Also known as: line item veto · line-item vetoes · item veto · partial veto
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An executive power to reject selected provisions of an appropriations bill or other enacted statute rather than approving or rejecting the measure in its entirety. The power permits cancellation of discrete spending items, tax benefits, or other portions after presentment and signing. The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution confers no such authority on the President.
Congress enacted a clean energy statute granting tax credits for solar, wind, and nuclear projects. The President signed the bill into law. Days later the President directed the IRS to disregard the nuclear credits entirely. AtomWave Energy, a nuclear startup that had relied on the credits, lost the statutory benefit when the agency followed the directive.
Congress passed the Green Infrastructure Act providing tax credits and direct payments for qualifying projects. The President signed the Act. The President then issued a directive canceling only the payments earmarked for unionized contractors. Apex General Contractors, which performed covered union projects, lost the payments the statute had directed.
Congress enacted a reform statute creating new inspector general offices, including one in the Department of Transportation. The President signed the statute. The President later directed that the Transportation inspector general provisions be treated as deleted. Felix, the nominee awaiting confirmation for the post, learned the position would never be filled.
Congress appropriated ten billion dollars for grants to aerospace firms and university labs and directed that the full amount be spent. The President instructed the agency to leave three billion dollars unobligated. AeroTech Systems and Stanton University Lab, both qualified applicants, were told their grants would not be awarded.
The Line Item Veto Act was passed by the Senate on March 27, 1996, by a vote of 69 to 31. All four appellee Senators voted against the bill. The House of Representatives passed the identical bill the next day by a vote of 232 to 177, with both appellee Congressmen voting nay. The President signed the Act on April 4, 1996, and it became effective on January 1, 1997. The appellees consist of six Members of the 104th Congress, including four Senators and two Congressmen. Shortly after the Act took effect, they filed suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia against the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. The complaint alleged that the Act unconstitutionally expanded the President's power and violated the requirements of bicameral passage and presentment. The District Court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of standing and ripeness. On April 10, 1997, it granted summary judgment to the appellees and declared the Act unconstitutional. The court also granted intervention to the National Treasury Employees Union and a group of Congressmen. Appellants filed a jurisdictional statement, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on April 23, 1997. The Court established an expedited briefing schedule and heard oral argument on May 27, 1997. The House Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group and the Senate appeared as amici curiae urging reversal on the merits without taking a position on standing.
View caseNo. The President's veto power allows only approval or rejection of a bill in its entirety. Once the President signs a bill, the Take Care Clause requires faithful execution of the entire statute. Any attempt to nullify discrete provisions after enactment functions as an impermissible line-item veto.
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Members of Congress generally lack standing to challenge such statutes on the basis of institutional injuries shared by all legislators. Article III requires a personal, particularized injury rather than an abstract dilution of legislative power.
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Ordinary discretion allows an agency to set enforcement priorities or fill gaps within statutory bounds. A line-item veto attempts to rewrite or nullify specific statutory commands after enactment. The Constitution permits the former but forbids the latter.
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…terms of a campaign pledge, has succeeded in faking out the Supreme Court. The President's action it authorizes in fact is not a line-item veto and thus does not offend Art. I, § 7; and insofar as the substance of that action is concerned, it is no different from what Congress has permitted the President to do since the formation…