Also known as: mistake of fact · mistakes of fact · mistake-of-fact doctrine · mistake of fact defense · factual mistake
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
A defense that negates the mental state required for an offense when the defendant honestly but erroneously believes in a fact that would render the conduct lawful or noncriminal. The defense succeeds only when the mistake directly eliminates the purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence element the prosecution must prove.
A defense that negates the mental state required for an offense when the defendant honestly but erroneously believes in a fact that would render the conduct lawful or noncriminal. The defense succeeds only when the mistake directly eliminates the purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence element the prosecution must prove.
Musa Mensah saw Malcolm McKinley raise a fist during a heated argument and struck first in response. McKinley was actually attempting only to push Mensah away from a falling object. Because Mensah's belief that he faced an imminent attack was reasonable and not caused by his own fault, the privilege to defend attaches and McKinley cannot recover for the resulting battery.
An equitable principle permitting reformation of a donative document, even if unambiguous, when clear and convincing evidence establishes that a mistake of fact or law affected specific terms and reveals the donor's true intention.
Mohan Malhotra's will left his "endowed chair funds at Northfield College" to his granddaughter Mariam Mansour. College records showed the college owned the funds, while Malhotra actually held a donor-advised fund he repeatedly told his planner would pass to Mariam. Clear and convincing evidence of the mistaken description and Malhotra's true intent allows the court to reform the will to substitute the donor-advised fund.
An equitable principle permitting reformation of a donative document, even if unambiguous, when clear and convincing evidence establishes that a mistake of fact or law affected specific terms and reveals the donor's true intention.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Musa Mensah, a corrections officer, carried a firearm believing his position exempted him from licensing requirements under a statute he had misread. The statute contained no such exemption. Because the error concerned the legal effect of the statute rather than an underlying fact, the mistake-of-fact doctrine provides no defense and Mensah remains subject to prosecution.
Defendant Marrero was a Federal corrections officer employed at a facility in Danbury, Connecticut. In 1977 he was arrested inside a Manhattan social club while carrying a loaded .38 caliber automatic pistol. At the time of arrest he asserted his Federal corrections officer status and maintained that he was authorized to carry the weapon without a permit. Marrero claimed that his belief rested on interpretations supplied by fellow officers and teachers together with the wording of the peace officer statutes themselves. The case had already moved through several procedural stages before trial. Marrero's pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment was granted at 94 Misc 2d 367. The Appellate Division reversed that order and reinstated the indictment by a divided vote at 71 AD2d 346. Marrero's subsequent appeal from the Appellate Division order lapsed and was dismissed. At trial Marrero sought to present evidence that his personal misunderstanding of the statutory definition of a peace officer excused his conduct. The trial court rejected the proffered defense, refused to charge the jury on the issue, and the jury returned a verdict convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
View caseAn officer obtained a warrant describing the items to be seized but the description contained an incorrect address due to a clerical transposition of numbers. The officer reasonably believed the warrant authorized the search of the correct residence. Because the mistake was one of fact and objectively reasonable under the circumstances, the officer receives qualified immunity from the ensuing Fourth Amendment claim.
In February 1997, a concerned citizen informed ATF Special Agent Jeff Groh that on multiple visits to the ranch of Joseph Ramirez and his family in Butte-Silver Bow County, Montana, the visitor had observed a large stock of weaponry including an automatic rifle, grenades, a grenade launcher, and a rocket launcher. Groh prepared and signed an application for a warrant to search the ranch for any automatic firearms or parts, destructive devices including grenades, grenade launchers, rocket launchers, and receipts pertaining to their purchase or manufacture. He supported the application with a detailed affidavit setting forth the basis for his belief that the listed items were concealed on the premises. Groh also completed a warrant form that, in the portion calling for a description of the person or property to be seized, contained a description of the respondents' two-story blue house rather than the stockpile of firearms. The warrant did not incorporate the application by reference. The magistrate judge signed the warrant form after reviewing the documents, and the affidavit was placed under seal. The day after the magistrate issued the warrant, Groh led a team of federal agents and local sheriff's deputies in executing the search on the Ramirez ranch while Joseph Ramirez was absent but his wife and children were present. The officers uncovered no illegal weapons or explosives. Groh gave Mrs. Ramirez a copy of the search warrant but not the sealed application. The following day he faxed respondents' attorney a copy of the page of the application listing the items to be seized. Respondents Joseph Ramirez and his family brought this action against Groh and the other officers under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the search violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court entered summary judgment for all defendants on all claims. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment as to all defendants and claims except the Fourth Amendment claim against Groh, on which it reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity questions.
