Also known as:marital homes · matrimonial home · family home
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
1
A family residence occupied by the spouses. In dissolution proceedings the court may award temporary possession to one spouse upon a showing that physical or emotional harm would otherwise result.
2
In probate the value of any constitutional homestead interest in the family home is charged against the surviving spouse's homestead allowance.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Sense 1
1
Sense 1
A family residence occupied by the spouses. In dissolution proceedings the court may award temporary possession to one spouse upon a showing that physical or emotional harm would otherwise result.
Examples5
Temporary Exclusion From Residence
Michelle Murphy petitions for divorce and shows that her husband has threatened physical harm. The court issues a temporary order excluding the husband from the marital home where the couple's two children reside, allowing Murphy and the children to remain until further proceedings.
Privacy Claim In Marital Dwelling
Mohan Malhotra and his wife challenge a state statute that criminalizes contraceptive counseling inside their home. The court recognizes that the marital home receives constitutional protection against government intrusion into intimate decisions of married couples.
Sense 2
2
Sense 2
In probate the value of any constitutional homestead interest in the family home is charged against the surviving spouse's homestead allowance.
Examples1
Homestead Value Charged Against Allowance
Musa Mensah dies owning the marital home in fee simple. His surviving spouse receives a constitutional homestead life estate in the home. The probate court values that life estate at $80,000 and reduces the spouse's statutory homestead allowance by that amount before distributing other estate assets.
Estelle Griswold served as Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Dr. C. Lee Buxton served as the League's Medical Director and was a professor at Yale Medical School. Together they opened and operated a center in New Haven that was open from November 1 to November 10, 1961.
At the center they gave information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons as to the means of preventing conception. They examined the wife and prescribed the best contraceptive device or material for her use. Fees were usually charged, although some couples were serviced free.
The statutes involved were sections 53-32 and 54-196 of the General Statutes of Connecticut (1958 rev.). Section 53-32 made it a crime to use any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception. Section 54-196 punished accessories as principals. The appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each.
The Appellate Division of the Circuit Court affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut affirmed that judgment in State v. Griswold, 151 Conn. 544, 200 A. 2d 479. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
The appellants asserted standing to raise the constitutional rights of the married persons with whom they had a professional relationship. A criminal conviction for serving married couples removes doubts about case or controversy. The rights of husband and wife would be diluted unless considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them.
Mustafa Mahmoud, subject to a protective order, enters the marital home and assaults his estranged wife. Prosecutors charge him with rape. The court rejects any marital exemption because the order had already terminated the legal incidents of marriage.
People v. Liberta64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567 (1984)
Mario Liberta and Denise Liberta married in 1978. Shortly after the birth of their son in October 1978, Mario began beating Denise. In early 1980, Denise brought a proceeding in the Family Court in Erie County seeking protection from the defendant. On April 30, 1980, the Family Court issued a temporary order of protection requiring the defendant to move out and remain away from the family home and to stay away from Denise, while permitting weekend visits with their son.
On the weekend of March 21, 1981, Mario did not visit his son. On Tuesday, March 24, 1981, he called Denise to request a visit that day. Denise agreed to allow him to pick up her and their son and take them to his motel after he assured her that a friend would be present at all times. The defendant and his friend picked up Denise and their son and drove to the motel.
Upon arrival at the motel the friend left. Mario then attacked Denise, threatened to kill her, and forced her to perform fellatio and engage in sexual intercourse while their son was in the room. The defendant forced Denise to tell their son to watch what he was doing to her. After the incident, Denise went to her parents’ home, then to a hospital for treatment of scratches on her neck and bruises on her head and back. She also went to the police station and swore out a felony complaint the next day. On July 15, 1981, the defendant was indicted for rape in the first degree and sodomy in the first degree.
The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the indictment. On appeal by the People, the Appellate Division reversed, reinstated the indictment, and remanded for trial. The defendant was convicted of both charges, and the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Mina Mehta's first husband dies leaving pension benefits acquired during their marriage. The second wife claims the benefits are separate. The Court holds that the first wife's community interest in the pension survives and passes to her heirs.
Boggs v. Boggs520 U.S. 833 (1997)
Isaac Boggs began working for South Central Bell in 1949 and remained employed until his retirement in 1985. He was married to Dorothy Boggs from 1949 until her death in 1979, and the couple had three sons. After Dorothy died, Isaac married Sandra Boggs in 1980, and they remained married until Isaac's death in 1989.
Upon retirement, Isaac received a lump-sum distribution of $151,628.94 from the Bell System Savings Plan, which he rolled over into an Individual Retirement Account worth $180,778.05 at his death. He also received 96 shares of AT&T stock from the Bell South Employee Stock Ownership Plan and a monthly annuity of $1,777.67 from the Bell South Service Retirement Program. Dorothy's will bequeathed one-third of her estate to Isaac outright along with a lifetime usufruct in the remaining two-thirds, with naked ownership passing to the sons. A 1980 Louisiana judgment of possession ascribed to Dorothy's estate a community property interest in Isaac's Savings Plan account valued at $21,194.29.
After Isaac's death, Sandra began receiving a survivor annuity and other benefits. The sons filed suit in Louisiana state court claiming a portion of the retirement benefits under Dorothy's will and Louisiana community property law. Sandra then filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana asserting that ERISA preempts the sons' claims. The District Court granted summary judgment against Sandra. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Mason McCarthy is served with divorce papers while visiting the marital home in California for a brief stay. The court exercises personal jurisdiction over him because physical presence within the state at the time of service satisfies due process requirements.
Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Marin495 U.S. 604, 618, 110 S.Ct. 2105, 109 L.Ed.2d 631 (1990)
Dennis Burnham married Francie Burnham in 1976 in West Virginia. In 1977 the couple moved to New Jersey, where their two children were born. In July 1987 the Burnhams separated. Mrs. Burnham, who intended to move to California, was visiting her parents in that State when she filed for divorce in New Jersey on grounds of extreme cruelty, seeking spousal and child support, custody of the children, and possession of the family home.
In early August 1987 petitioner visited Mrs. Burnham in California to discuss the children and the separation. He took the children to San Francisco for a few days. Upon returning the children to Mrs. Burnham, petitioner was served with a summons and complaint for divorce filed in California Superior Court that also sought custody of the children. After being served, petitioner returned to New Jersey.
In January 1988 petitioner made a special appearance in the California action and moved to quash service of process on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The Superior Court denied the motion, and the State Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the state and federal courts.
How does a court decide which spouse receives possession of the marital home during divorce proceedings?
Courts consider the best interests of any minor children, the financial resources of each spouse, and the need to avoid disruption. When physical or emotional harm is shown, a temporary order may exclude one spouse entirely from the residence.
Can a spouse be excluded from the marital home without a showing of harm?
No. Temporary exclusion orders require an affirmative showing that physical or emotional harm would otherwise result to the other party or children.
Students Frequently Ask...
Does a surviving spouse's constitutional homestead interest reduce the statutory homestead allowance?
Yes. The value of any constitutional homestead right in the family home is charged against the surviving spouse's homestead allowance to the extent the home would otherwise have been part of the decedent's estate.
marital
relation and the
marital home
. This Court recognized in Meyer v. Nebraska, supra , that the right "to marry, establish a
home
and bring up children" was an essential part of the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth…