Also known as:physical takings · physical appropriation
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A government action that physically appropriates or occupies private property. The action effects a per se taking when the government or a third party authorized by the government enters or takes possession of land or chattels, even if the invasion is temporary or intermittent.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Union Organizers Granted Recurring Access
Paul Peterson owns a large farm. A state regulation requires him to admit union organizers onto his fields for three hours twice a week during harvest. The organizers enter on schedule and use the property for their own purposes. The recurring physical invasions appropriate Peterson's right to exclude and constitute a physical taking.
Temporary Flooding From Dam Construction
Paige Porter owns riverside land. County officials build a dam that causes recurring seasonal flooding across her fields. The water covers the ground for weeks each year and prevents normal use. The repeated physical occupation amounts to a physical taking even though the water eventually recedes.
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles482 U.S. 304, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250
In 1957, the First English Evangelical Lutheran Church purchased a 21-acre parcel of land in a canyon along the banks of Mill Creek in the Angeles National Forest. The Church operated a campground known as Lutherglen on the property, which included a dining hall, two bunkhouses, a caretaker's lodge, an outdoor chapel, and a footbridge across the creek.
In July 1977, a forest fire denuded approximately 3,860 acres of the watershed area upstream from Lutherglen. On February 9 and 10, 1978, a storm dropped eleven inches of rain in the watershed, causing Mill Creek to overflow its banks, flood Lutherglen, and destroy its buildings.
In January 1979, the County of Los Angeles adopted Interim Ordinance No. 11,855, which provided that a person shall not construct, reconstruct, place or enlarge any building or structure within the outer boundary lines of the interim flood protection area located in Mill Creek Canyon. The ordinance was adopted because the County determined it was required for the immediate preservation of the public health and safety, and it was extended several times.
A little more than a month after the ordinance was adopted, the Church filed a complaint in Los Angeles County Superior Court alleging that Ordinance No. 11,855 denied the Church all use of Lutherglen and seeking damages for loss of use under each count. The defendants moved to strike the portions of the complaint alleging that the ordinance denied all use of Lutherglen.
The Superior Court granted the motion to strike. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, and the California Supreme Court denied review. The Church appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction.
Pearl Porter owns beachfront lots. State coastal rules prohibit any construction on the parcels. The rules leave the land without any economically viable use. The total deprivation of productive use does not qualify as a physical taking. It is instead analyzed as a regulatory taking under the Lucas per se rule for complete loss of value.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council505 U.S. 1003 (1992)
In 1986, petitioner David H. Lucas purchased two residential lots on the Isle of Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina, for $975,000. He intended to construct single-family homes on the parcels, which at the time were zoned for such use and required no building permit for development. No portion of the lots qualified as a critical area under then-existing coastal zone legislation.
Subsequently, in 1988, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act. The legislation established a baseline and prohibited construction of occupable improvements seaward of a line drawn 20 feet landward of that baseline, directly affecting Lucas's parcels by barring any permanent habitable structures.
Lucas filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas alleging that the Act's restrictions effected a taking of his property without just compensation. Following a bench trial, the court determined that the prohibition rendered the lots valueless and ordered the state to pay just compensation in the amount of $1,232,387.50.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the trial court's judgment. It accepted the legislature's findings that new construction threatened public resources and concluded that a regulation designed to prevent serious public harm could not constitute a taking.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision.
Pierre Poulin owns several undeveloped parcels. A regional planning agency imposes successive moratoria that block all construction for several years. The temporary but extended prohibition on use does not qualify as a physical taking because no physical invasion or permanent appropriation occurs.
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency535 U.S. 302
In the early 1980s, the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency imposed two moratoria on development in the Lake Tahoe Basin. The first, Ordinance 81-5, took effect on August 24, 1981, and lasted until August 26, 1983. The second, Resolution 83-21, ran from August 27, 1983, to April 25, 1984. Together these measures prohibited virtually all development on sensitive lands for a total of 32 months while TRPA developed a comprehensive land-use plan.
Lake Tahoe's exceptional water clarity had begun to deteriorate due to increased land development starting in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Runoff from impervious surfaces on steeper slopes and stream environment zones carried nutrients that promoted algae growth. In response, California and Nevada, along with the federal government, amended the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact in 1980 to require TRPA to establish environmental threshold carrying capacities and adopt a regional plan.
The 1980 Compact amendment directed TRPA to adopt thresholds within 18 months and a plan within a year thereafter. It also included a finding that temporary halts on development were necessary to preserve the region's capacity for future development consistent with the ultimate plan. TRPA enacted Ordinance 81-5 in June 1981 after concluding it could not meet the original deadlines, and later adopted Resolution 83-21 when no plan was in place by August 1983.
