Also known as: lienholder · lienors · lienholders
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A person or entity that holds a lien on property to secure performance of an obligation. The lien gives the holder the right to enforce the interest against the property in the event of default.
Linden Bank holds a recorded junior mortgage on a commercial parcel after the owner defaults on a senior loan held by Lakeshore Industries. Lakeshore commences judicial foreclosure and joins Linden Bank as a necessary party. Linden Bank receives notice and participates in the proceeding to protect its interest in any surplus.
Lakeshore Industries holds a perfected security interest in equipment pledged by Liam Larson. After default, a senior secured party schedules a disposition. Lakeshore tenders full payment of the senior obligation and redeems the collateral before the sale occurs.
Linden Logistics holds a junior lien on real property foreclosed by the senior mortgagee. The sale produces proceeds exceeding the senior debt. The court distributes the surplus first to Linden Logistics to satisfy its lien before any remainder reaches the mortgagor.
Linden Bank holds a perfected security interest in inventory but never notified the secured party of its identity. When the senior secured party disposes of the collateral without knowledge of the lien, it incurs no liability to Linden Bank for any procedural noncompliance.
Layla Lane holds a junior mortgage on residential property sold at foreclosure. Within the statutory period she tenders the sale price plus interest and costs. The purchaser's title remains subject to her redemption right until the period expires.
A municipality faces a judgment under section 1983. Legislative opponents expressed concern that an early version of the statute would allow judgment lienors to reach property held for public purposes. The final enactment addressed that exposure.
In July 1971 petitioners, a class of female employees of the Department of Social Services and of the Board of Education of the City of New York, commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. They sued the Department and its Commissioner, the Board and its Chancellor, and the city of New York and its Mayor, all in their official capacities. The complaint alleged that the city and its agencies had as a matter of official policy compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons. The suit sought injunctive relief and backpay for periods of unlawful forced leave. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court held petitioners' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief moot because the city and the Board had changed their maternity-leave policies after the complaint was filed. The court found that the acts complained of were unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. It denied backpay on the ground that any damages would come ultimately from the city of New York and that holding otherwise would circumvent the immunity conferred on municipalities by Monroe v. Pape. On appeal, petitioners renewed their arguments that the Board of Education was not a municipality within the meaning of Monroe v. Pape and that the District Court had erred in barring a damages award against the individual defendants. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Board was not a “person” under § 1983 because it performed a vital governmental function and had no final say over its appropriations. It also held that a damages action against officials sued in their official capacities could not proceed because any award would have to be paid by a city held not amenable to suit in Monroe v. Pape. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether local governmental officials and local independent school boards are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when equitable relief in the nature of back pay is sought against them in their official capacities. After oral argument, the Court requested the parties to address whether Monroe v. Pape should be reconsidered in light of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
View caseA lienor is any holder of a recorded lien on the property, including junior mortgagees and other secured parties. State statutes determine which lienors must be joined as necessary parties so that their interests can be addressed in the proceeding.
Yes. Any secured party or lienholder may redeem the collateral by tendering fulfillment of the secured obligations plus expenses before disposition occurs.
After satisfaction of the foreclosing lien, surplus is applied to junior liens in order of priority before any remainder reaches the mortgagor.
A lienor that has filed a financing statement and whose identity is known to the secured party must receive authenticated notification of disposition.
In jurisdictions that provide statutory redemption, junior lienholders are sometimes permitted to redeem after foreclosure by paying the sale price plus interest and costs within the statutory period.
…of Montgomery County. The investigation, which included interviews with the purchaser, the mortgage holder, and other lienholders of Lot 13T, as well as an examination of county land records, disclosed that petitioner, acting as settlement attorney, had defrauded Standard-Young Associates, the purchaser of Lot 13T.…