Also known as:per se compensable takings · per se taking
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A category of government action that the Takings Clause treats as automatically requiring just compensation because it is functionally equivalent to a physical appropriation of property. The rule applies to permanent physical occupations of any size and to regulations that deprive an owner of all economically beneficial use of land unless background principles of nuisance or property law already prohibited the use at the time of acquisition. Temporary restrictions and partial diminutions in value fall outside the per se category and instead trigger the multi-factor regulatory takings inquiry.
See Our Sources· 3 primary sources
Cases
How its tested
Common Examples
6
Total Ban on Development
Priya Prasad purchased coastal acreage intending to build a single-family residence. A new state regulation prohibited all construction on the parcel to protect dunes. Because the rule left the land with no economically beneficial use, the restriction operated as a per se compensable taking. Priya recovered the fair market value of the property.
Temporary Development Moratorium
Pearl Porter owned several vacant lots near a protected lake. The regional planning agency imposed successive building moratoria lasting thirty-two months while it completed a comprehensive plan. The court examined the duration, the agency's good-faith planning purpose, and the effect on value rather than treating the delay as a per se compensable taking. Pearl's claim therefore failed.
Compelled Cable Installation
Patricia Patel owned a multi-unit apartment building. A city ordinance required landlords to permit installation of cable television equipment on rooftops and inside units while limiting compensation to a nominal fee. The mandated physical occupation of even a small portion of the property constituted a per se compensable taking. Patricia obtained just compensation for the easement-like intrusion.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982)
In 1970, Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. obtained a permit from New York City to operate a cable television system in Manhattan. It entered into an agreement with the prior owner of a five-story apartment building at 303 West 105th Street to install cables on the roof in exchange for a flat fee of $50 per year.
The installation included a cable slightly less than one-half inch in diameter and approximately 30 feet in length running along the roof about 18 inches above the surface. It also included directional taps measuring approximately 4 inches by 4 inches by 4 inches on the front and rear of the roof. Two large silver boxes were placed along the roof cables. Additional cable was extended another 4 to 6 feet. All components were attached by screws or nails penetrating the masonry at approximately two-foot intervals.
In 1971, Jean Loretto purchased the building. At the time of purchase the cable installation was already in place as part of a larger network serving adjacent buildings, though Loretto did not discover its existence until after she took possession. Two years later Teleprompter connected a noncrossover line by dropping a cable down the front of the building to serve Loretto's own tenants.
In 1973 the New York Legislature enacted section 828 of the Executive Law, effective January 1, 1973, which prohibited landlords from interfering with cable television installations on their property, barred landlords from demanding payment from tenants for permitting service, and limited any payment from a cable company to an amount the State Commission on Cable Television determined to be reasonable; the Commission later set the presumptive fee at a one-time $1 payment.
In 1976 Loretto filed a class action against Teleprompter in New York Supreme Court on behalf of all owners of real property in the state on which Teleprompter had placed cable components, alleging trespass and a taking without just compensation and seeking damages and injunctive relief; the City of New York, which had granted Teleprompter an exclusive franchise for parts of Manhattan, intervened as a defendant.
The Supreme Court, Special Term, granted summary judgment to Teleprompter and the city. The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the statute. The Supreme Court of the United States noted probable jurisdiction.
Mobile-Home Rent Control
Paige Porter owned a mobile-home park. The city capped rents and restricted the owner's ability to raise rates or evict tenants. Because the ordinance regulated the terms of existing leases rather than authorizing a physical invasion by third parties, it did not qualify as a per se compensable taking. Paige's constitutional claim was dismissed.
John K. YEE, et al. v. City of ESCONDIDO, California503 U.S. 519, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 118 L.Ed.2d 153
John K. Yee and Irene Yee own the Friendly Hills and Sunset Terrace Mobile Home Parks in Escondido, California.
In 1988 the voters of Escondido approved Proposition K, a rent control ordinance that reset rents to 1986 levels and barred increases without city council approval after consideration of eleven enumerated factors such as the Consumer Price Index, comparable pad rents, capital improvements, property taxes, and operating expenses.
A few months after the ordinance took effect the Yees filed suit in San Diego County Superior Court, alleging that the ordinance deprived them of all use and occupancy of their property and granted tenants and their successors the right to occupy it permanently; they sought six million dollars in damages, a declaratory judgment, and an injunction.
The complaint was filed against the background of California's Mobilehome Residency Law, enacted in 1978, which restricts the grounds on which a park owner may terminate a tenancy, prohibits requiring removal of a mobile home upon sale, bars transfer fees, and prevents disapproval of a purchaser who can pay the rent. Eleven other park owners filed identical suits against the city; by stipulation the twelve cases were consolidated for appeal and submitted on the briefs and argument in the Yee case alone. The Superior Court sustained the city's demurrer and dismissed all complaints.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissals. The California Supreme Court denied review. Eight of the park owners, including the Yees, petitioned for certiorari, which the United States Supreme Court granted in 1991 to address a conflict between the decision below and holdings of the Third and Ninth Circuits in similar mobile-home rent-control cases.
The Yees' complaint and opposition to the demurrer relied on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hall v. Santa Barbara. They asserted that the combined state and local measures transferred to tenants the right to occupy pads indefinitely at below-market rents while preventing park owners from selecting incoming tenants or changing the use of their land without extended notice.
Nuisance Immunity for Feedlot
Perry Pratt operated a large feedlot. County supervisors granted neighboring farms statutory immunity from nuisance suits arising from the operation. The immunity effectively transferred to the neighbors an easement to deposit odors and waste on Pratt's land. The Iowa Supreme Court held that the statutory grant constituted a per se compensable taking.
