Also known as:per se taking rule · per se takings · per se taking · per se takings doctrine · categorical takings rule
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A categorical rule under the Takings Clause that certain government actions constitute takings requiring just compensation without case-specific balancing. The rule applies to permanent physical occupations of property and to regulations that deprive an owner of all economically beneficial use of land. Exceptions exist only when the prohibited use was already barred by background principles of nuisance or property law at the time of acquisition.
See Our Sources· 3 primary sources
Cases
How its tested
Common Examples
6
Total Loss of Land Value
Paula Pierce buys coastal acreage intending to build homes. A new state rule bars all construction because the land lies in a protected dune zone. Paula shows that the regulation leaves the parcel with no economically viable use. The court applies the per se rule and orders compensation because the restriction wipes out all productive value.
Temporary Development Ban
Premier Manufacturing owns shoreline lots slated for a resort. The regional planning agency imposes a two-year moratorium on all building permits while it studies environmental impacts. Premier claims a total taking during the moratorium period. The court rejects automatic per se treatment and weighs the moratorium's duration, planning purpose, and effect on value before deciding compensation is not required.
Cable Equipment Installation
Priscilla Parks owns an apartment building. A city ordinance forces her to allow a cable company to install small boxes and wiring on the roof and exterior walls. The equipment occupies only a few square feet. The court holds the mandated installation is a per se physical taking regardless of its minimal size or economic impact.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982)
In 1970, Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. obtained a permit from New York City to operate a cable television system in Manhattan. It entered into an agreement with the prior owner of a five-story apartment building at 303 West 105th Street to install cables on the roof in exchange for a flat fee of $50 per year.
The installation included a cable slightly less than one-half inch in diameter and approximately 30 feet in length running along the roof about 18 inches above the surface. It also included directional taps measuring approximately 4 inches by 4 inches by 4 inches on the front and rear of the roof. Two large silver boxes were placed along the roof cables. Additional cable was extended another 4 to 6 feet. All components were attached by screws or nails penetrating the masonry at approximately two-foot intervals.
In 1971, Jean Loretto purchased the building. At the time of purchase the cable installation was already in place as part of a larger network serving adjacent buildings, though Loretto did not discover its existence until after she took possession. Two years later Teleprompter connected a noncrossover line by dropping a cable down the front of the building to serve Loretto's own tenants.
In 1973 the New York Legislature enacted section 828 of the Executive Law, effective January 1, 1973, which prohibited landlords from interfering with cable television installations on their property, barred landlords from demanding payment from tenants for permitting service, and limited any payment from a cable company to an amount the State Commission on Cable Television determined to be reasonable; the Commission later set the presumptive fee at a one-time $1 payment.
In 1976 Loretto filed a class action against Teleprompter in New York Supreme Court on behalf of all owners of real property in the state on which Teleprompter had placed cable components, alleging trespass and a taking without just compensation and seeking damages and injunctive relief; the City of New York, which had granted Teleprompter an exclusive franchise for parts of Manhattan, intervened as a defendant.
The Supreme Court, Special Term, granted summary judgment to Teleprompter and the city. The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the statute. The Supreme Court of the United States noted probable jurisdiction.
Coal Mining Restriction
Peak Performance owns subsurface coal rights beneath developed land. A statute requires the company to leave 50 percent of the coal in place to prevent surface subsidence. Peak Performance argues the rule destroys the economic value of its mineral estate. The court declines to apply the per se rule because the regulation prevents a public nuisance rather than effecting a total taking.
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis480 U.S. 491, 491-492 (1987)
Beginning well over 100 years ago, landowners in western Pennsylvania began severing title to underground coal and the right of surface support while retaining or conveying away ownership of the surface estate. Approximately 90 percent of the coal that petitioners mine or will mine was severed from the surface in the period between 1890 and 1920.
When acquiring or retaining the mineral estate, petitioners or their predecessors typically acquired the right to deposit wastes, provide drainage and ventilation, erect surface facilities, and obtained waivers of claims for damages resulting from coal removal.
In 1966 the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act after concluding that existing subsidence legislation had failed to protect public safety, land conservation, municipal tax bases, and land development. Section 4 of the Act prohibits mining that causes subsidence damage to public buildings and noncommercial buildings used by the public, dwellings used for human habitation, and cemeteries that were in place on April 17, 1966. The Department of Environmental Resources applies a formula that generally requires 50 percent of the coal beneath protected structures to remain in place. Section 6 authorizes the Department to revoke a mining permit if removal of coal causes damage to a protected structure and the operator has not repaired the damage, satisfied any claim, or deposited security equal to the reasonable cost of repair within six months.
Petitioners are an association of coal mine operators and four corporations engaged in underground mining of bituminous coal in western Pennsylvania. Their members and the corporate petitioners own, lease, or control substantial coal reserves and support estates beneath surface property affected by the Act. In 1982, petitioners filed a civil rights action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania seeking to enjoin officials of the DER from enforcing the Subsidence Act and its implementing regulations.
The parties entered a stipulation of facts on the facial challenge and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court granted respondents' motion in 1984. The Court of Appeals affirmed in 1985. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1986.
Stipulations established that enforcement of the 50 percent rule would require petitioners to leave approximately 27 million tons of coal in place across 13 mines containing over 1.46 billion tons total. This amount represents less than 2 percent of the coal in those mines. Petitioners did not claim that any specific mine had become unprofitable since the Act's passage.
Raisin Set-Aside Program
Pioneer Energy grows raisins and must deliver a percentage of each crop to a government committee under a marketing order. The committee takes title to the raisins and disposes of them as it chooses. Pioneer Energy retains only a contingent interest in possible future proceeds. The court treats the forced transfer as a per se physical taking of personal property.
