Also known as:per se takings · per-se taking · per-se takings · categorical taking
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An automatic category of taking under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause that arises when the government effects a permanent physical occupation of property or imposes a regulation that deprives an owner of all economically beneficial use of land. Such actions require just compensation without application of the Penn Central balancing test unless background principles of nuisance or property law already prohibited the use at the time of acquisition.
See Our Sources· 3 primary sources
Cases
How its tested
Common Examples
6
Total Ban on Beachfront Development
Pierre Poulin purchased two oceanfront lots intending to build homes. After his purchase a state coastal council enacted rules barring any permanent habitable structures on the lots. The rules left the parcels with no economically beneficial use. A court treats the rules as a per se taking because they eliminate all productive value without reference to background nuisance principles.
Temporary Development Moratorium
Patricia Patel owned several parcels around a lake and planned immediate construction. A regional planning agency imposed a thirty-two-month moratorium on all development while it studied environmental impacts. The moratorium delayed but did not permanently eliminate all economic use. A court declines to apply per se treatment and instead weighs duration, planning purpose, and owner expectations.
Statutory Nuisance Immunity Creating Easement
Perry Pratt and neighboring farmers obtained county approval to operate a large hog confinement facility. A state statute granted the facility immunity from nuisance suits brought by adjacent owners. The immunity effectively transferred an easement allowing odors and runoff to cross the neighbors' land. A court holds the immunity provision effects a per se taking by appropriating the neighbors' right to exclude.
Bormann v. Board of Supervisors in and for Kossuth County584 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998)
In September 1994, Gerald and Joan Girres applied to the Kossuth County Board of Supervisors for establishment of an agricultural area that would include land they owned as well as property owned by Mike Girres, Norma Jean Thul, Gerald Thilges, Shirley Thilges, Thelma Thilges, Edwin Thilges, Ralph Reding, Loretta Reding, Bernard Thilges, Jacob Thilges, John Goecke, and Patricia Goecke. The real property involved consisted of 960 acres.
On November 10, 1994, the Board denied the application after finding that the policy in favor of agricultural land preservation was not furthered by the designation because there were no present or foreseeable nonagricultural development pressures in the area. The Board also found that the Agricultural Area designation and the nuisance protections provided therein would have a direct and permanent impact on the existing and long-held private property rights of the adjacent property owners. It concluded that the policy in favor of agricultural land preservation was outweighed by the policy in favor of the preservation of private property rights.
Two months later, in January 1995, the applicants submitted a new application that the Board approved by a 3-2 vote, one of which was based on the flip of a nickel. In granting the designation, the Board found that the application to create the agricultural area designation complied with Iowa Code section 352.6. The Board also found that the adoption of the proposed agricultural area was consistent with the purposes of Chapter 352.
In April 1995, several neighbors of the new agricultural area, including Clarence and Caroline Bormann and Leonard and Cecelia McGuire, filed a writ of certiorari and declaratory judgment action in district court against the Board and individual board members Joe Rahm, Al Dudding, Laurel Fantz, James Black, and Donald McGregor. The neighbors challenged the Board's action on constitutional grounds, including violations of their inalienable right to protect property under the Iowa Constitution and deprivations of property without due process or just compensation under both the federal and Iowa Constitutions, as well as on res judicata and arbitrary and capricious grounds.
Based on stipulated facts, memoranda, and oral argument, the district court determined that the Board's action was arbitrary and capricious because one Board member voted on the basis of a flipped coin, and this was the only ground on which the court ruled for the neighbors. The court rejected all of the neighbors' other arguments. Later, the neighbors filed an Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 179(b) motion asking the court to clarify its ruling. Meanwhile, the Board corrected the arbitrary and capricious infirmity in its November 1995 vote, after which the neighbors sought and received a certification of appeal from this court.
