Also known as: nuisances · private nuisance · public nuisance
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land. Liability arises when the invasion is intentional and unreasonable or otherwise actionable under negligence or strict liability rules.
Neville Norton owns a home directly across a narrow inlet from a ship-repair yard operated by Nova Pharmaceuticals. The yard begins open-air sandblasting and welding at night, sending metallic dust that coats Norton's decks and furniture while compressor noise prevents sleep. Norton sues for private nuisance. The dust and noise constitute a nontrespassory invasion of his interest in the use and enjoyment of his land.
Nyah Ndlovu purchases coastal land intending to build rental homes. A new state regulation prohibits all development to protect dunes. Ndlovu claims a total taking. Because the prohibited construction would have created a common-law nuisance by flooding neighboring properties during storms, the regulation does not require compensation.
Nikhil Narayan operates a cattle feedlot on rural land. Years later Nina Nielsen develops a large retirement community nearby. Residents complain of odors and flies. Nielsen sues to enjoin the feedlot as a nuisance. The court finds a nuisance but balances equities and awards damages rather than an injunction because the developer came to the nuisance.
In 1956, Spur’s predecessors in interest developed feedlots about ½ mile south of Olive Avenue in an area between the confluence of the usually dry Agua Fria and New Rivers, some 14 to 15 miles west of the urban area of Phoenix. By April and May of 1959, the Northside Hay Mill was feeding between 6,000 and 7,000 head of cattle and Welborn approximately 1,500 head on a combined area of 35 acres. In 1960, Spur purchased the property and expanded the feedlot operation from approximately thirty-five acres to one hundred fourteen acres by 1962, eventually maintaining between twenty thousand and thirty thousand head of cattle at the time of trial. Del E. Webb Development Co. began planning Sun City, a retirement community, in May 1959 after purchasing twenty thousand acres of farmland for fifteen million dollars. Construction of a golf course started that September. Homes were first offered in January 1960. The first residents moved in during 1960. By the time of trial, Sun City had a population of approximately fourteen thousand people, and the development had extended south to within five hundred feet of Spur's feedlot north of Olive Avenue. Residents of Sun City began complaining about odors and flies from the feedlot, which produced over a million pounds of wet manure per day, and Webb encountered sales resistance starting around 1963 in the southwestern portion of the development. Webb attempted to buy the feedlot from Spur but the parties could not agree on a price. Webb then filed suit alleging that the feedlot was a public nuisance because flies and odors drifted over the southern portion of Sun City, rendering in excess of one thousand three hundred lots unfit for residential development. The trial court, after proceedings that included an advisory jury later discharged and special actions in the Arizona Supreme Court, found the feedlot to be a nuisance, permanently enjoined its operation, and awarded damages to Webb. Spur appealed from the injunction and the damages award, while Webb cross-appealed from the trial court's refusal to award attorneys' fees. During the appeal process, Spur agreed to and did shut down its operation without prejudice to the final determination.
View caseNestor Navarro owns Grand Central Terminal. New York City designates the terminal a landmark and blocks construction of an office tower above it. Navarro claims a taking. The restriction does not constitute a taking because it prevents uses that would interfere with neighboring owners' interests in light, air, and historic character.
