Also known as: liferent · life rent · liferents · life estate
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A possessory estate in property measured by the life of a designated person. The holder enjoys use and income during the measuring life while the remainder or reversion follows upon death of that life.
After her husband's death, Lila Lin receives a constitutional homestead right in the family home that functions as a life-rent. The probate court values that life-rent and charges it against her statutory homestead allowance under the uniform code. The remainder of the allowance is then paid from other estate assets.
Logan Lane's father executes a deed conveying a painting to Logan but expressly reserves a life-rent for himself. The father keeps possession and enjoyment until his death. Upon the father's death the court declares that Logan holds full title free of the life-rent.
In 1959, Victor Gruen purchased a painting by Gustav Klimt entitled Schloss Kammer am Attersee II for $8,000. Victor Gruen, an architect with residences in New York and Los Angeles, had a son, Michael Gruen, the plaintiff in this action. On April 1, 1963, Victor wrote a letter to Michael, then a student at Harvard, stating that he was giving him the painting for his twenty-first birthday but wished to retain possession during his lifetime. This original letter was later destroyed at Victor's direction. Subsequently, on May 22, 1963, Victor sent Michael another letter explaining that his lawyer advised against mentioning the life estate in writing for tax reasons and enclosed a substitute letter dated April 1, 1963, that conveyed the painting without reference to any retained interest. Michael retained both letters. The painting remained in Victor's possession, except for a brief loan to exhibitions between 1964 and 1965, and moved with him to Beverly Hills and then to Vienna, Austria. Victor Gruen died on February 14, 1980. After his death, Michael requested the painting from his stepmother, the defendant, who refused to turn it over. Michael then commenced this action seeking a declaration that he owned the painting. Following a seven-day nonjury trial, Special Term found that no valid inter vivos gift had been made. The Appellate Division reversed that determination and remitted the matter for a determination of the painting's value. After the value was set at $2,500,000, the defendant appealed directly to the Court of Appeals from the final judgment awarding damages to the plaintiff.
View caseLucas Lee holds a life-rent in a historic mansion under his mother's will. He removes load-bearing walls and stops repairs, impairing the property's value. The remainderman sues and obtains an injunction plus damages measured by the reduction in security value.
John Harrison Weedon was born in High Point, North Carolina. After living throughout the South and two prior marriages that produced daughters Florence Weedon Baker and Delette Weedon Jones, he purchased Oakland Farm, a 152.95-acre tract in Alcorn County, in 1905. In 1915, at age 55, Weedon married 17-year-old Anna Plaxico; the couple worked the farm together, and Anna's daily labor hoeing, picking cotton, and milking fifteen cows protected the property during the difficult years after World War I. Weedon executed his will in 1925, granting Anna a life estate in all his property with remainder to her children if any existed and otherwise to his grandchildren in equal shares, while expressly excluding his daughters because they had not cared for him in his later years. Weedon died in 1932. Anna remarried J.E. Myers in 1933, but that union produced no children that would terminate the grandchildren's contingent remainder. Anna continued operating Oakland Farm until 1955, after which the land was rented for $1,000 per year plus $300 annually from sign rental and $50 monthly in social security. No contact occurred between Anna and Weedon's children or grandchildren from 1932 until 1964. At the time of suit Anna was 73 years old and her income was insufficient for her comfortable maintenance given her age and infirmities. In 1964 the Mississippi State Highway Department acquired a right-of-way across the farm for the U.S. Highway 45 bypass, paying $20,000 of which Anna received $7,500 to construct a new home. A 1970 contract for the sale of soil from the property yielded an additional $1,000 to Anna. At trial the property's commercial value was $168,500 and was projected to reach $336,000 within four years because of the highway construction and the growth of Corinth. Anna filed suit in the Chancery Court of Alcorn County seeking a sale of the property less the house site, with the proceeds invested so that interest would provide her adequate income. The chancellor ordered the sale. The contingent remaindermen Henry Baker, Sarah Baker Lyman, and Louise Virginia Baker Heck took an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court of Mississippi to review the decree.
View caseLuis Lopez orally promises his niece a life-rent in a cottage if she cares for him. The niece performs the services for years. The court refuses to enforce the oral promise because it lacks a signed writing required by the statute of frauds.
