Also known as: motions to dismiss · MTD
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A procedural request by which a party asks the court to terminate an action or a claim without a trial on the merits. The request commonly rests on a defect in the pleadings, lack of jurisdiction, or failure of the allegations to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
Maurice Marshall sued Maxwell Manufacturing alleging that the company conspired with competitors to fix prices. The complaint stated only that the defendants acted in parallel and that an agreement must have existed. Maxwell moved to dismiss. The court disregarded the bare assertion of conspiracy and found that the remaining facts did not plausibly show an agreement, so the motion succeeded.
Maya Malik was indicted by a grand jury. She filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, claiming one juror lacked legal qualification because of a prior felony conviction. The record showed that twelve qualified jurors still concurred in the indictment. The court denied the motion.
Madison Meyers sued several telecommunications firms alleging they conspired to restrain trade by charging similar rates. The complaint described only identical pricing behavior without facts suggesting prior agreement. The defendants moved to dismiss. The court held that the allegations described independent action rather than conspiracy and granted the motion.
In 1984 the divestiture of AT&T's local telephone business created seven regional service monopolies known as Regional Bell Operating Companies or Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers. More than a decade later Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 which restructured local telephone markets and imposed duties on the ILECs to facilitate entry by competitive local exchange carriers through resale of services at wholesale rates, leasing of unbundled network elements, or interconnection of facilities. William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of a putative class of all subscribers of local telephone and high-speed internet services from February 8, 1996 to the present. They named as defendants four consolidated ILECs: BellSouth Corporation, Qwest Communications International Inc., SBC Communications Inc., and Verizon Communications Inc. The complaint alleged that these ILECs conspired to restrain trade by engaging in parallel conduct to inhibit CLECs, including unfair agreements for network access, inferior connections, overcharging, and billing practices designed to sabotage CLEC customer relations. The complaint further alleged that the ILECs agreed not to compete against one another in their respective territories. This agreement was inferred from their common failure to pursue business opportunities in contiguous markets and from a statement by Qwest CEO Richard Notebaert that competing in another ILEC's territory might be a good way to turn a quick dollar but that does not make it right. The complaint asserted that in light of the absence of meaningful competition among the ILECs and their parallel course of conduct the defendants had entered into a contract combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry and to allocate customers and markets. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. It concluded that the alleged parallel behavior was fully explained by each ILEC's independent interest in defending its own territory and that the complaint did not allege facts suggesting the decision to refrain from competing elsewhere was contrary to the ILECs' apparent economic interests. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that plus factors need not be pleaded and that allegations of parallel conduct suffice if they leave open the possibility of collusion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct.
View caseMiles Montgomery was served with process while briefly visiting California on business. He moved to dismiss the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court found that his physical presence in the state at the time of service supplied the necessary contacts and denied the motion.
Dennis Burnham married Francie Burnham in 1976 in West Virginia. In 1977 the couple moved to New Jersey, where their two children were born. In July 1987 the Burnhams separated. Mrs. Burnham, who intended to move to California, was visiting her parents in that State when she filed for divorce in New Jersey on grounds of extreme cruelty, seeking spousal and child support, custody of the children, and possession of the family home. In early August 1987 petitioner visited Mrs. Burnham in California to discuss the children and the separation. He took the children to San Francisco for a few days. Upon returning the children to Mrs. Burnham, petitioner was served with a summons and complaint for divorce filed in California Superior Court that also sought custody of the children. After being served, petitioner returned to New Jersey. In January 1988 petitioner made a special appearance in the California action and moved to quash service of process on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The Superior Court denied the motion, and the State Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the state and federal courts.
View caseMegan Moore lived with her grandson and two great-grandchildren in a single-family zone. The city cited her for violating the occupancy ordinance and she moved to dismiss the enforcement action. The court examined whether the ordinance's narrow definition of family infringed protected liberty interests and granted the motion.
In early 1973, Mrs. Inez Moore received a notice of violation from the city of East Cleveland. The notice stated that her grandson John Moore, Jr., was an illegal occupant of her home. It directed her to comply with the housing ordinance. Mrs. Moore lived in her East Cleveland home together with her son Dale Moore, Sr., and her two grandsons Dale Moore, Jr., and John Moore, Jr. John came to live with her after his mother's death when he was less than one year old. When she failed to remove John from the home, the city filed a criminal charge against her. Mrs. Moore moved to dismiss the charge. She claimed that the ordinance was constitutionally invalid on its face. Her motion was overruled. Upon conviction she was sentenced to five days in jail and a $25 fine. The East Cleveland ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. The ordinance defined family to include only a husband or wife of the nominal head of the household, unmarried children of the head or spouse provided they have no children residing with them, a parent of the head or spouse, or not more than one dependent child of the head or spouse along with that child's spouse and dependent children. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction after giving full consideration to her constitutional claims. The Ohio Supreme Court denied review of the case. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of her appeal.
View caseMusa Mensah was charged under a state sodomy statute for private consensual conduct. He moved to dismiss the prosecution on constitutional grounds. The district court granted the motion after determining that the statute violated protected liberty interests.
In August 1982, respondent Michael Hardwick was charged with violating the Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy by committing that act with another adult male in the bedroom of respondent's home. After a preliminary hearing, the District Attorney decided not to present the matter to the grand jury unless further evidence developed. Hardwick, who identified as a practicing homosexual, then brought suit in the Federal District Court challenging the constitutionality of the statute insofar as it criminalized consensual sodomy. He asserted that the Georgia sodomy statute, as administered by the defendants, placed him in imminent danger of arrest. The District Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, relying on Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Richmond, which the Supreme Court had summarily affirmed. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that the Georgia statute violated respondent's fundamental rights because his homosexual activity is a private and intimate association beyond the reach of state regulation by reason of the Ninth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It remanded for trial. John and Mary Doe were also plaintiffs in the action. They alleged that they wished to engage in sexual activity proscribed by the statute in the privacy of their home and that they had been chilled and deterred from engaging in such activity by both the existence of the statute and Hardwick's arrest. The District Court held that because they had neither sustained, nor were in immediate danger of sustaining, any direct injury from the enforcement of the statute, they did not have proper standing to maintain the action. The Court of Appeals affirmed that dismissal. The Georgia statute at issue, Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2, provides that a person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another. A person convicted shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than twenty years. Because other Courts of Appeals had arrived at judgments contrary to that of the Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme Court granted the Attorney General's petition for certiorari questioning the holding that the sodomy statute violates the fundamental rights of homosexuals.
View caseThe complaint must contain well-pleaded factual allegations that, taken as true, plausibly show entitlement to relief rather than merely possible entitlement. Conclusory statements are disregarded.
A defendant may move to dismiss after indictment on the ground that a grand juror was not legally qualified, provided the objection was not previously ruled on and at least twelve qualified jurors concurred in the indictment.
A defendant waives the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by omitting it from a pre-answer motion or by filing a responsive pleading without raising the defense.
…May 1974, a municipal court found Mrs. Moore guilty of violating the single-family occupancy ordinance. The court overruled her motion to dismiss the charge, rejecting her claim that the ordinance's definition of "family" is invalid on its face under the United States Constitution. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed on the authority…