Horne v. Department of Agriculture576 U.S. 350 (2015)
The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate marketing orders to help maintain stable markets for particular agricultural products. Under the resulting California Raisin Marketing Order, growers must give a percentage of their crop to the Government free of charge in years when the Committee sets a reserve requirement. The Raisin Administrative Committee determined the allocation at 47 percent in 2002-2003 and 30 percent in 2003-2004.
Growers generally ship their raisins to a handler. The handler physically separates the reserve raisins due the Government, pays the growers only for the free-tonnage raisins, and packs and sells the free-tonnage raisins. The Raisin Committee acquires title to the reserve raisins that have been set aside and decides how to dispose of them in its discretion. Proceeds from Committee sales are principally used to subsidize handlers who sell raisins for export. Raisin growers retain an interest in any net proceeds after deductions for export subsidies and the Committee's expenses.
The Hornes are both raisin growers and handlers. They handled their own raisins and raisins produced by other growers, paying those growers in full for all of their raisins, not just the free-tonnage portion. In 2002 the Hornes refused to set aside any raisins for the Government. The Government assessed a fine equal to the market value of the missing raisins—about $480,000—and an additional civil penalty of just over $200,000 for disobeying the order.
When the Government sought to collect the fine, the Hornes sued, arguing that the reserve requirement was an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. This Court previously held that the Hornes could present their constitutional defense and remanded for consideration on the merits. On remand, the Ninth Circuit viewed the reserve requirement as a use restriction rather than a per se taking. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Mobile Home Rent Control
Pablo Perez owns a mobile home park. A city ordinance caps rents and restricts the owner's ability to change the use of the land. Pablo Perez claims the rules effect a physical taking by granting tenants a perpetual right to occupy the spaces. The court holds that the rent control measures regulate use rather than authorize a permanent physical occupation and therefore fall outside the per se rule.
John K. YEE, et al. v. City of ESCONDIDO, California503 U.S. 519, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 118 L.Ed.2d 153
John K. Yee and Irene Yee own the Friendly Hills and Sunset Terrace Mobile Home Parks in Escondido, California.
In 1988 the voters of Escondido approved Proposition K, a rent control ordinance that reset rents to 1986 levels and barred increases without city council approval after consideration of eleven enumerated factors such as the Consumer Price Index, comparable pad rents, capital improvements, property taxes, and operating expenses.
A few months after the ordinance took effect the Yees filed suit in San Diego County Superior Court, alleging that the ordinance deprived them of all use and occupancy of their property and granted tenants and their successors the right to occupy it permanently; they sought six million dollars in damages, a declaratory judgment, and an injunction.
The complaint was filed against the background of California's Mobilehome Residency Law, enacted in 1978, which restricts the grounds on which a park owner may terminate a tenancy, prohibits requiring removal of a mobile home upon sale, bars transfer fees, and prevents disapproval of a purchaser who can pay the rent. Eleven other park owners filed identical suits against the city; by stipulation the twelve cases were consolidated for appeal and submitted on the briefs and argument in the Yee case alone. The Superior Court sustained the city's demurrer and dismissed all complaints.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissals. The California Supreme Court denied review. Eight of the park owners, including the Yees, petitioned for certiorari, which the United States Supreme Court granted in 1991 to address a conflict between the decision below and holdings of the Third and Ninth Circuits in similar mobile-home rent-control cases.
The Yees' complaint and opposition to the demurrer relied on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hall v. Santa Barbara. They asserted that the combined state and local measures transferred to tenants the right to occupy pads indefinitely at below-market rents while preventing park owners from selecting incoming tenants or changing the use of their land without extended notice.
5 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
When does a regulation that eliminates all economic use trigger the per se takings rule?
A regulation triggers the per se rule when it deprives the owner of all economically beneficial or productive use of the land. Compensation is required unless the prohibited use was already barred by background nuisance or property principles at the time of acquisition. Courts treat such total wipeouts like physical appropriations.
Supporting sources
Does a temporary moratorium on development automatically qualify as a per se taking?
No. A temporary moratorium that denies all economic use for a limited period is not automatically a per se taking. Courts instead examine the duration of the restriction, the government's planning purposes, the owner's reasonable expectations, and the effect on property value to decide whether compensation is required.
Supporting sources
What government action constitutes a per se physical taking under the Loretto rule?
A government-authorized permanent physical occupation of private property, however small, constitutes a per se taking. The rule applies even when the occupation has little economic impact or does not significantly interfere with investment-backed expectations.
Supporting sources
How does the per se takings rule apply to personal property?
The rule applies to personal property when the government physically appropriates a discrete portion of an owner's goods for public use. A forced transfer of title or possession, even with only a contingent interest retained by the owner, triggers the duty to pay just compensation.
Supporting sources
Does recurring but intermittent access by third parties trigger the per se rule?
Yes. A regulation that grants third parties a recurring legal right to enter private property appropriates the owner's right to exclude and constitutes a per se physical taking. The intermittent nature of each entry does not remove the action from per se treatment.
Supporting sources
of property requiring compensation under the
Takings
Clause. (a) Although this Court's physical
takings
jurisprudence, for the most part, involves the straightforward application of per se…
.” 224 Cal. App. 3d 1349, 1358, 274 Cal. Rptr. 551, 557 (1990). The California Supreme Court denied review. App. to Pet. for Cert. B-41. Eight of the twelve park owners, including the Yees,…
analysis with regulatory-
takings
analysis. A regulation that does not entirely deprive an owner of property may escape
takings
treatment under Penn Central . But where the Government…
Per Se Takings
, "3. Violate Article I, § 10 of the Constitution of the United States." App. 12. The Court of Appeals recognized the limited nature of its inquiry, pointing out that it was passing only…
Constitutional LawIndividual rights · TakingsUBEIntermediate