Petitioners, including the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council representing about 2,000 owners and a class of approximately 400 individual owners of vacant lots purchased before 1980 primarily for building single-family homes, filed parallel actions in federal courts in Nevada and California shortly after the 1984 plan was adopted. The suits were consolidated in the District of Nevada. The District Court found that the moratoria constituted categorical takings under Lucas because they temporarily deprived owners of all economically viable use. The Ninth Circuit reversed that determination.
The Ninth Circuit held that the temporary nature of the regulations meant no categorical taking had occurred and that Penn Central analysis applied, though petitioners had not challenged the District Court's Penn Central findings. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the moratoria effected per se takings.
Pilar Pena owns a mobile home park. City rules cap rents and restrict her ability to change tenants. The regulations do not require her to submit to any physical occupation by third parties. The restrictions therefore remain regulatory measures rather than a physical taking.
John K. YEE, et al. v. City of ESCONDIDO, California503 U.S. 519, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 118 L.Ed.2d 153
John K. Yee and Irene Yee own the Friendly Hills and Sunset Terrace Mobile Home Parks in Escondido, California.
In 1988 the voters of Escondido approved Proposition K, a rent control ordinance that reset rents to 1986 levels and barred increases without city council approval after consideration of eleven enumerated factors such as the Consumer Price Index, comparable pad rents, capital improvements, property taxes, and operating expenses.
A few months after the ordinance took effect the Yees filed suit in San Diego County Superior Court, alleging that the ordinance deprived them of all use and occupancy of their property and granted tenants and their successors the right to occupy it permanently; they sought six million dollars in damages, a declaratory judgment, and an injunction.
The complaint was filed against the background of California's Mobilehome Residency Law, enacted in 1978, which restricts the grounds on which a park owner may terminate a tenancy, prohibits requiring removal of a mobile home upon sale, bars transfer fees, and prevents disapproval of a purchaser who can pay the rent. Eleven other park owners filed identical suits against the city; by stipulation the twelve cases were consolidated for appeal and submitted on the briefs and argument in the Yee case alone. The Superior Court sustained the city's demurrer and dismissed all complaints.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissals. The California Supreme Court denied review. Eight of the park owners, including the Yees, petitioned for certiorari, which the United States Supreme Court granted in 1991 to address a conflict between the decision below and holdings of the Third and Ninth Circuits in similar mobile-home rent-control cases.
The Yees' complaint and opposition to the demurrer relied on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hall v. Santa Barbara. They asserted that the combined state and local measures transferred to tenants the right to occupy pads indefinitely at below-market rents while preventing park owners from selecting incoming tenants or changing the use of their land without extended notice.
Penelope Price owns a chain of service stations. Federal rules cap the price she may charge for fuel. The limits affect only the economic return from her property. They do not involve any physical appropriation and therefore do not constitute a physical taking.
Lingle, et al. v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005)
In 1997, the State of Hawaii had a highly concentrated wholesale oil market due to its small size and isolation over 1,600 miles from the mainland, with only two refineries and six gasoline wholesalers operating in the state. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. was the largest refiner and marketer, controlling 60 percent of the in-state gasoline market and 30 percent of the wholesale market on Oahu. Gasoline was sold at retail through approximately 300 service stations, about half leased by oil companies to independent lessee-dealers.
Chevron operated 64 such lessee-dealer stations under arrangements where it leased land, constructed stations, and leased them to dealers while setting wholesale prices and requiring supply contracts. In June 1997, the Hawaii Legislature enacted Act 257, which capped the rent oil companies could charge lessee-dealers at 15 percent of gross profits from gasoline sales plus 15 percent of other product sales, and imposed other restrictions on station ownership.
Thirty days after enactment, Chevron filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii against the Governor and Attorney General, challenging the rent cap. The parties stipulated that the cap would reduce aggregate rent on 11 of Chevron's stations by about $207,000 per year but allow increases on the remaining 53, potentially raising overall rental income by nearly $1.1 million annually, and that Chevron had not recovered station maintenance costs through rent alone over the past 20 years.
The District Court granted summary judgment to Chevron. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case. After a one-day bench trial featuring competing expert economists, the District Court entered judgment for Chevron. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2004.
Does a physical taking require permanent occupation of the property?
No. Even temporary or intermittent physical invasions that appropriate a right to enter private property qualify as per se physical takings requiring just compensation.
Supporting sources
Does the Takings Clause protect personal property as well as real property?
Yes. The Clause applies to both real and personal property, so government appropriation of chattels such as crops or inventory effects a physical taking.
Supporting sources
When does a regulation granting third-party access become a physical taking?
A regulation becomes a physical taking when it grants third parties a recurring legal right to enter and occupy private property, thereby appropriating the owner's right to exclude.
Supporting sources
505 U.S. 1003 (1992)
…Justice Brennan suggested, that total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation. See San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego , 450 U. S., at 652 (dissenting opinion). "[F]or what is the land but the profits thereof[?]" 1 E. Coke, Institutes, ch. 1, § 1 (1st Am.…