Also known as: nuptial agreements · antenuptial agreement · postnuptial agreement
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A written agreement between spouses or prospective spouses addressing classification or division of assets. In dissolution proceedings the court considers any such agreement when equitably apportioning property and assets belonging to either or both parties.
Neil Nair and Nia Nkosi married and later signed a written postnuptial agreement designating Neil's startup stock options as his individual property. After the company was acquired, Nia sought half the proceeds in their dissolution proceeding. The court classified the options as Neil's separate property under the agreement and assigned them to him without division.
Nikhil Narayan and Natasha Nielsen were about to marry and entered a written antenuptial agreement allocating business assets acquired during their relationship. When they later separated, Natasha claimed the agreement was unenforceable. The court considered the agreement as a factor in apportioning property under applicable dissolution statutes.
In October 1964, plaintiff and defendant entered into an oral agreement. While the parties lived together, they would combine their efforts and earnings. They would share equally any and all property accumulated as a result of their efforts, whether individual or combined. They further agreed to hold themselves out to the general public as husband and wife. Plaintiff would render her services as a companion, homemaker, housekeeper, and cook to defendant. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff agreed to give up her lucrative career as an entertainer and singer. She did so to devote her full time to defendant as a companion, homemaker, housekeeper, and cook. In return, defendant agreed to provide for all of plaintiff's financial support and needs for the rest of her life. The parties lived together from October 1964 through May 1970. During this period, as a result of their efforts and earnings, they acquired in defendant's name substantial real and personal property. This included motion picture rights worth over $1 million. In May 1970, defendant compelled plaintiff to leave his household. He continued to support plaintiff until November 1971 but thereafter refused to provide further support. Plaintiff brought this action asserting two causes of action. The first, for declaratory relief, asked the court to determine her contract and property rights. The second sought to impose a constructive trust upon one half of the property acquired during the course of the relationship. Defendant answered the complaint after an unsuccessful demurrer. Following extensive discovery and pretrial proceedings, the case came to trial. When the case was called for trial, plaintiff sought leave to file an amended complaint. The trial court treated defendant's motion to dismiss as one for judgment on the pleadings. This was augmented by a stipulation that defendant's marriage to Betty Marvin did not terminate until the filing of a final decree of divorce in January 1967. The court granted the motion and entered judgment for defendant. Plaintiff moved to set aside the judgment. She asked leave to amend her complaint to allege that she and defendant reaffirmed their agreement after the divorce became final. The trial court denied the motion. Plaintiff appealed from the judgment.
View caseNorman Nash and Nalini Narula were about to marry and signed a written antenuptial agreement directing use of frozen embryos in the event of divorce. After separation, Norman sought implantation contrary to the document. The court refused to enforce the agreement because it altered an essential incident of the marital relationship.
A.Z. and B.Z. married in 1977. For the first two years they resided in Virginia, where both served in the armed forces. They underwent fertility testing after difficulties conceiving. The wife suffered an ectopic pregnancy that resulted in miscarriage and removal of her left fallopian tube. In 1980 the couple moved to Maryland for a year of additional fertility treatment that produced no pregnancy. The wife transferred to Massachusetts in 1988 while the husband remained in Maryland for schooling. He joined her in Massachusetts in 1991. After arriving in Massachusetts the wife began IVF treatments at a clinic. The couple first attempted a GIFT procedure on November 6, 1988, which produced another ectopic pregnancy and removal of the wife's remaining fallopian tube. They then pursued IVF from 1988 through 1991. Each time before egg retrieval the couple signed a clinic consent form. They executed seven such forms in total, the last in August 1991. On every form the wife wrote that the preembryos should be returned to her for implantation should the couple separate. The husband usually signed the forms while blank and before the wife completed the disposition language. The 1991 treatment produced twin daughters born in 1992, and two vials of preembryos were frozen for possible later use. In spring 1995, before the couple separated, the wife thawed one vial and had a preembryo implanted without informing the husband. He learned of the procedure from an insurance notice. Relations deteriorated, the wife obtained a protective order against the husband, the couple separated, and the husband filed for divorce. At the time of divorce one vial containing four frozen preembryos remained in storage. The husband moved for a permanent injunction prohibiting the wife from using the preembryos. The Probate and Family Court bifurcated the preembryos issue from the divorce action and held a hearing at which both parties were represented by counsel. The probate judge found the consent form unenforceable because of changed circumstances since 1991 and balanced the parties' interests, granting the husband a permanent injunction. The Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case on its own motion. On February 8, 2000, it issued an order affirming the Probate and Family Court judgment, with this opinion to follow.
View caseNo. Under governing marital property statutes, a written agreement signed by both spouses reallocating property rights is enforceable without any bargained-for exchange or monetary payment.
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Yes. A written marital agreement expressly designating stock options as one spouse's individual property overcomes the presumption that assets acquired during marriage are marital property.
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No. Even when a postnuptial agreement authorizes an arbitrator to grant any relief a family court could order, the arbitrator lacks authority to alter marital status through annulment or divorce.
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It may still be enforceable if the document is signed by both spouses and meets statutory formalities. Lack of counsel alone does not invalidate the agreement absent fraud, duress, or unconscionability.
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…of Dawley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 342 [131 Cal. Rptr. 3, 551 P.2d 323] offers a close analogy. Rejecting the contention that an antenuptial agreement is invalid if the parties contemplated a marriage of short duration, we pointed out in Dawley that a standard based upon the subjective contemplation of the parties is uncertain and…