Also known as: Miranda-custody · custodial interrogation · Miranda trigger
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A term of art specifying circumstances that present a serious danger of coercion during police questioning. A person is in Miranda custody when the objective circumstances of the interrogation would lead a reasonable person to believe they are not free to terminate the encounter and leave. The determination examines all relevant factors including the location, duration, and physical restraints imposed.
Madison Meyers invoked her right to counsel during stationhouse questioning about a theft. Two days later detectives summoned her back to the same locked interview room to ask about an unrelated assault. Because she remained in custody, the detectives could not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present.
Megan Moore was pulled over for a broken taillight and questioned briefly beside her car about her destination. The officer did not place her in handcuffs or transport her to the station. The brief roadside encounter did not rise to Miranda custody.
Miranda Morales requested counsel during an initial custodial interview at the precinct. After meeting briefly with an attorney she was returned to the locked holding cell. Detectives later reentered the cell without counsel and resumed questioning about the same offense.
Maria Morales was transported to headquarters in a locked cruiser and placed in a small windowless room for four hours of questioning about stolen exam answers. No warnings were given before the detectives sought a confession. The prolonged confinement established Miranda custody.
Mustafa Mahmoud walked into the station and began speaking with officers about a homicide. He was not restrained or told he could not leave until the officers decided to handcuff him. The initial conversation occurred outside Miranda custody.
Respondent Francis Connelly approached Officer Patrick Anderson of the Denver Police Department on August 18, 1983, at approximately 2:40 p.m. and stated that he had killed someone and wanted to talk about it. Anderson immediately advised respondent of his Miranda rights. Respondent stated that he understood those rights but wanted to talk about the murder anyway. At this point, respondent stated that he had come all the way from Boston to confess to the murder of Mary Ann Junta, a young girl whom he had killed in Denver sometime during the month of November 1982. Respondent was then taken to police headquarters. A detective again advised him of his rights. After respondent answered that he understood them, he was asked to describe the murder in detail. Respondent gave a lengthy account including the location of the body, the date of the murder, the fact that he had used a blunt instrument in the killing, and that after killing the victim he had washed his knife in a nearby stream. After hearing this account, the detective arrested respondent for the murder of Mary Ann Junta. A search of the area where respondent said the body was located revealed the body of a young girl. The cause of death was determined to be a skull fracture. At a preliminary hearing, the psychiatrist who had examined respondent testified that at the time of the confession, respondent was clearly suffering from chronic schizophrenia and was in a psychotic state at least as of the time of his arrest. The psychiatrist testified that respondent's psychosis motivated his confession, that respondent was not capable of making a free and intelligent decision to confess, and that the confession was not voluntary. The trial court found that respondent's initial statement to Officer Anderson was involuntary and ordered that it be suppressed. The trial court also ruled that the subsequent statements made at the police station were tainted by the prior involuntary statement and ordered that they too be suppressed. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the suppression order. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether respondent's confession was obtained in a manner that violated the Due Process Clause.
Mariam Mansour was arrested on federal charges and taken to a holding facility. Agents questioned her there for several hours without providing warnings. The post-arrest setting constituted Miranda custody requiring the prescribed advisements.
Courts examine all circumstances surrounding the interrogation to decide whether a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the questioning and leave. Factors include location, duration, physical restraints, and whether the suspect was told they could depart.
No. Routine traffic stops are temporary and brief and therefore noncustodial, so Miranda warnings are not required during ordinary roadside questioning even though the driver is not free to leave during the stop itself.
…follow but briefly stated it is this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning…
…for Petitioner in Brookhart v. Janis , O. T. 1965, No. 657, pp. 10-11); Bruton v. United States , 391 U. S. 123, 124 (1968) (custodial interrogation); Roberts v. Russell , 392 U. S. 293 (1968) ( per curiam ) (custodial interrogation
…the product of a free and deliberate choice . . . ." Because respondent's waiver was not voluntary in that sense, his custodial interrogation was presumptively coercive. The Colorado Supreme Court was unquestionably correct in concluding that his postcustodial incriminatory statements were inadmissible. Accordingly, I concur in…
…significantly intrusive. Compare Dunaway v. New York , 442 U. S., at 212-216 (seizure of suspect without probable cause and custodial interrogation in police station violates Fourth Amendment), and Davis v. Mississippi , 394 U. S. 721, 727-728 (1969) (suspect may not be summarily detained and taken to police station for fingerprinting…
…436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), to determine the voluntariness of statements made, or possibly made, by them under custodial interrogation. For reasons set out below, Gumpricht’s motion is granted and Cercena’s and Tarantelli’s are denied. Tarantelli Tarantelli’s affidavit affirms merely that [i]n the event the…
Once a suspect in custody invokes the right to counsel, police may not reinitiate interrogation about any offense without counsel present unless the suspect reinitiates contact. The protection continues even after the suspect has consulted an attorney.
Yes. Warnings are required before custodial interrogation for any offense regardless of how minor, provided the encounter meets the objective test for custody.
A voluntary approach does not create custody until officers take actions that would lead a reasonable person to believe they are not free to leave, such as handcuffing or confining the individual.