Also known as: personal and advertising injuries · personal injury · advertising injury
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An insurance coverage category that protects the insured against liability for specified torts including libel, slander, invasion of privacy, and copyright infringement arising from the insured's advertising activities. The coverage applies only when the underlying conduct falls within the enumerated offenses and is not excluded by deliberate-infliction or criminal-act provisions.
State legislators who voted against a bill sue an executive official after a tie-breaking vote allows the bill to pass. The legislators seek coverage under their liability policy's personal and advertising injury section for the official's public statements accusing them of corruption. The insurer denies the claim because the statements do not match any enumerated offense and the underlying injury is not personal to the legislators in the required sense.
A spouse receives a settlement labeled as personal injury damages after an accident. The other spouse claims a share under marital property rules. The injured spouse's liability insurer refuses to treat the settlement as falling under personal and advertising injury coverage because the policy excludes amounts already satisfied from marital property.
A state bar disciplines an attorney for advertising personal injury services in plain language on a website. The attorney sues the bar, claiming the discipline violates free speech. The attorney's professional liability policy provides personal and advertising injury coverage for the resulting defense costs because the claim arises from advertising activity that is truthful and not misleading.
A firm jointly represents a husband, wife, and insurer in a personal injury case. When the wife later sues the husband, the firm faces disqualification. The firm's professional liability policy treats the disqualification motion as a claim under personal and advertising injury coverage because it arises from the firm's prior representation and public statements about the clients.
A contractor sues a supplier for defective materials that cause only economic harm. The supplier's insurer denies coverage under the personal and advertising injury section because the claim is barred by the economic loss rule and does not involve any enumerated tort such as libel or privacy invasion.
Insurers are accused of conspiring to limit coverage terms for certain risks. One insurer seeks defense costs under its own policy's personal and advertising injury section for statements made in trade publications defending the coverage limits. The insurer argues the statements constitute advertising injury because they address the scope of coverage offered to the public.
In the late 1970s, ISO, an association of approximately 1,400 domestic property and casualty insurers that serves as the almost exclusive source of support services for CGL insurance in the United States, began revising its 1973 standard CGL policy form. The 1973 form provided occurrence-based coverage for sudden and accidental pollution and did not cap defense costs. Primary insurers including Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Allstate Insurance Company, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, and CIGNA Corporation sought four changes: a shift to claims-made coverage with a retroactive date, elimination of pollution coverage, and a legal defense cost cap. After ISO proposed 1984 forms that omitted some of these changes, Hartford persuaded General Reinsurance Corporation, the largest American reinsurer, to procure the modifications or derail the program. The Reinsurance Association of America agreed to boycott the 1984 forms unless the changes were added, and domestic and London reinsurers informed ISO they would withhold reinsurance until the forms were altered. ISO then withdrew the 1984 forms and adopted 1986 forms containing a retroactive date and pollution exclusion; it later withdrew support services for the 1973 form. Separate agreements among London reinsurers required primary insurers to switch to claims-made policies and excluded pollution coverage from reinsurance contracts covering North American risks. Nineteen states and many private plaintiffs filed 36 complaints alleging that these actions violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. The cases were consolidated in the Northern District of California. The District Court granted motions to dismiss in 1989, holding the conduct fell within McCarran-Ferguson immunity and applying international comity to the foreign defendants. The Ninth Circuit reversed in 1991. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1992.
View caseThe coverage enumerates specific torts such as libel, slander, invasion of privacy, and copyright infringement arising from advertising. It does not extend to bodily injury or property damage, which fall under separate coverage parts.
The coverage excludes deliberately inflicted harm and criminal acts. An insured's knowing violation of another's rights or criminal conduct removes the claim from coverage even if it otherwise matches an enumerated offense.
…with the problem whether invasion of the plaintiff’s right to be free from emotional disturbance is actionable where there is no injury to person or property rights in addition to the inflicted mental distress. (Cf. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. , 59 Cal.2d 295 [29 Cal.Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513].)