Also known as: more definite statements · motion for a more definite statement · Rule 12(e) motion · motion for definite statement
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A procedural device available to a party who receives a pleading to which a response is required but that is so vague or ambiguous that a meaningful response cannot reasonably be prepared. The motion must identify the defects and the details sought and must be filed before any responsive pleading. If the court orders a more definite statement and the order is not obeyed within 14 days after notice of the order or within the time the court sets, the court may strike the pleading or issue any other appropriate order.
Northern Move sued Noon Dispatch for repeated delivery failures but listed no specific shipments, dates, or customers. Noon Dispatch could not admit or deny the claims in any meaningful way. It therefore moved for a more definite statement before answering, pointing out the missing details needed to frame a response.
Malcolm McKinley sued his former employer alleging discriminatory termination but supplied no facts about comparators or the decision-makers involved. The employer moved for a more definite statement, arguing it could not prepare an answer without knowing which conduct supported the claim. The motion preserved the employer's ability to respond once the pleading was clarified.
Akos Swierkiewicz, a native of Hungary who was 53 years old at the time of his complaint, began working for Sorema N.A. in April 1989 as senior vice president and chief underwriting officer. Sorema is a reinsurance company headquartered in New York and principally owned and controlled by a French parent corporation. Nearly six years later, Sorema's Chief Executive Officer François M. Chavel demoted Swierkiewicz to a marketing and services position and transferred the bulk of his underwriting responsibilities to Nicholas Papadopoulo, a 32-year-old French national. About a year later, Chavel appointed Papadopoulo as chief underwriting officer, even though Swierkiewicz had 26 years of experience in the insurance industry while Papadopoulo had only one year of underwriting experience. Following his demotion, Swierkiewicz was isolated by Chavel, excluded from business decisions and meetings, and denied the opportunity to reach his true potential. In April 1997, Swierkiewicz sent a memo to Chavel outlining his grievances and requesting a severance package. Two weeks later, after refusing to resign without a severance package, Swierkiewicz was fired by Chavel. Swierkiewicz filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. He alleged that he had been terminated on account of his national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. He also alleged that he had been terminated on account of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that Swierkiewicz had not adequately alleged circumstances that support an inference of discrimination. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the Courts of Appeals concerning the proper pleading standard for employment discrimination cases.
View caseMosaic Retail sued Millennium Media alleging an agreement to restrain trade but stated only parallel pricing without facts showing an actual conspiracy. Millennium Media moved for a more definite statement, contending the complaint left it unable to identify which communications or meetings it must admit or deny. The motion forced the plaintiff to supply the factual detail needed for a response.
In 1984 the divestiture of AT&T's local telephone business created seven regional service monopolies known as Regional Bell Operating Companies or Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers. More than a decade later Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 which restructured local telephone markets and imposed duties on the ILECs to facilitate entry by competitive local exchange carriers through resale of services at wholesale rates, leasing of unbundled network elements, or interconnection of facilities. William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of a putative class of all subscribers of local telephone and high-speed internet services from February 8, 1996 to the present. They named as defendants four consolidated ILECs: BellSouth Corporation, Qwest Communications International Inc., SBC Communications Inc., and Verizon Communications Inc. The complaint alleged that these ILECs conspired to restrain trade by engaging in parallel conduct to inhibit CLECs, including unfair agreements for network access, inferior connections, overcharging, and billing practices designed to sabotage CLEC customer relations. The complaint further alleged that the ILECs agreed not to compete against one another in their respective territories. This agreement was inferred from their common failure to pursue business opportunities in contiguous markets and from a statement by Qwest CEO Richard Notebaert that competing in another ILEC's territory might be a good way to turn a quick dollar but that does not make it right. The complaint asserted that in light of the absence of meaningful competition among the ILECs and their parallel course of conduct the defendants had entered into a contract combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry and to allocate customers and markets. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. It concluded that the alleged parallel behavior was fully explained by each ILEC's independent interest in defending its own territory and that the complaint did not allege facts suggesting the decision to refrain from competing elsewhere was contrary to the ILECs' apparent economic interests. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that plus factors need not be pleaded and that allegations of parallel conduct suffice if they leave open the possibility of collusion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct.
View caseMichelle Murphy sued her union alleging failure to process grievances but gave no dates, grievance numbers, or descriptions of the underlying disputes. The union moved for a more definite statement before answering, explaining that the complaint prevented it from determining which grievances were at issue. The motion ensured the union could prepare a targeted response once the facts were supplied.
The petitioners, Negro members of the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, brought this class suit in a Federal District Court in Texas on behalf of themselves and other Negro employees similarly situated. They sued the Brotherhood, its Local Union No. 28, and officers of both the Brotherhood and Local Union No. 28. The petitioners worked for the Texas and New Orleans Railroad at its Houston Freight House, where Local 28 acted as the designated bargaining agent for their unit under the Railway Labor Act. A contract between the Union and the Railroad protected employees in the unit from discharge and loss of seniority. In May 1954 the Railroad claimed to abolish 45 jobs held by the petitioners or other Negroes, leading to their discharge or demotion. The jobs were actually filled by white employees, although a few Negroes were rehired without their prior seniority. The Union, following a plan, ignored the petitioners' repeated requests for protection and declined to offer them the same safeguards provided to white employees. The complaint also asserted that the Union had failed overall to represent Negro employees equally and in good faith, seeking declaratory judgment, injunction, and damages for the alleged violation of fair representation rights under the Railway Labor Act. The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that the National Railroad Adjustment Board possessed exclusive jurisdiction, that the Railroad was an indispensable party not joined as a defendant, and that the complaint did not state a claim for relief. The District Court dismissed the action on the basis of the Adjustment Board's exclusive jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed that dismissal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the case presented an important question about employee rights under the Railway Labor Act.
View caseThe motion must be made before filing a responsive pleading. It is unavailable once an answer has been served.
Supporting sources
The court may strike the pleading or issue any other appropriate order. The fourteen-day period for compliance begins after notice of the order.
Supporting sources
Yes. Service of the motion starts a twenty-one-day period during which the plaintiff may amend once as a matter of course, measured from the earlier of the motion or a responsive pleading.
Supporting sources
A motion for a more definite statement addresses vagueness that prevents any response at all. A motion to dismiss tests legal sufficiency assuming the facts alleged are true.
Supporting sources
Yes. When allegations from distinct transactions are lumped together without numbered paragraphs or separate counts, the court may order a more definite statement to promote clarity.
Supporting sources
…69 F.2d 326, 329 (8th Cir. 1934)). The Leimer court viewed the Federal Rules — specifically Rules 8(a)(2), 12(b)(6), 12(e) (motion for a more definite statement), and 56 (motion for summary judgment) — as reinforcing the notion that “there is no justification for dismissing a complaint for insufficiency of statement, except where it appears to a…