Also known as: mistake-of-fact defense · mistake of fact · mistakes of fact defense · ignorance of fact · factual mistake
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
A defense available when a defendant's honest but erroneous belief about existing facts prevents the formation of the culpable mental state required for the offense. The defense succeeds only when the mistake directly negates purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness, or negligence as to a material element. It does not excuse reckless disregard of readily available information that would have corrected the error.
A ground for reforming an unambiguous donative document when clear and convincing evidence establishes that a mistake of fact or law affected specific terms and reveals the donor's true intention. Reformation corrects errors in expression or inducement so the document conforms to what the donor actually intended. The remedy applies to wills and will substitutes alike.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
A defense available when a defendant's honest but erroneous belief about existing facts prevents the formation of the culpable mental state required for the offense. The defense succeeds only when the mistake directly negates purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness, or negligence as to a material element. It does not excuse reckless disregard of readily available information that would have corrected the error.
Officer Ramirez lawfully attempts to arrest Miguel Mendoza after a valid warrant issues. Mendoza, unaware of the warrant because of a clerical error in the database he checked, believes the officer is acting without authority and resists with force. Because Mendoza's mistake concerns the factual existence of the warrant rather than a legal privilege, the defense does not shield him from battery liability.
Marcus Mitchell engages in sexual intercourse with a woman who states she is eighteen. He honestly believes the statement and has reasonable grounds for doing so. The woman is actually sixteen. Because the mistake of fact negates the mental state required for statutory rape, Mitchell avoids conviction under the defense.
2 common questions
In criminal law the defense succeeds whenever the mistake negates the required mental state, even if the belief is unreasonable, provided the defendant actually held the belief. Recklessness or negligence in forming the belief may still support liability under a different mental-state element. Reformation in donative documents requires clear and convincing proof of the mistake and the donor's true intention regardless of reasonableness.
Supporting sources
A ground for reforming an unambiguous donative document when clear and convincing evidence establishes that a mistake of fact or law affected specific terms and reveals the donor's true intention. Reformation corrects errors in expression or inducement so the document conforms to what the donor actually intended. The remedy applies to wills and will substitutes alike.
Dennis executes a will leaving his donor-advised account at Helping Hands Fund to Elm Council. He maintains two accounts under different emails but refers to both collectively in conversations. After his death, clear and convincing evidence shows he intended both accounts to pass to the charity. The court reforms the will to include the omitted account.
Jessica creates a trust directing low-basis assets to one charity and her retirement account to another, producing unexpectedly high estate taxes. Clear and convincing evidence establishes she would have reversed the allocation had she known the tax consequences. The court reforms the trust terms to achieve her probable tax-saving intention.
2 common questions
In the trusts-and-estates context a mistake of law as to the legal effect of terms is treated the same as a mistake of fact and supports reformation when clear and convincing evidence shows both the error and the donor's actual intention. In criminal law a pure mistake of law rarely excuses liability unless the statute itself makes knowledge of the law an element.
Supporting sources
…out of a second marriage when the first marriage had not in fact been terminated. ( Id. at pp. 801, 804-805.) However, the mistake of fact defense would not have been applicable if the first marriage had in fact been terminated. In this situation there is no mistake of fact; rather, the facts as they actually exist preclude a…
…that to constitute a crime there must be both a wrongful act and a guilty mind. Where a defendant has an honest and reasonable mistake of fact which, if true, would render his act lawful, that mistake
…Creighton, supra . Our qualified immunity doctrine applies regardless of whether the officer's error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact
…similar objections which doubtless were voiced with equal intensity to the long-accepted defenses of justification, accident, mistake of fact, insanity, entrapment, duress and intoxication. As Justice Holmes wrote in commenting on John Austin’s argument that permitting the
…and the Utah Code generally. Holm bases this argument on subsection three of the bigamy statute, which essentially creates a mistake-of-fact defense for a bigamy defendant. Subsection three provides that "[i]t shall be a
On Saturday, November 4, 1989, Deborah S. and her sister Jenny S. were staying at the Episcopal Sanctuary homeless shelter at Eighth and Market Streets in San Francisco after arriving from Wichita, Kansas approximately two weeks earlier. Deborah waited outside the shelter while Jenny went inside. Defendant Wash Jones Williams, a 52-year-old electrician, volunteer, and resident at the shelter who stood 6 feet 1 inch tall and weighed 220 pounds, approached the 28-year-old Deborah, who was 5 feet 1 inch tall and weighed 117 pounds. Williams suggested getting coffee with no strings attached, and the pair spent the morning walking, talking, and eating. Williams purchased a bracelet for Deborah from a street vendor on Turk Street. He led her to the Dahlia Hotel, rang the buzzer, rented a room, and requested a sheet from the clerk. Once inside the room, Deborah noticed there was no television. Deborah attempted to leave but could not release the bolt lock. According to Deborah's testimony, Williams punched her in the left