Rent Control on Mobile Home Pads
Phoebe Park owned a mobile home park and leased pads to tenants. A city ordinance capped pad rents and permitted tenants to sell their homes in place while transferring the lease. The ordinance prevented Phoebe from raising rents to market levels or evicting tenants upon sale. A court analyzes the measure under regulatory rather than per se physical taking doctrine because no physical occupation was compelled.
John K. YEE, et al. v. City of ESCONDIDO, California503 U.S. 519, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 118 L.Ed.2d 153
John K. Yee and Irene Yee own the Friendly Hills and Sunset Terrace Mobile Home Parks in Escondido, California.
In 1988 the voters of Escondido approved Proposition K, a rent control ordinance that reset rents to 1986 levels and barred increases without city council approval after consideration of eleven enumerated factors such as the Consumer Price Index, comparable pad rents, capital improvements, property taxes, and operating expenses.
A few months after the ordinance took effect the Yees filed suit in San Diego County Superior Court, alleging that the ordinance deprived them of all use and occupancy of their property and granted tenants and their successors the right to occupy it permanently; they sought six million dollars in damages, a declaratory judgment, and an injunction.
The complaint was filed against the background of California's Mobilehome Residency Law, enacted in 1978, which restricts the grounds on which a park owner may terminate a tenancy, prohibits requiring removal of a mobile home upon sale, bars transfer fees, and prevents disapproval of a purchaser who can pay the rent. Eleven other park owners filed identical suits against the city; by stipulation the twelve cases were consolidated for appeal and submitted on the briefs and argument in the Yee case alone. The Superior Court sustained the city's demurrer and dismissed all complaints.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissals. The California Supreme Court denied review. Eight of the park owners, including the Yees, petitioned for certiorari, which the United States Supreme Court granted in 1991 to address a conflict between the decision below and holdings of the Third and Ninth Circuits in similar mobile-home rent-control cases.
The Yees' complaint and opposition to the demurrer relied on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hall v. Santa Barbara. They asserted that the combined state and local measures transferred to tenants the right to occupy pads indefinitely at below-market rents while preventing park owners from selecting incoming tenants or changing the use of their land without extended notice.
Mandatory Cable Installation on Apartment Building
Premier Manufacturing owned a large apartment building. A state statute authorized a cable company to install wires and boxes across the roof and into individual units. The company performed the installation without the owner's consent and paid only a nominal fee. A court classifies the installation as a per se taking because it constitutes a permanent physical occupation however small.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982)
In 1970, Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. obtained a permit from New York City to operate a cable television system in Manhattan. It entered into an agreement with the prior owner of a five-story apartment building at 303 West 105th Street to install cables on the roof in exchange for a flat fee of $50 per year.
The installation included a cable slightly less than one-half inch in diameter and approximately 30 feet in length running along the roof about 18 inches above the surface. It also included directional taps measuring approximately 4 inches by 4 inches by 4 inches on the front and rear of the roof. Two large silver boxes were placed along the roof cables. Additional cable was extended another 4 to 6 feet. All components were attached by screws or nails penetrating the masonry at approximately two-foot intervals.
In 1971, Jean Loretto purchased the building. At the time of purchase the cable installation was already in place as part of a larger network serving adjacent buildings, though Loretto did not discover its existence until after she took possession. Two years later Teleprompter connected a noncrossover line by dropping a cable down the front of the building to serve Loretto's own tenants.
In 1973 the New York Legislature enacted section 828 of the Executive Law, effective January 1, 1973, which prohibited landlords from interfering with cable television installations on their property, barred landlords from demanding payment from tenants for permitting service, and limited any payment from a cable company to an amount the State Commission on Cable Television determined to be reasonable; the Commission later set the presumptive fee at a one-time $1 payment.
In 1976 Loretto filed a class action against Teleprompter in New York Supreme Court on behalf of all owners of real property in the state on which Teleprompter had placed cable components, alleging trespass and a taking without just compensation and seeking damages and injunctive relief; the City of New York, which had granted Teleprompter an exclusive franchise for parts of Manhattan, intervened as a defendant.
