In June 1977, petitioner Cyril Standefer was indicted on four counts of making gifts to a public official in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(f). He faced five additional counts of aiding and abetting a revenue official in accepting compensation in addition to that authorized by law in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7214(a)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The indictment charged that Standefer, as head of Gulf Oil Corp.’s tax department, had authorized payments for five vacation trips to Cyril Niederberger. Niederberger was the Internal Revenue Service agent in charge of the audits of Gulf’s federal income tax returns. The trips were to Pompano Beach in July 1971, Miami in January 1973, Absecon in August-September 1973, Pebble Beach in April 1974, and Las Vegas in June 1974.
Prior to Standefer’s indictment, Niederberger was separately charged in a 10-count indictment with violating 18 U.S.C. § 201(g) and 26 U.S.C. § 7214(a)(2). In February 1977, Niederberger was tried and convicted on four counts of violating § 201(g) in connection with the Miami, Absecon, Pebble Beach, and Las Vegas vacations and on two counts of violating § 7214(a)(2) for the Pebble Beach and Las Vegas trips. He was acquitted on the § 201(g) count involving the Pompano Beach trip and on the three counts under § 7214(a)(2) charging him with accepting payments from Gulf for trips to Pompano Beach, Miami, and Absecon.
In July 1977, Standefer moved to dismiss the counts under § 7214(a)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 which charged him with aiding and abetting Niederberger in connection with the Pompano Beach, Miami, and Absecon vacations. The District Court denied the motion. Standefer’s case then proceeded to trial on all nine counts, where he admitted authorizing payment for all five vacation trips but testified that the trips were purely social. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all nine counts, and Standefer was sentenced to concurrent terms of six months’ imprisonment followed by two years’ probation and fined a total of $18,000.
Standefer appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, claiming that he could not be convicted of aiding and abetting a principal who had been acquitted of the charged offense. By a divided vote, the Court of Appeals sitting en banc rejected that contention. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the question presented is one of importance to the administration of criminal justice on which the Courts of Appeals are in conflict.