A category of government actions that automatically require just compensation under the Takings Clause without further inquiry into economic impact or investment-backed expectations. These actions include permanent physical invasions of property and regulations that deprive an owner of all economically beneficial use of land.
See Our Sources· 3 primary sources
Cases
How its tested
Common Examples
6
Total Loss of Development Value
Paula Pierce purchased coastal acreage intending to build a resort. A state coastal commission then barred all construction on the parcel. Paula sues, claiming the regulation leaves her with no economically viable use of the land. The court treats the complete deprivation as a per se taking that triggers the duty to pay just compensation.
Temporary Development Moratorium
Prism Analytics owns waterfront lots slated for a mixed-use project. The regional planning agency imposes a two-year moratorium while it studies flood risks. Prism argues the pause wipes out all present economic use. The court examines the moratorium's duration, planning purpose, and effect on value rather than applying automatic per se treatment.
Nuisance Immunity Creating Easement
Philip Powell operates a large hog facility near Priscilla Parks's residence. A county ordinance grants the facility immunity from nuisance suits. Priscilla sues, contending the immunity imposes an easement-like burden on her land. The court holds that the statutory protection effects a per se taking of her right to be free from the nuisance.
Bormann v. Board of Supervisors in and for Kossuth County584 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998)
In September 1994, Gerald and Joan Girres applied to the Kossuth County Board of Supervisors for establishment of an agricultural area that would include land they owned as well as property owned by Mike Girres, Norma Jean Thul, Gerald Thilges, Shirley Thilges, Thelma Thilges, Edwin Thilges, Ralph Reding, Loretta Reding, Bernard Thilges, Jacob Thilges, John Goecke, and Patricia Goecke. The real property involved consisted of 960 acres.
On November 10, 1994, the Board denied the application after finding that the policy in favor of agricultural land preservation was not furthered by the designation because there were no present or foreseeable nonagricultural development pressures in the area. The Board also found that the Agricultural Area designation and the nuisance protections provided therein would have a direct and permanent impact on the existing and long-held private property rights of the adjacent property owners. It concluded that the policy in favor of agricultural land preservation was outweighed by the policy in favor of the preservation of private property rights.
Two months later, in January 1995, the applicants submitted a new application that the Board approved by a 3-2 vote, one of which was based on the flip of a nickel. In granting the designation, the Board found that the application to create the agricultural area designation complied with Iowa Code section 352.6. The Board also found that the adoption of the proposed agricultural area was consistent with the purposes of Chapter 352.
In April 1995, several neighbors of the new agricultural area, including Clarence and Caroline Bormann and Leonard and Cecelia McGuire, filed a writ of certiorari and declaratory judgment action in district court against the Board and individual board members Joe Rahm, Al Dudding, Laurel Fantz, James Black, and Donald McGregor. The neighbors challenged the Board's action on constitutional grounds, including violations of their inalienable right to protect property under the Iowa Constitution and deprivations of property without due process or just compensation under both the federal and Iowa Constitutions, as well as on res judicata and arbitrary and capricious grounds.
Based on stipulated facts, memoranda, and oral argument, the district court determined that the Board's action was arbitrary and capricious because one Board member voted on the basis of a flipped coin, and this was the only ground on which the court ruled for the neighbors. The court rejected all of the neighbors' other arguments. Later, the neighbors filed an Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 179(b) motion asking the court to clarify its ruling. Meanwhile, the Board corrected the arbitrary and capricious infirmity in its November 1995 vote, after which the neighbors sought and received a certification of appeal from this court.
Compelled Cable Installation
Penelope Price owns an apartment building. A city ordinance requires her to permit a cable company to install equipment on the roof for a nominal fee. Penelope objects that the installation occupies her property. The court classifies the mandated physical occupation as a per se taking regardless of its small size.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982)
In 1970, Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. obtained a permit from New York City to operate a cable television system in Manhattan. It entered into an agreement with the prior owner of a five-story apartment building at 303 West 105th Street to install cables on the roof in exchange for a flat fee of $50 per year.