Bormann v. Board of Supervisors in and for Kossuth County584 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998)
In September 1994, Gerald and Joan Girres applied to the Kossuth County Board of Supervisors for establishment of an agricultural area that would include land they owned as well as property owned by Mike Girres, Norma Jean Thul, Gerald Thilges, Shirley Thilges, Thelma Thilges, Edwin Thilges, Ralph Reding, Loretta Reding, Bernard Thilges, Jacob Thilges, John Goecke, and Patricia Goecke. The real property involved consisted of 960 acres.
On November 10, 1994, the Board denied the application after finding that the policy in favor of agricultural land preservation was not furthered by the designation because there were no present or foreseeable nonagricultural development pressures in the area. The Board also found that the Agricultural Area designation and the nuisance protections provided therein would have a direct and permanent impact on the existing and long-held private property rights of the adjacent property owners. It concluded that the policy in favor of agricultural land preservation was outweighed by the policy in favor of the preservation of private property rights.
Two months later, in January 1995, the applicants submitted a new application that the Board approved by a 3-2 vote, one of which was based on the flip of a nickel. In granting the designation, the Board found that the application to create the agricultural area designation complied with Iowa Code section 352.6. The Board also found that the adoption of the proposed agricultural area was consistent with the purposes of Chapter 352.
In April 1995, several neighbors of the new agricultural area, including Clarence and Caroline Bormann and Leonard and Cecelia McGuire, filed a writ of certiorari and declaratory judgment action in district court against the Board and individual board members Joe Rahm, Al Dudding, Laurel Fantz, James Black, and Donald McGregor. The neighbors challenged the Board's action on constitutional grounds, including violations of their inalienable right to protect property under the Iowa Constitution and deprivations of property without due process or just compensation under both the federal and Iowa Constitutions, as well as on res judicata and arbitrary and capricious grounds.
Based on stipulated facts, memoranda, and oral argument, the district court determined that the Board's action was arbitrary and capricious because one Board member voted on the basis of a flipped coin, and this was the only ground on which the court ruled for the neighbors. The court rejected all of the neighbors' other arguments. Later, the neighbors filed an Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 179(b) motion asking the court to clarify its ruling. Meanwhile, the Board corrected the arbitrary and capricious infirmity in its November 1995 vote, after which the neighbors sought and received a certification of appeal from this court.
Mandatory Raisin Set-Aside
Paul Peterson grew raisins and also acted as a handler. A federal marketing order required him to surrender a percentage of each crop to a government committee that took title and disposed of the raisins. The compelled physical appropriation of personal property effected a per se compensable taking even though Peterson retained a contingent interest in possible net proceeds. He recovered just compensation for the seized raisins.
Horne v. Department of Agriculture576 U.S. 350 (2015)
The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate marketing orders to help maintain stable markets for particular agricultural products. Under the resulting California Raisin Marketing Order, growers must give a percentage of their crop to the Government free of charge in years when the Committee sets a reserve requirement. The Raisin Administrative Committee determined the allocation at 47 percent in 2002-2003 and 30 percent in 2003-2004.
Growers generally ship their raisins to a handler. The handler physically separates the reserve raisins due the Government, pays the growers only for the free-tonnage raisins, and packs and sells the free-tonnage raisins. The Raisin Committee acquires title to the reserve raisins that have been set aside and decides how to dispose of them in its discretion. Proceeds from Committee sales are principally used to subsidize handlers who sell raisins for export. Raisin growers retain an interest in any net proceeds after deductions for export subsidies and the Committee's expenses.
The Hornes are both raisin growers and handlers. They handled their own raisins and raisins produced by other growers, paying those growers in full for all of their raisins, not just the free-tonnage portion. In 2002 the Hornes refused to set aside any raisins for the Government. The Government assessed a fine equal to the market value of the missing raisins—about $480,000—and an additional civil penalty of just over $200,000 for disobeying the order.
When the Government sought to collect the fine, the Hornes sued, arguing that the reserve requirement was an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. This Court previously held that the Hornes could present their constitutional defense and remanded for consideration on the merits. On remand, the Ninth Circuit viewed the reserve requirement as a use restriction rather than a per se taking. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
4 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
When does a regulation that eliminates all economic use qualify as a per se compensable taking?
A regulation qualifies when it deprives the owner of all economically beneficial or productive use of land and the prohibited use was not already barred by background principles of nuisance or property law at the time of acquisition. Total wipeouts are treated like physical appropriations and require just compensation without further balancing.
Does a temporary moratorium on development automatically trigger per se compensation?
No. Courts examine the duration of the restriction, the government's planning purposes, the owner's reasonable expectations, and the effect on property value to decide whether fairness requires compensation. The temporary nature prevents automatic per se treatment.
Why is a government-mandated physical occupation treated as a per se compensable taking even when the intrusion is small?
Any permanent physical occupation authorized by the government, however minimal, appropriates the owner's right to exclude and is therefore equivalent to a classic taking. Compensation is required regardless of the size of the occupied space or the public purpose served.
How does the per se rule apply to personal property such as crops or manufactured goods?
When the government compels an owner to surrender title and possession of discrete items of personal property, the action constitutes a per se taking. Retention of only a contingent interest in future proceeds does not avoid the compensation requirement.
of property requiring compensation under the
Takings
Clause of the United States Constitution. This case involves two moratoria ordered by respondent TRPA to maintain the status quo while…
.” 224 Cal. App. 3d 1349, 1358, 274 Cal. Rptr. 551, 557 (1990). The California Supreme Court denied review. App. to Pet. for Cert. B-41. Eight of the twelve park owners, including the Yees,…
Takings
Clause affords less protection to personal property and that growers retained an interest in proceeds from sales of reserve raisins. We granted certiorari.…
Constitutional LawIndividual rights · TakingsUBEIntermediate