Also known as: per-capita · by the head
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An equal allocation of property among all members of a designated class of beneficiaries. Each eligible taker receives one share without regard to representation of a deceased ancestor.
Dr. Moore's trust directed clinic interests to her issue per capita at each generation. She was survived by son Mark and by three grandchildren through her predeceased daughter. The nearest generation with survivors contained two branches, so the trustee divided the interests into two equal shares. Mark received one share outright while the three grandchildren divided the second share equally.
State law required the Available School Fund to be distributed annually on a per capita basis to local districts. Each district received an equal amount per enrolled student regardless of the district's property wealth or tax base. The flat per-student formula produced identical per capita grants across wealthy and poor districts.
In the summer of 1968 Mexican-American parents whose children attended elementary and secondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School District in San Antonio Texas brought a class action. They sued on behalf of schoolchildren throughout the state who were members of minority groups or who were poor and resided in school districts having a low property tax base. Named as defendants were the State Board of Education the Commissioner of Education the State Attorney General and the Bexar County Board of Trustees. The complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. A three-judge court was impaneled in January 1969. The Texas system of financing public education originated with the state's first constitution in 1845. It evolved through constitutional amendments permitting local school districts to levy ad valorem taxes for school buildings and maintenance. These local revenues were supplemented by distributions from the state's Permanent School Fund established in 1854 and the Available School Fund. In the late 1940s the legislature enacted the Minimum Foundation School Program. Under the program the state supplies approximately 80 percent of the cost of teacher salaries operating expenses and transportation. Each district contributes the remaining 20 percent through a Local Fund Assignment. The assignment is calculated by an economic index reflecting relative taxpaying ability. Every district also levies additional local property taxes beyond the assignment to supplement its foundation grant. For the 1967-1968 school year the Edgewood Independent School District had an average assessed property value of $5960 per pupil and a median family income of $4686. It raised $26 per pupil through local taxation at a rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed valuation. It received $222 per pupil from the Foundation Program and obtained $108 in federal funds for a total of $356 per pupil. By comparison the Alamo Heights Independent School District had an assessed property value exceeding $49000 per pupil and a median family income of $8001. It raised $333 per pupil locally at a rate of $0.85 per $100 received $225 from the Foundation Program and $36 in federal funds for a total of $594 per pupil. Similar disparities in per-pupil expenditures existed throughout the state. They were largely attributable to differences in the amount of taxable property within each district. In December 1971 the three-judge District Court rendered judgment holding the Texas school finance system unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The State appealed. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1972 to consider the constitutional questions presented.
View caseFederal law governing fractionated Indian land interests directed per capita distribution of certain payments among living heirs. Each heir received an equal fractional share calculated by head count rather than by ancestral line. The method ensured every qualifying heir obtained the same undivided interest in the proceeds.
In the late 19th century, Congress enacted a series of land acts that divided communal Indian reservations into individual allotments for Indians and unallotted lands for non-Indian settlement. The Act of March 2, 1889, allotted 320 acres to each male Sioux head of household and 160 acres to most other individuals on the Great Reservation of the Sioux Nation, with the allotted lands held in trust by the United States. Ownership of these allotted lands fragmented over successive generations into numerous undivided interests, with some parcels having hundreds of owners. Because the land was held in trust and often could not be alienated or partitioned, the fractionation problem grew over time. This created administrative difficulties and economic waste. A 1928 report and comprehensive 1960 House and Senate studies indicated that one-half of approximately 12 million acres of allotted trust lands were held in fractionated ownership. In 1983, Congress enacted the Indian Land Consolidation Act. Section 207 provided that no undivided fractional interest in any tract of trust or restricted land within a tribe's reservation shall descend by intestacy or devise but shall escheat to the tribe if such interest represents 2 per centum or less of the total acreage in such tract and has earned to its owner less than $100 in the preceding year before it is due to escheat. The provision was signed into law on January 12, 1983, and became effective immediately, with no compensation provided to owners of escheated interests. Four enrolled members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe died in 1983 while owning fractional interests subject to the escheat provision. Chester Irving died on March 18, Mary Poor Bear-Little Hoop Cross died on March 23, Charles Leroy Pumpkin Seed died on April 2, and Edgar Pumpkin Seed died on June 23. Collectively the four decedents owned 41 such interests whose values included approximately $100 for the two interests lost by the Irving estate, approximately $2,700 for the 26 interests in the Cross estate, and approximately $1,816 for the 13 interests in the Pumpkin Seed estates. The three appellees are enrolled members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe who are or represent heirs or devisees of the decedents. Mary Irving is the daughter of Chester Irving, Eileen Bissonette is the guardian for the five minor children of Mary Poor Bear-Little Hoop Cross, and Patrick Pumpkin Seed is the son of Charles Leroy Pumpkin Seed and nephew of Edgar Pumpkin Seed. But for the escheat provision the fractional interests would have passed to the appellees or those they represent. Appellees filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota claiming that the escheat provision resulted in a taking of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment for the Government. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA state statute limited new ice plants by issuing one license per capita of local population. The licensing board calculated the allowable number of plants by dividing total residents by a fixed ratio. Each approved applicant received an equal share of the limited market regardless of existing plant capacity.