eye. Williams pushed her onto the bed. Williams ordered her to remove her pants while stating he did not like to hurt people. Williams engaged in sexual intercourse for 10 to 15 minutes despite her screams and efforts to push him off. Williams testified to a different version of events, stating that Deborah hugged and kissed him upon entering the room, initiated removal of her clothes, fondled him for 10 to 15 minutes to overcome his impotence as a diabetic, and inserted his penis into her vagina. After the encounter, Deborah returned to the shelter, obtained directions to the nearest police station, walked to the San Francisco Hall of Justice, and reported that she had been raped, at which point her eye was swollen shut. An officer took Deborah's statement and drove her to the hospital, where she waited approximately seven hours for an examination. The examining nurse and doctor observed that the eye injury was more consistent with a punch than a slap. Vaginal slides showed the presence of semen. Deborah had additional complaints of pain and tenderness consistent with her account. She appeared scared during the exam. Williams was convicted of two counts of forcible rape and one count of false imprisonment. The trial court instructed the jury on consent but refused to give the requested instruction on reasonable and good faith but mistaken belief as to consent. The jury convicted Williams on all counts, and he was sentenced to eight years in state prison. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding substantial evidence supported giving the requested instruction based on Deborah's willing accompaniment to the hotel, her lack of objection to the bedsheet, Williams's account of events inside the room, and the clerk's failure to hear screams or sounds of violence.
View caseMalcolm McKinley, a federal agent, executes a search warrant he believes is facially valid. The warrant in fact fails to describe the items to be seized. Because the mistake concerns a factual defect in the warrant rather than a legal interpretation, the defense does not protect him from a Fourth Amendment violation claim.
Defendant Marrero was a Federal corrections officer employed at a facility in Danbury, Connecticut. In 1977 he was arrested inside a Manhattan social club while carrying a loaded .38 caliber automatic pistol. At the time of arrest he asserted his Federal corrections officer status and maintained that he was authorized to carry the weapon without a permit. Marrero claimed that his belief rested on interpretations supplied by fellow officers and teachers together with the wording of the peace officer statutes themselves. The case had already moved through several procedural stages before trial. Marrero's pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment was granted at 94 Misc 2d 367. The Appellate Division reversed that order and reinstated the indictment by a divided vote at 71 AD2d 346. Marrero's subsequent appeal from the Appellate Division order lapsed and was dismissed. At trial Marrero sought to present evidence that his personal misunderstanding of the statutory definition of a peace officer excused his conduct. The trial court rejected the proffered defense, refused to charge the jury on the issue, and the jury returned a verdict convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
View caseAn officer obtains a warrant that an informant describes as authorizing a search for weapons. The warrant actually authorizes a search for documents. The officer executes the warrant in good-faith reliance on the informant's description. Because the mistake of fact concerns the warrant's contents, qualified immunity may still attach.
In February 1997, a concerned citizen informed ATF Special Agent Jeff Groh that on multiple visits to the ranch of Joseph Ramirez and his family in Butte-Silver Bow County, Montana, the visitor had observed a large stock of weaponry including an automatic rifle, grenades, a grenade launcher, and a rocket launcher. Groh prepared and signed an application for a warrant to search the ranch for any automatic firearms or parts, destructive devices including grenades, grenade launchers, rocket launchers, and receipts pertaining to their purchase or manufacture. He supported the application with a detailed affidavit setting forth the basis for his belief that the listed items were concealed on the premises. Groh also completed a warrant form that, in the portion calling for a description of the person or property to be seized, contained a description of the respondents' two-story blue house rather than the stockpile of firearms. The warrant did not incorporate the application by reference. The magistrate judge signed the warrant form after reviewing the documents, and the affidavit was placed under seal. The day after the magistrate issued the warrant, Groh led a team of federal agents and local sheriff's deputies in executing the search on the Ramirez ranch while Joseph Ramirez was absent but his wife and children were present. The officers uncovered no illegal weapons or explosives. Groh gave Mrs. Ramirez a copy of the search warrant but not the sealed application. The following day he faxed respondents' attorney a copy of the page of the application listing the items to be seized. Respondents Joseph Ramirez and his family brought this action against Groh and the other officers under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the search violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court entered summary judgment for all defendants on all claims. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment as to all defendants and claims except the Fourth Amendment claim against Groh, on which it reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity questions.
View caseUnder the Model Penal Code approach adopted in many jurisdictions the defense reduces the grade of the offense to the lesser crime the defendant would have committed had the facts been as believed. The prosecution must still prove the elements of the lesser offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Supporting sources
No. Reformation is available even when the document is unambiguous if clear and convincing evidence establishes that a mistake of fact or law affected specific terms and reveals the donor's true intention.
Supporting sources