maltreatment

In 1969 William Henry Furman was convicted of murder in Georgia and sentenced to death under Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1005 (Supp. 1971), after which the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E.2d 628 (1969). In the same year Lucius Jackson, Jr., was convicted of rape in Georgia and sentenced to death under Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1302 (Supp. 1971), and the same court affirmed that judgment in 225 Ga. 790, 171 S.E.2d 501 (1969). Also in 1969 Elmer Branch was convicted of rape in Texas and sentenced to death under Tex. Penal Code, Art. 1189 (1961), after which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment in 447 S.W.2d 932 (Ct. Crim. App. 1969). Each death sentence was imposed after a jury trial under a statute that left the choice between death and a lesser punishment to the uncontrolled discretion of the jury or judge, and the state courts upheld the convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question whether the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, then consolidated the matters for argument in January 1972. The records showed that the three petitioners were Black men convicted of crimes against white victims. Furman had been diagnosed with mild mental deficiency and psychotic episodes associated with convulsive disorder, while Jackson and Branch had limited education and low intelligence scores. No standards guided the sentencing decision, and the penalty was imposed on only a trivial fraction of eligible offenders despite statutory authorization for these offenses.

In August 1985, appellant was arrested and charged with sexually assaulting two 13-year-old girls earlier that month while they were camping out in the backyard of the house next door to him. According to the girls, the assailant entered their tent after they were asleep wearing a stocking over his head, shined a flashlight in their eyes, and warned them not to look at him; neither was able to describe his face. In November 1985, at the beginning of appellant’s trial, the State made a motion pursuant to a recently enacted statute, Act of May 23, 1985, § 6, 1985 Iowa Acts 338, now codified at Iowa Code §910A.14 (1987), to allow the complaining witnesses to testify either via closed-circuit television or behind a screen. The trial court approved the use of a large screen to be placed between appellant and the witness stand during the girls’ testimony. After lighting adjustments in the courtroom, the screen would enable appellant dimly to perceive the witnesses, but the witnesses to see him not at all. Appellant objected strenuously to use of the screen, based first of all on his Sixth Amendment confrontation right. He also argued that his right to due process was violated, since the procedure would make him appear guilty and thus erode the presumption of innocence. The trial court rejected both constitutional claims, though it instructed the jury to draw no inference of guilt from the screen. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed appellant’s conviction, 397 N. W. 2d 730 (1986). The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, 483 U. S. 1019 (1987).

In 1974 Terri Lee Halderman, a resident of Pennhurst State School and Hospital, filed suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The case became a class action on behalf of all present and future residents of the institution. The Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens and the United States joined as plaintiffs. Defendants included Pennhurst and its officials, the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare and its officials, and county officials from five surrounding counties. The amended complaint alleged that conditions at Pennhurst violated rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, and the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966. Both damages and injunctive relief were sought. After a lengthy trial the District Court found in 1977 that conditions were dangerous, with residents often physically abused or drugged by staff, and inadequate for habilitation. Some residents suffered deterioration in physical, intellectual, and emotional skills. The court ordered immediate steps to remove residents from Pennhurst, directed the provision of community living arrangements, and appointed a Special Master with broad supervisory powers. The Court of Appeals affirmed most of the judgment in 1979 but remanded for individual determinations regarding institutionalization. On further remand the District Court established procedures for individual habilitation plans and appointed a Hearing Master. This Court in 1981 reversed the Court of Appeals' reliance on federal statutory grounds and remanded for consideration of state-law, constitutional, and section 504 claims. On remand the Court of Appeals in 1982 reinstated its prior judgment solely on the state Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in In re Schmidt. It rejected Eleventh Amendment and abstention challenges. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1982. The District Court had found that the individual defendants acted in good faith within the sphere of their official responsibilities despite staff shortages and limited resources.

Joshua DeShaney was born in 1975. In 1980, a Wyoming court granted his parents a divorce and awarded custody of Joshua to his father, Randy DeShaney, who then moved with the child to Winnebago County, Wisconsin. In January 1982, the Winnebago County Department of Social Services became aware that Joshua might be a victim of child abuse after he was admitted to a local hospital with multiple bruises and abrasions. The examining physician notified DSS. A caseworker interviewed Randy DeShaney and visited the home, observing suspicious injuries on Joshua's head, but concluded there was insufficient evidence of abuse to retain him in court custody and returned him to his father while recommending counseling and preschool enrollment. Over the next two years, Joshua was repeatedly treated for suspicious injuries at local hospitals, with physicians notifying DSS on multiple occasions. Caseworkers conducted regular visits, noted additional injuries, received reports from emergency room personnel and neighbors, and at one point convened a Child Protection Team that decided against retaining custody, yet consistently returned Joshua to his father's care after determining insufficient evidence existed for court intervention. In March 1984, Randy DeShaney beat Joshua so severely that the child fell into a coma and suffered permanent brain damage requiring lifelong institutionalization for profound mental retardation. Randy DeShaney was later tried and convicted of child abuse. Joshua and his mother filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Winnebago County, its Department of Social Services, and two social workers in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, claiming a deprivation of liberty without due process. The district court granted summary judgment for the respondents. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.