In 1925 the Oklahoma legislature passed Chapter 147 of the Session Laws. That statute declared the manufacture, sale, and distribution of ice a public business. It prohibited any person from engaging in that business without first obtaining a license from the Corporation Commission. The statute directed that a license would issue only after a formal hearing at which competent evidence established the necessity for additional ice facilities at the proposed location. It authorized the Commission to deny an application if existing licensed plants already provided sufficient capacity to meet public needs. New State Ice Company secured such a license and for several years operated an ice manufacturing and distribution business in Oklahoma City in which it had invested $500,000. While New State Ice Company was operating under its license, E.A. Liebmann purchased a parcel of land in Oklahoma City and began construction of an ice plant without applying for or obtaining a license from the Commission. Liebmann acted with the purpose of entering the business in direct competition with the licensed company. New State Ice Company filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma seeking an injunction to prevent Liebmann from manufacturing, selling, or distributing ice without a license. The district court dismissed the bill of complaint for want of equity. It concluded that the ice business is a private enterprise not subject to the statutory restrictions. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. The case arrived in the Supreme Court on appeal from the circuit court decree. The record before the Court included evidence of the structure of the ice industry in Oklahoma, the extent of competition or monopoly in communities across the state, the Commission's prior exercise of regulatory authority over ice plants under earlier statutes dating to 1908, and the practical effects of the 1925 licensing requirement on service and pricing in the state.
View caseA milk control board set minimum prices paid to producers on a per capita consumption basis within each market area. Every producer received the same per-unit price calculated from total population served. The uniform per capita formula prevented any single producer from obtaining a larger share based on volume alone.
In 1932, prices received by New York dairy farmers for milk fell substantially below the cost of production amid overproduction and destructive competition. A joint legislative committee investigated the industry through public hearings and expert studies, producing a detailed report that recommended price regulation to stabilize the market and ensure an adequate supply of wholesome milk. The Legislature responded by enacting Chapter 158 of the Laws of 1933, which established a Milk Control Board empowered to fix minimum and maximum wholesale and retail prices for milk. The Board issued an order setting a minimum price of nine cents per quart for milk sold by stores to consumers in cities and villages over one thousand population. Leo Nebbia, the proprietor of a grocery store in Rochester, sold two quarts of milk and a five-cent loaf of bread for eighteen cents on April 19, 1933, thereby charging less than the prescribed minimum. He was prosecuted for violating the order, convicted in the County Court of Monroe County, and sentenced to pay a fine. The conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court and by the Court of Appeals of New York. Nebbia maintained throughout that the statute and the order contravened the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
View caseA state board prohibited pharmacies from advertising prescription prices on a per capita reach basis. The regulation treated every potential consumer equally by banning all price advertisements regardless of audience size. Each pharmacy therefore operated under identical per-person exposure limits.
Virginia law made it unprofessional conduct for a licensed pharmacist to publish, advertise, or promote any price for prescription drugs under Va. Code Ann. § 54-524.35(3). The Virginia State Board of Pharmacy regulated the profession to protect public health, safety, and welfare. It licensed pharmacists only after they showed good moral character, graduated from an approved school, completed up to twelve months of experience, and passed a Board examination. Licensed pharmacists remained subject to penalties or license revocation for negligence, fraud, or unprofessional conduct. Prescription drug prices varied sharply even within the same locality. In Richmond the cost of forty Achromycin tablets ranged from $2.59 to $6.00. In the Newport News-Hampton area the price of tetracycline ranged from $1.20 to $9.00. About ninety-five percent of prescriptions were filled with dosage forms prepared by manufacturers. Some pharmacies refused to quote prices over the telephone. An individual Virginia resident who suffered from diseases requiring daily prescription drugs, together with two nonprofit organizations whose members included many users of such drugs, brought suit against the Board and its members. The plaintiffs claimed the ban prevented them from learning where their limited resources could be spent most effectively. A prior challenge to the same statute brought by a drug retailer and one of its pharmacists had been rejected on due-process and equal-protection grounds. The three-judge District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia declared the quoted portion of the statute void and enjoined its enforcement. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of the Board's appeal.
View casePer capita divides property into equal shares among all surviving members of the designated class without regard to generational lines. Per stirpes divides property first by ancestral stocks and then by representation within each stock. The UPC per capita at each generation method first creates shares at the nearest generation containing survivors and then subdivides unused shares among further descendants.
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The UPC applies per capita at each generation when the instrument calls for distribution by representation or per capita at each generation. The rule counts surviving descendants in the nearest generation plus deceased descendants in that generation who left surviving issue. Each survivor in the nearest generation receives one full share.
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Yes. Only descendants who survive the distribution date receive shares. Deceased individuals without surviving descendants are disregarded entirely under the governing statute.
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