The installation included a cable slightly less than one-half inch in diameter and approximately 30 feet in length running along the roof about 18 inches above the surface. It also included directional taps measuring approximately 4 inches by 4 inches by 4 inches on the front and rear of the roof. Two large silver boxes were placed along the roof cables. Additional cable was extended another 4 to 6 feet. All components were attached by screws or nails penetrating the masonry at approximately two-foot intervals.
In 1971, Jean Loretto purchased the building. At the time of purchase the cable installation was already in place as part of a larger network serving adjacent buildings, though Loretto did not discover its existence until after she took possession. Two years later Teleprompter connected a noncrossover line by dropping a cable down the front of the building to serve Loretto's own tenants.
In 1973 the New York Legislature enacted section 828 of the Executive Law, effective January 1, 1973, which prohibited landlords from interfering with cable television installations on their property, barred landlords from demanding payment from tenants for permitting service, and limited any payment from a cable company to an amount the State Commission on Cable Television determined to be reasonable; the Commission later set the presumptive fee at a one-time $1 payment.
In 1976 Loretto filed a class action against Teleprompter in New York Supreme Court on behalf of all owners of real property in the state on which Teleprompter had placed cable components, alleging trespass and a taking without just compensation and seeking damages and injunctive relief; the City of New York, which had granted Teleprompter an exclusive franchise for parts of Manhattan, intervened as a defendant.
The Supreme Court, Special Term, granted summary judgment to Teleprompter and the city. The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the statute. The Supreme Court of the United States noted probable jurisdiction.
Rent Control on Mobile Home Pads
Pierce Patterson owns a mobile home park. The city caps rents on the pads while allowing tenants to sell their homes at market prices. Pierce claims the ordinance transfers a possessory interest to tenants. The court rejects the per se physical taking argument because the regulation limits rents rather than authorizing a physical invasion.
John K. YEE, et al. v. City of ESCONDIDO, California503 U.S. 519, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 118 L.Ed.2d 153
John K. Yee and Irene Yee own the Friendly Hills and Sunset Terrace Mobile Home Parks in Escondido, California.
In 1988 the voters of Escondido approved Proposition K, a rent control ordinance that reset rents to 1986 levels and barred increases without city council approval after consideration of eleven enumerated factors such as the Consumer Price Index, comparable pad rents, capital improvements, property taxes, and operating expenses.
A few months after the ordinance took effect the Yees filed suit in San Diego County Superior Court, alleging that the ordinance deprived them of all use and occupancy of their property and granted tenants and their successors the right to occupy it permanently; they sought six million dollars in damages, a declaratory judgment, and an injunction.
The complaint was filed against the background of California's Mobilehome Residency Law, enacted in 1978, which restricts the grounds on which a park owner may terminate a tenancy, prohibits requiring removal of a mobile home upon sale, bars transfer fees, and prevents disapproval of a purchaser who can pay the rent. Eleven other park owners filed identical suits against the city; by stipulation the twelve cases were consolidated for appeal and submitted on the briefs and argument in the Yee case alone. The Superior Court sustained the city's demurrer and dismissed all complaints.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissals. The California Supreme Court denied review. Eight of the park owners, including the Yees, petitioned for certiorari, which the United States Supreme Court granted in 1991 to address a conflict between the decision below and holdings of the Third and Ninth Circuits in similar mobile-home rent-control cases.
The Yees' complaint and opposition to the demurrer relied on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hall v. Santa Barbara. They asserted that the combined state and local measures transferred to tenants the right to occupy pads indefinitely at below-market rents while preventing park owners from selecting incoming tenants or changing the use of their land without extended notice.
Subsidence Regulation on Mining
Phoenix Technologies holds coal rights beneath developed land. A statute requires the company to leave pillars of coal in place to prevent surface subsidence. Phoenix contends the requirement destroys the economic value of its mineral estate. The court declines to treat the regulation as a per se taking because the company retains substantial value in its remaining holdings.