The Supreme Court, Special Term, granted summary judgment to Teleprompter and the city. The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the statute. The Supreme Court of the United States noted probable jurisdiction.
Compelled Reserve of Raisins
Peak Performance grew raisins and was required each year to deliver a percentage of its crop to a government reserve pool. The government took title to the raisins and could sell or dispose of them while the grower retained only a contingent interest in any net proceeds. A court holds the reserve requirement a per se taking of personal property because the government physically appropriated the crop.
Horne v. Department of Agriculture576 U.S. 350 (2015)
The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate marketing orders to help maintain stable markets for particular agricultural products. Under the resulting California Raisin Marketing Order, growers must give a percentage of their crop to the Government free of charge in years when the Committee sets a reserve requirement. The Raisin Administrative Committee determined the allocation at 47 percent in 2002-2003 and 30 percent in 2003-2004.
Growers generally ship their raisins to a handler. The handler physically separates the reserve raisins due the Government, pays the growers only for the free-tonnage raisins, and packs and sells the free-tonnage raisins. The Raisin Committee acquires title to the reserve raisins that have been set aside and decides how to dispose of them in its discretion. Proceeds from Committee sales are principally used to subsidize handlers who sell raisins for export. Raisin growers retain an interest in any net proceeds after deductions for export subsidies and the Committee's expenses.
The Hornes are both raisin growers and handlers. They handled their own raisins and raisins produced by other growers, paying those growers in full for all of their raisins, not just the free-tonnage portion. In 2002 the Hornes refused to set aside any raisins for the Government. The Government assessed a fine equal to the market value of the missing raisins—about $480,000—and an additional civil penalty of just over $200,000 for disobeying the order.
When the Government sought to collect the fine, the Hornes sued, arguing that the reserve requirement was an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. This Court previously held that the Hornes could present their constitutional defense and remanded for consideration on the merits. On remand, the Ninth Circuit viewed the reserve requirement as a use restriction rather than a per se taking. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
4 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
What distinguishes a per se taking from a regulatory taking analyzed under Penn Central?
A per se taking occurs when the government effects a permanent physical occupation or a regulation that eliminates all economically beneficial use of land. In those situations compensation is required without balancing the Penn Central factors. Other regulations that merely diminish value or restrict some uses are evaluated under the multi-factor Penn Central test.
Supporting sources
Does a temporary moratorium on development automatically qualify as a per se taking?
No. A temporary moratorium that denies all economic use for a limited period is not automatically a per se taking. Courts instead examine duration, government planning purpose, owner expectations, and effects on value to decide whether fairness requires compensation.
Supporting sources
Can a per se taking arise from government-authorized access by third parties that is intermittent rather than continuous?
Yes. When a regulation grants third parties a recurring legal right to enter private property, even for limited hours on a scheduled basis, the government has appropriated the owner's right to exclude. That recurring invasion is treated as a per se physical taking requiring compensation.
Supporting sources
Does the Takings Clause protect personal property against per se takings?
Yes. The Takings Clause applies to both real and personal property. When the government physically appropriates personal property such as crops, inventory, or financial instruments, the appropriation constitutes a per se taking that requires just compensation.
Supporting sources
had occurred; that Lucas applied to the relatively rare case in which a regulation permanently denies all productive use of an entire parcel, whereas the moratoria involved only a temporal…
.” 224 Cal. App. 3d 1349, 1358, 274 Cal. Rptr. 551, 557 (1990). The California Supreme Court denied review. App. to Pet. for Cert. B-41. Eight of the twelve park owners, including the Yees,…
. Here, the neighbors argue further, that the section 352.11(1)(a) immunity provision gives the applicants the right to create or maintain a nuisance over the neighbors’ property, in effect…
Constitutional LawIndividual rights · TakingsUBEIntermediate