In June 1918, James A. Halsey, an old man and a widower, was living without family or housekeeper in his house in Hornell, New York. He told the plaintiffs that if they gave up their home and business in Andover, New York, and boarded and cared for him during his life, the house and lot with its furniture and equipment would be theirs upon his death. The plaintiffs did as he asked, selling out an interest in a little draying business in Andover and boarding and tending him until he died about five months after their coming. Neither deed nor will nor memorandum subscribed by the promisor exists to authenticate the promise, and the plaintiffs ask specific performance. During Halsey's lifetime the plaintiffs had no possession of the property and did not occupy it as owners. Halsey retained possession, and the plaintiffs lived with him merely as his servants or guests who could be asked to leave at any time. The plaintiffs paid food bills and performed housekeeping work while Halsey paid the taxes and upkeep costs. There were ties of kinship between one of the plaintiffs and Halsey.
View caseLeah Lamb and her sister hold Blackacre as joint tenants. Leah conveys her interest to a third party while retaining a life-rent measured by her own life. The conveyance severs the joint tenancy and the life-rent continues until Leah's death.
Raymond Johnson and plaintiff Hazel Tenhet owned a parcel of property as joint tenants. The deed was executed by Jettie N. Johnson to them as joint tenants. The property consisted of a dwelling house and lot. Its value did not exceed three thousand five hundred dollars at the time of Johnson's death in 1971. Assertedly without plaintiff's knowledge or consent, Johnson leased the property to defendant Boswell. The lease was for a period of ten years at a rental of one hundred fifty dollars per year. It included a provision granting the lessee an option to purchase. Johnson died some three months after execution of the lease. Plaintiff sought to establish her sole right to possession of the property as the surviving joint tenant. After an unsuccessful demand upon defendant to vacate the premises, plaintiff brought this action to have the lease declared invalid. The third amended complaint contained five causes of action. The trial court granted a motion to strike the fourth and fifth causes of action. It sustained demurrers to the second and third causes without leave to amend. But the court made no express ruling on the first cause of action seeking declaratory relief and damages. The trial court sustained demurrers to the complaint and entered a judgment of dismissal. Plaintiff appealed from the ensuing judgment of dismissal to the Supreme Court of California.
View caseLorenzo Lugo and his brother hold property as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Lorenzo executes a deed purporting to convey a life-rent to himself and the remainder to his daughter. The deed severs the joint tenancy and creates a tenancy in common subject to the life-rent.
Mr. and Mrs. Riddle purchased a parcel of real estate, taking title as joint tenants. Several months before her death, Mrs. Riddle retained an attorney to plan her estate. After reviewing pertinent documents, he advised her that the property was held in joint tenancy and that, upon her death, the property would pass to her husband. Distressed upon learning this, she requested that the joint tenancy be terminated so that she could dispose of her interest by will. As a result, the attorney prepared a grant deed whereby Mrs. Riddle granted to herself an undivided one-half interest in the subject property. The document also provided that “The purpose of this Grant Deed is to terminate those joint tenancies formerly existing between the Grantor, Frances P. Riddle, and Jack C. Riddle, her husband. ...” He also prepared a will disposing of Mrs. Riddle’s interest in the property. Both the grant deed and will were executed on December 8, 1975. Mrs. Riddle died 20 days later. The trial court refused to sanction her plan to sever the joint tenancy and quieted title to the property in her husband. The executrix of the will of Frances Riddle appeals from that judgment.
View caseA life-rent ends automatically upon the death of the measuring life. A fee simple continues indefinitely and passes to heirs or devisees.
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Yes. Under Uniform Probate Code section 2-402A the value of a constitutional homestead life-rent received by a surviving spouse is charged against the spouse's homestead allowance to the extent the home is part of the decedent's estate.
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Yes. Removing load-bearing walls or failing to maintain the property constitutes waste when it reduces value or violates mortgage covenants. The remainderman or mortgagee may obtain injunction and damages.
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No. The statute of frauds requires a signed writing for any conveyance of an interest in land, including a life-rent. Performance of services alone does not satisfy the writing requirement.
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…that he has never had possession of the painting but asserts that his father made a valid gift of the title in 1963 reserving a life estate for himself. His father retained possession of the painting until he died in 1980. Defendant, plaintiff’s stepmother, has the painting now and has refused plaintiff’s requests that she turn…