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis480 U.S. 491, 491-492 (1987)
Beginning well over 100 years ago, landowners in western Pennsylvania began severing title to underground coal and the right of surface support while retaining or conveying away ownership of the surface estate. Approximately 90 percent of the coal that petitioners mine or will mine was severed from the surface in the period between 1890 and 1920.
When acquiring or retaining the mineral estate, petitioners or their predecessors typically acquired the right to deposit wastes, provide drainage and ventilation, erect surface facilities, and obtained waivers of claims for damages resulting from coal removal.
In 1966 the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act after concluding that existing subsidence legislation had failed to protect public safety, land conservation, municipal tax bases, and land development. Section 4 of the Act prohibits mining that causes subsidence damage to public buildings and noncommercial buildings used by the public, dwellings used for human habitation, and cemeteries that were in place on April 17, 1966. The Department of Environmental Resources applies a formula that generally requires 50 percent of the coal beneath protected structures to remain in place. Section 6 authorizes the Department to revoke a mining permit if removal of coal causes damage to a protected structure and the operator has not repaired the damage, satisfied any claim, or deposited security equal to the reasonable cost of repair within six months.
Petitioners are an association of coal mine operators and four corporations engaged in underground mining of bituminous coal in western Pennsylvania. Their members and the corporate petitioners own, lease, or control substantial coal reserves and support estates beneath surface property affected by the Act. In 1982, petitioners filed a civil rights action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania seeking to enjoin officials of the DER from enforcing the Subsidence Act and its implementing regulations.
The parties entered a stipulation of facts on the facial challenge and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court granted respondents' motion in 1984. The Court of Appeals affirmed in 1985. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1986.
Stipulations established that enforcement of the 50 percent rule would require petitioners to leave approximately 27 million tons of coal in place across 13 mines containing over 1.46 billion tons total. This amount represents less than 2 percent of the coal in those mines. Petitioners did not claim that any specific mine had become unprofitable since the Act's passage.
4 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
When does a regulation granting recurring access to private property qualify as a per se physical taking?
A regulation that creates a recurring legal entitlement for third parties to enter private property appropriates the owner's right to exclude and constitutes a per se physical taking. The analysis focuses on the government's grant of an access right rather than the duration of each individual entry or the absence of permanent structures. Courts treat such recurring invasions as equivalent to an easement even when the entries are intermittent or time-limited.
Does the Takings Clause protect personal property from per se takings?
Yes. The Takings Clause applies to both real and personal property. A government mandate that requires an owner to surrender a fixed portion of personal property such as inventory or manufactured goods for public use effects a per se taking. The owner need not show a substantial decline in overall business value. The compelled transfer itself triggers the compensation requirement.
Supporting sources
Is a temporary moratorium on development automatically a per se taking?
No. Courts examine the duration of the restriction, the government's planning purposes, the owner's reasonable expectations, and the effect on property value to decide whether compensation is required. The temporary nature of the moratorium means it is not automatically treated as a per se taking.
Supporting sources
What distinguishes a per se physical taking from a regulatory taking analyzed under Penn Central?
A per se physical taking occurs when the government authorizes a physical invasion or appropriation of property. In contrast, a regulatory taking that merely restricts use without authorizing invasion is evaluated under the multifactor Penn Central test that weighs economic impact, investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action.
. Penn Central requires focusing on the parcel as a whole. We have rejected such a segmented approach to the denominator question. The District Court erred when it disaggregated property…
.” 224 Cal. App. 3d 1349, 1358, 274 Cal. Rptr. 551, 557 (1990). The California Supreme Court denied review. App. to Pet. for Cert. B-41. Eight of the twelve park owners, including the Yees,…
. Here, the neighbors argue further, that the section 352.11(1)(a) immunity provision gives the applicants the right to create or maintain a nuisance over the neighbors’ property, in effect…
Constitutional LawIndividual rights · TakingsUBEIntermediate