affirmed, 835 F. 2d 1341 (1988), ruling that petitioners lacked a statutory right to a jury trial because the constructive fraud provision contains no mention of such a right and 28 U. S. C. § 1411 affords jury trials only in personal injury or wrongful death suits, and that the Seventh Amendment supplied no right because fraudulent conveyance actions are equitable in nature and bankruptcy proceedings are inherently equitable. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether petitioners were entitled to a jury trial, 486 U. S. 1054 (1988), and now reverses.
Lucas Lee obtains a money judgment from a legislative court in a private contract dispute. When he seeks enforcement, the opposing party objects that the court lacked power to enter a binding judgment. The objection succeeds because Article III prevents Congress from assigning core private-rights cases to non-Article III tribunals for final resolution.
In 1987 petitioners filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky against respondents. The complaint alleged that respondents had committed fraud and deceit in the sale of stock in 1983 and 1984 in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. The District Court dismissed the action as time barred under the then-applicable Kentucky statute of limitations. While petitioners' appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court decided Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson on June 20, 1991. The next day the Court applied that decision to dismiss another pending appeal. The Sixth Circuit remanded petitioners' case to the District Court for further proceedings in light of Lampf. On August 13, 1991, the District Court dismissed the action with prejudice under the Lampf statute of limitations. Petitioners filed no appeal, and the judgment became final thirty days later on December 18, 1991. On December 19, 1991, the President signed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991. Section 476 of that Act added section 27A to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Subsection (b) provides that any private civil action under section 10(b) commenced on or before June 19, 1991, which was dismissed as time barred after that date and which would have been timely under the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction as such laws existed on June 19, 1991, shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than sixty days after December 19, 1991. Petitioners promptly filed a motion under section 27A(b) to reinstate their action. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Lila Lin files a claim with an administrative tribunal for benefits under a federal workers' compensation statute. The tribunal, staffed by fixed-term officers, conducts hearings and issues binding awards. The arrangement is valid because the claims involve public rights created by Congress and are adjudicated as part of an integrated regulatory program.
Knudsen filed a claim for compensation against Benson under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act with Deputy Commissioner Crowell of the United States Employees' Compensation Commission. The evidence introduced before the deputy commissioner was directed largely to the employment issue and was conflicting. After considering the evidence the deputy commissioner found that Knudsen was in Benson's employ at the time of the injury and filed an order for compensation. Benson then brought suit in the United States District Court to enjoin enforcement of the award. Benson alleged that Knudsen was not his employee at the time of the injury and that the claim lay outside the deputy commissioner's jurisdiction. An amended complaint further challenged the constitutionality of the Act on multiple grounds. Those grounds included alleged violations of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial, the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures, and the judicial power provisions of Article III. The District Judge denied motions to dismiss and granted a hearing de novo upon the facts and the law. The case was transferred to the admiralty docket, answers were filed presenting the issue as to the fact of employment, and the evidence of both parties having been heard, the District Court decided that Knudsen was not in the employ of the petitioner and restrained the enforcement of the award. The decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, and this Court granted writs of certiorari.
Liam Larson challenges the constitutionality of a commission that promulgates sentencing guidelines and resolves related disputes. The commission's members serve fixed terms without Article III protections. The structure is upheld because Congress may create legislative courts that perform both administrative and judicial functions in aid of its enumerated powers.
In 1984, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act to address widespread criticisms that federal sentencing was a national scandal marked by unwarranted disparities and uncertainty. The legislation created the United States Sentencing Commission as an independent commission in the judicial branch consisting of seven voting members. The President appoints the members with the advice and consent of the Senate, and at least three members must be federal judges selected after consideration of recommendations from the Judicial Conference of the United States, while the Attorney General serves as an ex officio nonvoting member. Petitioner John M. Mistretta was indicted in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri on three counts centering on a cocaine sale. He pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The district court sentenced him under the Guidelines to 18 months' imprisonment to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release, along with a $1,000 fine and a $50 assessment. Mistretta appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, challenging the constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission and the Guidelines. Both Mistretta and the United States petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari before judgment in the Eighth Circuit. The Court granted the petitions because of the imperative public importance of the issue and the disarray among the federal district courts.
A legislative court is created by Congress under Article I and its judges lack life tenure and salary protection. An Article III court exercises the judicial power of the United States and its judges enjoy those constitutional guarantees. The distinction turns on whether the tribunal is exercising core judicial power or performing functions incidental to a federal regulatory scheme.
…over members of another Branch. Indeed, we already have recognized that the President may remove a judge who serves on an Article I court. McAllister v. United States , 141 U. S. 174, 185 (1891). In any event, we hold here no more than that Congress may vest in the President the power to remove for good cause an Article…
…the case "might present a different question." Id. , at 238-239. Freeborn v. Smith , 2 Wall. 160 (1865), which involved an Article I court, upheld a law that applied to all cases pending on appeal (in the Supreme Court
…judges unprotected by Art. III. First, it is urged that "pursuant to its enumerated Article
…Corp. , 279 U. S., at 451. See also Williams v. United States , 289 U. S. 553, 581 (1933) (noting sovereign immunity origins of legislative courts); Ex parte Bakelite , supra , at 453-454 (same). Cf. McElrath v. United States , 102 U. S. 426, 440 (1880). In Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co. , 473 U. S. 568 (1985),…
…"recognized that the courts of the District of Columbia are not created under the judiciary article
Congress may assign disputes involving public rights or matters closely tied to a federal regulatory program. It may not assign traditional state-law contract or tort claims between private parties wholesale to a legislative court for final adjudication. The key inquiry is whether the matter historically could have been resolved by the executive or legislative branches.
No. Legislative courts and administrative tribunals routinely perform both functions as part of implementing a federal program. The combination is permissible when the adjudicative role remains incidental to the regulatory scheme and Article III courts retain appropriate review authority.
The judgment is subject to constitutional challenge. Article III forbids Congress from removing traditional private-rights cases from Article III courts and vesting final authority in a legislative court. The defect is structural and may be raised even if the parties did not object below.