Also known as: standi in judicio · locus standi · legal standing · capacity to sue
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The legal capacity to appear in court as a party to litigation. This capacity permits an entity or individual to initiate or defend an action in its own name without requiring joinder of other persons or entities.
Pinnacle Holdings, an out-of-state LLC, was sued in federal court in a district where it regularly conducted business. The plaintiff invoked the statute to establish proper venue. Because Pinnacle Holdings possessed the capacity to sue and be sued in its common name, the court treated it as residing in that district for venue purposes and denied the motion to dismiss for improper venue.
Pioneer Energy LLC filed suit in its own name against a former engineer who allegedly misappropriated proprietary code developed during employment. The defendant moved to dismiss, claiming only individual members could sue. The court denied the motion because the LLC statute granted the entity full capacity to sue and be sued in its own name to protect its business affairs.
Pacific Bank LP sued a streaming platform for unpaid royalties under a distribution agreement naming the partnership as payee. The defendant argued only the general partner or an affiliate could enforce the contract. The court denied the motion to dismiss because the uniform act conferred on the limited partnership the capacity to sue in the partnership name to protect its business interests.
Priscilla Parks, a state legislator, joined a suit challenging a constitutional amendment. Opponents contended she lacked individualized interest sufficient to appear as a party. The court examined whether state law supplied the requisite capacity to vindicate the asserted institutional interest and permitted the action to proceed.
In June 1924, the Congress proposed an amendment to the Constitution known as the Child Labor Amendment. In January 1925, the Legislature of Kansas adopted a resolution rejecting the proposed amendment and a certified copy of the resolution was sent to the Secretary of State of the United States. The rejection in the Senate was by a vote of 21 to 20. The rejection in the House was by a vote of 61 to 28. In January 1937, at a special session called by the Governor, a resolution known as Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 3 was introduced in the Senate of Kansas ratifying the proposed amendment. There were forty senators. When the resolution came up for consideration, twenty senators voted in favor of its adoption and twenty voted against it. The Lieutenant Governor, the presiding officer of the Senate, then cast his vote in favor of the resolution. The resolution was later adopted by the House of Representatives on the vote of a majority of its members, specifically 58 to 40. This original proceeding in mandamus was then brought in the Supreme Court of Kansas by twenty-one members of the Senate, including the twenty senators who had voted against the resolution, and three members of the House of Representatives, together with a citizen and taxpayer of the state. The plaintiffs sought to compel the Secretary of the Senate to erase an endorsement on the resolution to the effect that it had been adopted by the Senate and to endorse thereon the words "was not passed." They also sought to restrain the officers of the Senate and House of Representatives from signing the resolution and the Secretary of State of Kansas from authenticating it and delivering it to the Governor. The petition challenged the right of the Lieutenant Governor to cast the deciding vote in the Senate. The petition also set forth the prior rejection of the proposed amendment. It alleged that in the period from June 1924 to March 1927 the amendment had been rejected by both houses of the legislatures of twenty-six States and had been ratified in only five States. It further alleged that by reason of that rejection and the failure of ratification within a reasonable time the proposed amendment had lost its vitality. The Supreme Court of Kansas entertained the action and held that the Lieutenant Governor was authorized to cast the deciding vote. The court also held that the proposed amendment retained its original vitality. It concluded that the resolution having duly passed the house of representatives and the senate, the act of ratification of the proposed amendment by the legislature of Kansas was final and complete. The writ of mandamus was accordingly denied. The defendants other than the secretary of the senate took an appeal from the judgment of the state court. The secretary of the senate took a cross-appeal from that part of the judgment which directed him to erase from the resolution of ratification the endorsement showing that it was adopted by the casting vote of the lieutenant governor. This Court granted certiorari.
View casePablo Perez sued several defendants in one district and the defendants sought transfer under the venue statute. The court first confirmed each defendant possessed capacity to be sued in its own name before analyzing convenience factors for transfer. The presence of suable entities shaped the venue analysis.
On October 4, 1960, a commercial airliner scheduled to fly from Boston to Philadelphia plunged into Boston Harbor shortly after departing from a Boston airport. This crash led to the institution of over 150 actions for personal injury and wrongful death against the airline, manufacturers of the aircraft, the United States, and in some cases the Massachusetts Port Authority. More than 100 of these actions were brought in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. More than 45 actions were instituted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The present case involves 40 wrongful death actions brought in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by personal representatives of victims of the crash. These plaintiffs are described as Pennsylvania fiduciaries representing the estates of Pennsylvania decedents. The defendants moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer these actions to the District of Massachusetts. The defendants alleged that most of the witnesses resided there and that over 100 other actions were already pending in that district. The District Court granted the defendants' motion to transfer the actions. The plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had erred and should vacate its transfer order. The Court of Appeals concluded that a transfer could be granted only if the plaintiffs had qualified to sue in Massachusetts at the time the suits were brought in Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review important questions concerning the construction and operation of § 1404(a). Prior citations in the case include the District Court decision at 204 F. Supp. 426 and the Court of Appeals decision at 309 F. 2d 953.
View casePhuong Pham brought a tort action in Wisconsin after an accident in another state. The defendant argued that foreign law deprived the plaintiff of capacity to sue. The court applied Wisconsin law to determine the plaintiff's capacity to appear as a party and rejected the foreign-law bar.
The plaintiff, Mrs. Haumschild, and her husband were domiciled in Wisconsin at all relevant times. Wisconsin is both the state of the forum and of the domicile while California is the state where the alleged wrong was committed. While the couple was traveling in California, Mrs. Haumschild sustained personal injuries in an automobile accident that was allegedly caused by her husband's negligence. She subsequently commenced an action in Wisconsin circuit court against her husband and Continental Casualty Company, his insurer, seeking damages for those injuries. The defendants asserted that California law barred a wife from suing her husband in tort and therefore precluded recovery. The circuit court rendered judgment against the plaintiff on that ground. The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. The appeal was argued before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin on March 2, 1959. On April 10, 1959, the court reversed the judgment in an opinion authored by Justice Currie, with Justice Fairchild filing a separate concurrence joined by Justice Brown.
View caseYes. Uniform limited partnership acts grant a limited partnership the capacity to sue and be sued in the name of the partnership. This statutory grant allows the entity itself to appear as plaintiff or defendant without requiring suit in the names of individual partners.
Supporting sources
Capacity concerns the legal power of an entity or person to appear in court at all. Standing concerns whether that party has a sufficient interest in the particular controversy to obtain relief. A party may have capacity yet lack standing, or vice versa.
Yes. The LLC's statutory capacity to sue in its own name is not defeated by an affiliate's operational role. As long as the LLC is a party to the contract and the suit advances its affairs, the entity may enforce the agreement.
Supporting sources
No. A dismissal for lack of capacity is not on the merits. It leaves the plaintiff free to refile once capacity is obtained or in a court where capacity exists.
Supporting sources
An entity with capacity to sue or be sued is deemed to reside, for venue purposes, in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction. Venue analysis therefore presupposes the entity's suable status under applicable law.
Supporting sources
…candidly admits that the action against Piper and Hartzell was filed in the United States because its laws regarding liability, capacity to sue, and damages are more favorable to her position than are those of Scotland. Scottish law does not recognize strict liability in tort. Moreover, it permits wrongful-death actions only when…