View caseMalcolm McKinley testified that Meredith Maxwell willingly accompanied him to a hotel room, initiated physical contact, and appeared to consent throughout the encounter. Maxwell later claimed she had not consented. Because evidence of Maxwell's conduct could support a reasonable and good-faith belief in consent, the court must instruct the jury on the mistake-of-fact defense.
On Saturday, November 4, 1989, Deborah S. and her sister Jenny S. were staying at the Episcopal Sanctuary homeless shelter at Eighth and Market Streets in San Francisco after arriving from Wichita, Kansas approximately two weeks earlier. Deborah waited outside the shelter while Jenny went inside. Defendant Wash Jones Williams, a 52-year-old electrician, volunteer, and resident at the shelter who stood 6 feet 1 inch tall and weighed 220 pounds, approached the 28-year-old Deborah, who was 5 feet 1 inch tall and weighed 117 pounds. Williams suggested getting coffee with no strings attached, and the pair spent the morning walking, talking, and eating. Williams purchased a bracelet for Deborah from a street vendor on Turk Street. He led her to the Dahlia Hotel, rang the buzzer, rented a room, and requested a sheet from the clerk. Once inside the room, Deborah noticed there was no television. Deborah attempted to leave but could not release the bolt lock. According to Deborah's testimony, Williams punched her in the left eye. Williams pushed her onto the bed. Williams ordered her to remove her pants while stating he did not like to hurt people. Williams engaged in sexual intercourse for 10 to 15 minutes despite her screams and efforts to push him off. Williams testified to a different version of events, stating that Deborah hugged and kissed him upon entering the room, initiated removal of her clothes, fondled him for 10 to 15 minutes to overcome his impotence as a diabetic, and inserted his penis into her vagina. After the encounter, Deborah returned to the shelter, obtained directions to the nearest police station, walked to the San Francisco Hall of Justice, and reported that she had been raped, at which point her eye was swollen shut. An officer took Deborah's statement and drove her to the hospital, where she waited approximately seven hours for an examination. The examining nurse and doctor observed that the eye injury was more consistent with a punch than a slap. Vaginal slides showed the presence of semen. Deborah had additional complaints of pain and tenderness consistent with her account. She appeared scared during the exam. Williams was convicted of two counts of forcible rape and one count of false imprisonment. The trial court instructed the jury on consent but refused to give the requested instruction on reasonable and good faith but mistaken belief as to consent. The jury convicted Williams on all counts, and he was sentenced to eight years in state prison. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding substantial evidence supported giving the requested instruction based on Deborah's willing accompaniment to the hotel, her lack of objection to the bedsheet, Williams's account of events inside the room, and the clerk's failure to hear screams or sounds of violence.
View case2 common questions
In criminal law the defense succeeds whenever the honest mistake negates the required mental state, even if the belief was unreasonable, although recklessness or negligence in forming the belief may still support liability for a lesser offense. In the self-defense context the Restatement requires the mistake to be reasonable.
A mistake of fact negates the mental state when it concerns an underlying circumstance that would make the conduct innocent. A mistake about the legal effect of a statute generally does not excuse liability unless the statute itself recognizes a defense based on good-faith reliance on an official interpretation.
Matthew Martinez executed a will leaving "my 20 percent of Precision Plastics, Inc." to his plant supervisor Meredith Maxwell. An outdated capitalization table caused Martinez to believe he still held that interest, when he actually owned only 5 percent plus a 15 percent stake in a related LLC he had described to family as part of the same gift. Clear and convincing proof of the mistake and Martinez's intent supports reformation to convey both interests to Maxwell.
2 common questions
Yes. Both the Restatement (Third) of Property and the Uniform Probate Code authorize reformation of even unambiguous donative documents when clear and convincing evidence shows a mistake of fact or law affected specific terms and establishes the donor's true intention.
Direct statements by the donor to third parties, consistent course-of-conduct evidence, and the existence of a closely related asset the donor actually owned can together meet the standard when they demonstrate both the mistake and the donor's contrary intention.