navy

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In the late 1990s the city of New London, Connecticut, confronted severe economic decline after the 1996 closure of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, which had employed more than 1,500 people. The city's unemployment rate stood nearly double the state average and its population had dropped below 24,000 residents from a 1970 high of 30,000. State and local officials therefore designated the Fort Trumbull peninsula for targeted economic revitalization. In 1998 the New London Development Corporation, a private nonprofit entity, was reactivated to prepare a redevelopment plan covering roughly 90 acres. The plan divided the area into seven parcels designated for a waterfront conference hotel and marinas, retail and entertainment space, research and office facilities, parking and park support, residential units, a Coast Guard museum, and additional office and retail uses. The city council formally approved the plan in January 2000 and authorized the NLDC to acquire needed parcels by purchase or, if necessary, by eminent domain. Petitioners Susette Kelo, Wilhelmina Dery, and seven other owners held fifteen properties within parcels 3 and 4A; ten of those parcels were occupied by the owners or their family members and none was alleged to be blighted. After negotiations with the NLDC failed, the corporation initiated condemnation proceedings against the remaining properties in November 2000. In December 2000 the petitioners filed suit in New London Superior Court asserting that the proposed takings violated the public-use limitation of the Fifth Amendment. Following a seven-day bench trial the Superior Court entered a permanent restraining order barring condemnation of the parcel 4A properties but denied relief as to the parcel 3 properties. Both sides appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, which upheld the validity of all challenged takings. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the federal constitutional question.

Helen B. Feeney, a Massachusetts resident, entered the workforce in 1948 and held a variety of jobs in the private sector for the next fourteen years. She first entered the state civil service system in 1963 after competing successfully for a Senior Clerk Stenographer position in the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency. She worked there for four years and was promoted in 1967 to Federal Funds and Personnel Coordinator in the same agency. The agency and her job were eliminated in 1975. During her twelve years of public employment, Feeney took and passed multiple open competitive civil service examinations. She received the second-highest score on a 1971 examination for a position with the Board of Dental Examiners and the third-highest score on a 1973 test for an Administrative Assistant position with a mental health center. Despite these strong performances, the veterans' preference placed her behind multiple male veterans on the eligible lists, some with lower scores, and she was never certified for appointment. The Massachusetts veterans' preference statute, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 31, § 23, applies to all positions in the state's classified civil service, which constitute approximately 60 percent of the public jobs in the state. It requires that disabled veterans, veterans, and surviving spouses and surviving parents of veterans who achieve passing scores be ranked above all other candidates on eligible lists. The preference originated in 1884 as a tie-breaking measure for Civil War veterans and blossomed into an absolute preference in 1895 when the state exempted veterans from all merit selection requirements. In 1919 the formula was modified to provide a priority in eligibility rather than an absolute preference in hiring, and it has since been extended to cover veterans of later wars. At the time this litigation began, over 98 percent of the veterans in Massachusetts were male. During the decade between 1963 and 1973, 47,005 new permanent appointments were made in the classified official service. Of the women appointed, 1.8 percent were veterans, while 54 percent of the men had veteran status. Feeney sued the Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts and other state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the absolute preference unconstitutionally denied women equal protection of the laws. A three-judge District Court ruled in her favor in 1976. After this Court vacated the judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of Washington v. Davis, the District Court reaffirmed its conclusion in 1978, and the Attorney General appealed directly to this Court.