Also known as: MPC § 2.04 · Model Penal Code section 2.04 · MPC 2.04 · ignorance or mistake
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A statutory provision establishing when ignorance or mistake as to fact or law supplies a defense to criminal liability. The defense is available if the error negatives the culpable mental state required for a material element of the offense or if the governing law treats the resulting state of mind as exculpatory. The defense is also available when the actor reasonably relies on an official but erroneous statement of law. When the defendant would still be guilty of a lesser offense under the facts as supposed, the provision reduces the grade and degree of the conviction rather than barring liability entirely.
Michelle Murphy, a software engineer, reviewed her company's data policy and formed the sincere belief that a customer data set had already been anonymized. She integrated the data into an algorithm and launched it, unaware that visible personal identifiers remained. The mistake prevented her from possessing the knowledge that the information was still identifiable at the time of use.
Marcus Mitchell, a nurse practitioner, received direct assurance from the supervising physician that a medication had been reclassified as over-the-counter. He administered it from clinic stock without a prescription, relying on that statement. The resulting state of mind aligned with the exculpatory mental state recognized by the governing law.
Mohan Malhotra attended an agency seminar where an agency lawyer stated that certain conduct fell outside domestic regulatory rules. He engaged in the conduct just beyond the stated line in reliance on the statement. The reasonable reliance on the official yet erroneous interpretation supplied the exculpatory state of mind.
David and Ginger Twitchell were the parents of Robyn Twitchell, who died on April 8, 1986, at the age of two and one-half years. Robyn's death resulted from peritonitis caused by the perforation of his bowel, which had been obstructed as a result of an anomaly known as Meckel's diverticulum. Evidence presented at trial indicated that this condition could be corrected by surgery with a high success rate. The Twitchells are practicing Christian Scientists who grew up in Christian Science families and believe in healing by spiritual treatment. During Robyn's five-day illness from Friday, April 4, through Tuesday, April 8, they retained a Christian Science practitioner, a Christian Science nurse, and at one time consulted with Nathan Talbot, who held a position in the church known as the Committee on Publication. As a result of that consultation, David Twitchell read a church publication concerning the legal rights and obligations of Christian Scientists in Massachusetts. That publication quoted a portion of G.L. c. 273, § 1, as then amended, which accepted remedial treatment by spiritual means alone as satisfying any parental obligation not to neglect a child or to provide a child with physical care. The Twitchells appealed their convictions of involuntary manslaughter, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted their request for direct appellate review.
Melanie Morris received confirmation at a company compliance seminar that a civilian drone design was exempt from export restrictions. She emailed the design files abroad believing the material was uncontrolled. The honest mistake undercut the knowledge element the prosecution was required to prove.
Defendant Marrero was a Federal corrections officer employed at a facility in Danbury, Connecticut. In 1977 he was arrested inside a Manhattan social club while carrying a loaded .38 caliber automatic pistol. At the time of arrest he asserted his Federal corrections officer status and maintained that he was authorized to carry the weapon without a permit. Marrero claimed that his belief rested on interpretations supplied by fellow officers and teachers together with the wording of the peace officer statutes themselves. The case had already moved through several procedural stages before trial. Marrero's pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment was granted at 94 Misc 2d 367. The Appellate Division reversed that order and reinstated the indictment by a divided vote at 71 AD2d 346. Marrero's subsequent appeal from the Appellate Division order lapsed and was dismissed. At trial Marrero sought to present evidence that his personal misunderstanding of the statutory definition of a peace officer excused his conduct. The trial court rejected the proffered defense, refused to charge the jury on the issue, and the jury returned a verdict convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
Miguel Mendoza saw copper pipes on a neighboring vacant lot and recalled an old email indicating the materials had been abandoned with permission. He directed workers to remove the pipes believing they were discarded scrap. The genuine belief negated the intent to take property belonging to another.
On Saturday, November 4, 1989, Deborah S. and her sister Jenny S. were staying at the Episcopal Sanctuary homeless shelter at Eighth and Market Streets in San Francisco after arriving from Wichita, Kansas approximately two weeks earlier. Deborah waited outside the shelter while Jenny went inside. Defendant Wash Jones Williams, a 52-year-old electrician, volunteer, and resident at the shelter who stood 6 feet 1 inch tall and weighed 220 pounds, approached the 28-year-old Deborah, who was 5 feet 1 inch tall and weighed 117 pounds. Williams suggested getting coffee with no strings attached, and the pair spent the morning walking, talking, and eating. Williams purchased a bracelet for Deborah from a street vendor on Turk Street. He led her to the Dahlia Hotel, rang the buzzer, rented a room, and requested a sheet from the clerk. Once inside the room, Deborah noticed there was no television. Deborah attempted to leave but could not release the bolt lock. According to Deborah's testimony, Williams punched her in the left eye. Williams pushed her onto the bed. Williams ordered her to remove her pants while stating he did not like to hurt people. Williams engaged in sexual intercourse for 10 to 15 minutes despite her screams and efforts to push him off. Williams testified to a different version of events, stating that Deborah hugged and kissed him upon entering the room, initiated removal of her clothes, fondled him for 10 to 15 minutes to overcome his impotence as a diabetic, and inserted his penis into her vagina. After the encounter, Deborah returned to the shelter, obtained directions to the nearest police station, walked to the San Francisco Hall of Justice, and reported that she had been raped, at which point her eye was swollen shut. An officer took Deborah's statement and drove her to the hospital, where she waited approximately seven hours for an examination. The examining nurse and doctor observed that the eye injury was more consistent with a punch than a slap. Vaginal slides showed the presence of semen. Deborah had additional complaints of pain and tenderness consistent with her account. She appeared scared during the exam. Williams was convicted of two counts of forcible rape and one count of false imprisonment. The trial court instructed the jury on consent but refused to give the requested instruction on reasonable and good faith but mistaken belief as to consent. The jury convicted Williams on all counts, and he was sentenced to eight years in state prison. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding substantial evidence supported giving the requested instruction based on Deborah's willing accompaniment to the hotel, her lack of objection to the bedsheet, Williams's account of events inside the room, and the clerk's failure to hear screams or sounds of violence.
The defense applies when the defendant's ignorance or mistake prevents formation of the purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness, or negligence that the offense requires for a material element. Courts examine whether the error directly undercuts the culpable mental state the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
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…classes: [¶] .... .... .... .... .... .... .... [¶] Three — Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged under an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent." : Since Mayberry , supra , the Courts of Appeal have struggled with the issue of when an instruction on reasonable and good faith…
…them as felons? Might it not be wise to ingraft an exception in the statute?" : The American Law Institute in its Model Penal
…who is charged by law with the responsibility for the interpretation or enforcement of the law defining the offense. See Model Penal Code § 2.04 (3) (b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Cf. United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., supra at 673-674. Federal courts have characterized an affirmative defense of this…
…The proposition that New York adopted the MPC general approach finds additional support in the comments to section 2.04
…to the offense. The Model Penal Code
Yes, when the governing law itself treats the state of mind produced by the ignorance or mistake as a defense. This independent basis operates separately from negation of a material element.
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The defense is unavailable to bar conviction entirely, but the ignorance or mistake reduces the grade and degree of the offense to those of the lesser crime the defendant would have committed.
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Yes, when the defendant acts in reasonable reliance on an official statement contained in a statute, judicial decision, administrative order, or interpretation by the public officer charged with enforcement of the law, and the statement is later determined to be invalid.
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Yes, when the statute or other enactment defining the offense was not known to the actor and had not been published or otherwise reasonably made available prior to the conduct.
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