In 1965 New York City enacted the Landmarks Preservation Law, which created an eleven-member Landmarks Preservation Commission and authorized it to designate buildings at least thirty years old that possess special historical or aesthetic interest. The law required owners of designated landmarks to obtain Commission approval before altering exterior architectural features and imposed an affirmative duty to keep those features in good repair. In August 1967 the Commission designated Grand Central Terminal a landmark and the city tax block it occupies a landmark site; the Board of Estimate confirmed the designation the following month. Penn Central Transportation Co. and its affiliates owned the Terminal, an eight-story Beaux-Arts structure completed in 1913 that served as the main station for the New York Central and Harlem lines. On January 22, 1968, Penn Central entered a fifty-year renewable lease with UGP Properties, Inc., under which UGP agreed to construct a multistory office building cantilevered above the Terminal and to pay Penn Central at least three million dollars annually after construction. Penn Central and UGP submitted two plans prepared by architect Marcel Breuer: Breuer I, a fifty-five-story tower resting on the Terminal roof, and Breuer II Revised, a fifty-three-story building that would have removed part of the 42d Street facade. After four days of hearings at which over 80 witnesses testified, the Commission denied this application as to both proposals. Penn Central filed suit in New York Supreme Court, Trial Term, seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages for a temporary taking. The trial court granted the injunctive and declaratory relief. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Penn Central had failed to prove deprivation of all reasonable beneficial use. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Terminal could still earn a reasonable return and that transferable development rights provided significant compensation. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseNadia Novak lives with her grandson and his two children in a single-family zone. City ordinance limits occupancy to nuclear families. Novak challenges the ordinance as exceeding the police power. The court strikes down the restriction, finding it does not reasonably advance nuisance prevention by regulating household composition.
In early 1973, Mrs. Inez Moore received a notice of violation from the city of East Cleveland. The notice stated that her grandson John Moore, Jr., was an illegal occupant of her home. It directed her to comply with the housing ordinance. Mrs. Moore lived in her East Cleveland home together with her son Dale Moore, Sr., and her two grandsons Dale Moore, Jr., and John Moore, Jr. John came to live with her after his mother's death when he was less than one year old. When she failed to remove John from the home, the city filed a criminal charge against her. Mrs. Moore moved to dismiss the charge. She claimed that the ordinance was constitutionally invalid on its face. Her motion was overruled. Upon conviction she was sentenced to five days in jail and a $25 fine. The East Cleveland ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. The ordinance defined family to include only a husband or wife of the nominal head of the household, unmarried children of the head or spouse provided they have no children residing with them, a parent of the head or spouse, or not more than one dependent child of the head or spouse along with that child's spouse and dependent children. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction after giving full consideration to her constitutional claims. The Ohio Supreme Court denied review of the case. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of her appeal.
View caseNeptune Energy operates a large cement plant. Nearby homeowners including Nestor Navarro sue for nuisance from dust, smoke, and vibration. The court finds a nuisance but denies a permanent injunction and awards permanent damages instead, allowing the plant to continue operations while compensating the neighbors.
The defendant Atlantic Cement Company operates a large cement plant near Albany. Neighboring land owners brought actions for injunction and damages by alleging injury to property from dirt, smoke and vibration emanating from the plant. A nuisance has been found after trial, temporary damages have been allowed; but an injunction has been denied. The court at Special Term also found the amount of permanent damage attributable to each plaintiff. The total of permanent damages to all plaintiffs thus found was $185,000. Respondent’s investment in the plant is in excess of $45,000,000. There are over 300 people employed there. The total damage to plaintiffs’ properties is, however, relatively small in comparison with the value of defendant’s operation and with the consequences of the injunction which plaintiffs seek. The orders at Special Term and at the Appellate Division denied the injunction. The plant commenced production in 1962.
View caseThe plaintiff must show a nontrespassory invasion of the interest in private use and enjoyment of land that is either intentional and unreasonable or otherwise actionable under negligence or strict liability rules. Causation and substantial harm are also required.
The court weighs the gravity of the harm to the plaintiff against the social utility of the defendant's conduct, the suitability of the location, and the cost of mitigation. Violation of a regulation or statute supplies evidence of unreasonableness.
A plaintiff may recover damages only upon proof of special harm different in kind from that suffered by the general public. Economic loss unique to the plaintiff's business satisfies the requirement.
Coming to the nuisance is a factor in balancing equities for injunctive relief but does not automatically defeat liability. Courts may award damages instead of shutting down an established activity.
Courts may grant an injunction, award damages, or both. When an injunction would cause disproportionate hardship, courts often award permanent damages and permit the activity to continue.