Also known as: order of protection · protective order · protective orders · restraining order
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
A court order that shields a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense during litigation.
A court order that prevents irreparable harm pending further proceedings.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
A court order that shields a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense during litigation.
A court order that prevents irreparable harm pending further proceedings.
Orbit Communications received a broad subpoena for internal emails in a contract dispute. Its counsel moved for relief after good-faith talks failed to narrow the request. The court limited the production to a defined time period and required cost-sharing to avoid oppressive expense.
A prosecutor learned that a key witness had recanted statements implicating the defendant. The office sought permission to delay disclosure until sentencing because early release could endanger the witness. The tribunal issued an order allowing the delay while still requiring eventual production of the information.
5 common questions
The movant must certify that a good-faith effort was made to resolve the dispute without court intervention. The court then decides whether good cause exists to protect against annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.
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A prosecutor may withhold such evidence only when a tribunal issues a protective order relieving the prosecutor of the usual disclosure duty. The order must be entered after the prosecutor demonstrates that disclosure would create a specific risk.
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The statute permits the partnership to seek a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction as extraordinary relief without first obtaining unanimous partner consent. The decision to pursue such relief is treated as part of the special litigation committee process.
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The court must require security in an amount it deems proper to cover costs and damages if the enjoined party is later found to have been wrongfully restrained. The United States and its agencies are exempt from this requirement.
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A protective order in the discovery context limits information exchange to prevent undue burden. An order of protection in domestic violence cases restrains contact or proximity to prevent physical harm and may be issued without prior notice upon a showing of irreparable injury.
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Limited partners of Omega Energy filed a derivative action alleging self-dealing by the general partner. The partnership moved for interim relief to halt asset transfers. The court granted a temporary restraining order preserving the status quo during the special litigation committee investigation.
Olympia Steel sought a preliminary injunction to stop a competitor from using allegedly misappropriated trade secrets. The court required the company to post a bond covering potential lost profits before the order took effect. The bond amount was set after the defendant submitted evidence of projected damages.
Onyx O'Reilly obtained an order barring repeated protests at a neighbor's home after prior demonstrations disrupted family life. The neighbor challenged the order as content-based. The court upheld the restriction because it targeted conduct rather than speech and left open ample alternative channels.
The Illinois residential picketing statute generally bars picketing of residences or dwellings but exempts from its prohibition the peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute. It also exempts picketing of a residence used as a place of business, picketing by a resident of his or her own home, and picketing at the place of holding a meeting or assembly on premises commonly used to discuss subjects of general public interest. On September 6, 1977, several of the appellees, all of whom are members of a civil rights organization entitled the Committee Against Racism, participated in a peaceful demonstration on the public sidewalk in front of the home of Michael Bilandic, then Mayor of Chicago, protesting his alleged failure to support the busing of schoolchildren to achieve racial integration. They were arrested and charged with unlawful residential picketing in violation of Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, § 21.1-2 (1977). Appellees pleaded guilty to the charge and were sentenced to periods of supervision ranging from six months to a year. In April 1978, appellees commenced this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Illinois residential picketing statute is unconstitutional on its face and as applied, and an injunction prohibiting defendants from enforcing the statute. Appellees did not attempt to attack collaterally their earlier state-court convictions, but requested only prospective relief. The District Court, ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, denied all relief. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
View casePrison officials sought to administer antipsychotic medication to Odin Obeng against his will after he refused treatment for a diagnosed mental disorder. The court reviewed medical evidence and issued an order authorizing the treatment because the inmate posed a danger to himself and others.
In August 1976 Walter Harper was sentenced to prison for robbery and incarcerated at the Washington State Penitentiary, where he spent most of his time in the mental health unit and consented to antipsychotic medication. In 1980 Harper was paroled on the condition that he participate in psychiatric treatment, which he received at Harborview Medical Center and later at Western State Hospital under a civil commitment order. His parole was revoked in December 1981 after he assaulted two nurses at a hospital in Seattle. Upon his return to prison, respondent was sent to the Special Offender Center, a 144-bed correctional institute established by the Washington Department of Corrections to diagnose and treat convicted felons with serious mental disorders. At the Center, Harper was diagnosed with a manic-depressive disorder and initially consented to treatment, including antipsychotic drugs, but in November 1982 he refused further medication. The treating psychiatrist then invoked SOC Policy 600.30 to administer the drugs involuntarily after a committee hearing found that Harper suffered from a mental disorder and posed a likelihood of serious harm to others. Harper was involuntarily medicated for about one year beginning November 23, 1982, then transferred to the Washington State Reformatory in November 1983 where he took no medication and his condition deteriorated, prompting his retransfer to the Center and another involuntary medication approval. He continued receiving the drugs subject to periodic reviews until his transfer to the Washington State Penitentiary in June 1986. In February 1985 Harper filed suit in state court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State and individual defendants, alleging that the failure to provide a judicial hearing before involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication violated due process and other constitutional provisions. After a bench trial in March 1987 the trial court upheld the policy's procedures as satisfying due process, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that a judicial hearing with full adversarial protections and proof by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence was required. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1989 to review the constitutional questions presented by the state court's decision.
…that a competent individual's right to refuse [psychotropic] medication is a fundamental liberty interest deserving the highest order of protection"). : Under traditional tort law, exceptions have been found only to protect dependent children. See Cruzan v. Harmon , 760 S.W.2d 408, 422, n. 17 (Mo. 1988) (citing cases where…