per se reversal

In September 1982, Oreste Fulminante reported his eleven-year-old stepdaughter Jeneane Michelle Hunt missing from Mesa, Arizona. Two days later her body was discovered in the desert east of Mesa, having been shot twice in the head at close range with a ligature around her neck. Fulminante became a suspect due to inconsistencies in his statements to police but left Arizona when no charges were filed against him. Fulminante was later convicted of a federal firearms violation in New Jersey and incarcerated at the Ray Brook Federal Correctional Institution in New York. There he became friends with another inmate, Anthony Sarivola, then serving a 60-day sentence for extortion. Sarivola, a former police officer, had been involved in loansharking for organized crime but then became a paid informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. While at Ray Brook, he masqueraded as an organized crime figure. In October 1983, while walking on the prison track, Sarivola told Fulminante he had heard rumors that Fulminante was suspected of killing a child and offered to protect him from other inmates in exchange for the truth about the murder. Fulminante then admitted to Sarivola that he had driven Jeneane to the desert on his motorcycle, where he choked her, sexually assaulted her, and made her beg for her life, before shooting her twice in the head. After his release from prison in May 1984, Fulminante was rearrested in Arizona and indicted for the murder in September 1984. He also confessed the crime to Donna Sarivola, Anthony's fiancée and later wife, following his May 1984 release from prison. Both confessions were introduced at Fulminante's December 1985 trial in Arizona state court, resulting in his conviction and death sentence. The Arizona Supreme Court held that the confession to Sarivola was coerced under the totality of the circumstances, that the second confession was its fruit, and that the admission of the first confession was not harmless error. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Petitioner Luce was indicted on charges of conspiracy and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1). During his trial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, Luce moved for a ruling to preclude the Government from using a 1974 state conviction to impeach him if he testified. There was no commitment by Luce that he would testify if the motion were granted, nor did he make a proffer to the court as to what his testimony would be. In opposing the motion, the Government represented that the conviction was for a serious crime—possession of a controlled substance. The District Court ruled that the prior conviction fell within the category of permissible impeachment evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a). The District Court noted, however, that the nature and scope of Luce's trial testimony could affect the court's specific evidentiary rulings; for example, the court was prepared to hold that the prior conviction would be excluded if Luce limited his testimony to explaining his attempt to flee from the arresting officers, but if he took the stand and denied any prior involvement with drugs, he could then be impeached by the 1974 conviction. Luce did not testify, and the jury returned guilty verdicts. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals refused to consider Luce's contention that the District Court abused its discretion in denying the motion in limine without making an explicit finding that the probative value of the prior conviction outweighed its prejudicial effect. The Court of Appeals held that when the defendant does not testify, the court will not review the District Court's in limine ruling. Some other Circuits have permitted review in similar situations. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.

In March 1992, Timothy Hall was found dead in Newport News, Virginia, with his throat cut and evidence of sodomy. Police arrested Walter Mickens days later on murder charges. The same juvenile court judge who had appointed Bryan Saunders to represent Hall on unrelated assault and battery charges appointed Saunders to represent Mickens on April 6, 1992. Saunders had met with Hall for fifteen to thirty minutes the week before the murder, and the judge did not inquire into any potential conflict from the prior representation. Mickens's trial occurred in 1993. The Commonwealth presented overwhelming evidence of guilt, the jury convicted Mickens of capital murder, and it sentenced him to death. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence in 1994. In June 1998, Mickens filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Federal habeas counsel discovered Saunders's prior representation of Hall when a clerk mistakenly produced the confidential juvenile file. Mickens alleged that Saunders's conflict of interest violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied the petition, concluding that Mickens had not shown the conflict adversely affected Saunders's representation. A panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial. The en banc Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the trial judge's failure to inquire into the potential conflict required automatic reversal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Ruth Elizabeth Chapman and Thomas LeRoy Teale were convicted in a California state court upon a charge that they robbed, kidnaped, and murdered a bartender. Chapman was sentenced to life imprisonment and Teale to death. At trial both petitioners chose not to testify. The prosecutor took full advantage of a provision in the California Constitution allowing comment on a defendant's failure to testify, filling his argument to the jury from beginning to end with numerous references to their silence and inferences of guilt. The trial court also charged the jury that it could draw adverse inferences from petitioners' failure to testify. The trial took place before this Court decided Griffin v. California. On appeal the California Supreme Court acknowledged that petitioners had been denied a federal constitutional right by the comments on their silence but affirmed applying the State's harmless-error provision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to these questions: where there is a violation of the rule of Griffin v. California, can the error be held to be harmless, and if so, was the error harmless in this case.