Also known as: plain-meaning · plain meaning rule · ordinary meaning rule
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The ordinary sense attributed to the words of a document by a reasonable reader familiar with the surrounding circumstances.
Priscilla Parks executed a will devising property to my cousin John. At execution she had a nephew named John but no cousin by that name. Extrinsic evidence of the surrounding circumstances showed the latent ambiguity. The court admitted objective facts to resolve the description but excluded direct testimony of her subjective intent that would contradict the text.
Pilar Pena created a trust leaving her estate to my son Philip but the scrivener typed Phillip. Clear and convincing evidence showed the typo and her actual intent. The court reformed the document even though the text was unambiguous on its face because the plain meaning could be corrected when mistake was proven.
Prosperity Investments required its delivery drivers to sign arbitration agreements. When a driver sued, the company invoked the Federal Arbitration Act. The court applied the plain meaning of engaged in commerce to hold that the drivers fell outside the exemption for seamen or railroad employees.
In October 1995, Saint Clair Adams applied for a job at Circuit City Stores, Inc., a national retailer of consumer electronics. Adams signed an employment application that included a provision stating he would settle any and all previously unasserted claims, disputes or controversies arising out of or relating to his application or candidacy for employment, employment and/or cessation of employment with Circuit City exclusively by final and binding arbitration before a neutral Arbitrator, with examples including claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, the Americans with Disabilities Act, contract law, and tort law. Adams was hired as a sales counselor in Circuit City's store in Santa Rosa, California. Two years later Adams filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against Circuit City in California state court asserting claims under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act and other claims based on general tort theories under California law. Circuit City filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California seeking to enjoin the state-court action and to compel arbitration of Adams's claims pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. The district court entered an order concluding that Adams was obligated by the arbitration agreement to submit his claims to binding arbitration. Adams appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. While the appeal was pending the Ninth Circuit ruled in an unrelated case that the Federal Arbitration Act does not apply to contracts of employment. Following that ruling the Ninth Circuit held in Adams's case that the arbitration agreement was contained in a contract of employment and therefore was not subject to the Federal Arbitration Act. Circuit City petitioned the Supreme Court for review noting that the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that all employment contracts are excluded from the Federal Arbitration Act conflicts with every other Court of Appeals to have addressed the question. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue.
View casePhilip Powell sold narcotics in two separate transactions minutes apart. The government charged two violations of the same statute. The court looked to the plain meaning of the penalty provision and held that each distinct sale constituted a separate offense subject to separate punishment.
The petitioner was charged with violating provisions of the Harrison Narcotic Act, c. 1, § 1, 38 Stat. 785, as amended by c. 18, § 1006, 40 Stat. 1057, 1131, and c. 1, § 2, 38 Stat. 785, 786, as amended. The indictment contained five counts. The jury returned a verdict against petitioner upon the second, third and fifth counts only. Each of these counts charged a sale of morphine hydrochloride to the same purchaser. The second count charged a sale on a specified day of ten grains of the drug not in or from the original stamped package. The third count charged a sale on the following day of eight grains of the drug not in or from the original stamped package. The fifth count charged the latter sale also as having been made not in pursuance of a written order of the purchaser as required by the statute. It appears from the evidence that shortly after delivery of the drug which was the subject of the first sale, the purchaser paid for an additional quantity, which was delivered the next day. The first sale had been consummated, and the payment for the additional drug, however closely following, was the initiation of a separate and distinct sale completed by its delivery. The court sentenced petitioner to five years imprisonment and a fine of $2,000 upon each count, the terms of imprisonment to run consecutively. This judgment was affirmed on appeal.
View casePriya Prasad served briefly on a city housing committee but held no paid government post. A magazine called her a public official in an article. The court refused to stretch the plain meaning of public official to include her and applied the actual malice standard only to those who fit the ordinary definition.
In 1968, Chicago police officer Richard Nuccio shot and killed a youth named Nelson. State authorities prosecuted Nuccio and obtained a conviction for second-degree murder. The Nelson family retained petitioner Elmer Gertz, a Chicago attorney, to represent them in civil litigation against Nuccio. Respondent Robert Welch, Inc., publishes American Opinion, a monthly magazine expressing the views of the John Birch Society. In March 1969, the magazine published an article titled "FRAME-UP: Richard Nuccio And The War On Police." The article accused Gertz of participating in a Communist conspiracy to discredit local law enforcement, described him as a "Leninist" and "Communist-fronter," and claimed he had been an officer of the National Lawyers Guild, which it portrayed as a Communist organization involved in planning attacks on Chicago police during the 1968 Democratic Convention. The article contained numerous inaccuracies, including the false implication that Gertz had a criminal record. Gertz had served as an officer of the National Lawyers Guild approximately fifteen years earlier but had no involvement in planning the 1968 demonstrations. He had never been a member of the Marxist League for Industrial Democracy or the Intercollegiate Socialist Society. The managing editor of American Opinion made no effort to verify the charges against Gertz before publication and appended an editorial introduction stating that the author had conducted extensive research. Gertz filed a diversity action for libel in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The district court ruled that the statements constituted libel per se under Illinois law. After a trial, the jury awarded Gertz $50,000 in compensatory damages. The district court later entered judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict, applying the New York Times standard. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the application of constitutional standards to defamation of a private individual.
View caseThe President issued a proclamation suspending entry from several countries. Challengers argued the statute limited the power to wartime emergencies. The court held that the plain meaning of the text granted broad authority without those limits and upheld the order.
Shortly after taking office, President Trump signed Executive Order 13769 directing a review of information provided by foreign governments about their nationals seeking entry and temporarily restricting entry from seven countries previously identified as posing terrorism risks. After courts enjoined that order, the President revoked it and issued Executive Order 13780, which again directed a worldwide review and temporarily restricted entry from six of the countries. Following completion of the review, the President issued Proclamation No. 9645 on September 24, 2017, placing entry restrictions on nationals of eight countries—Chad, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen—whose systems for managing and sharing information the President deemed inadequate. The Proclamation imposed varying restrictions by country, exempted lawful permanent residents and asylees, provided for case-by-case waivers, and directed ongoing 180-day reviews; restrictions on Chad were later lifted after it improved its practices. Plaintiffs including the State of Hawaii, three U.S. citizens with foreign-national relatives from Iran, Syria, and Yemen applying for visas, and the Muslim Association of Hawaii challenged the Proclamation in the District of Hawaii on statutory and Establishment Clause grounds. The district court granted a nationwide preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on statutory grounds. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseExtrinsic evidence fails to create an ambiguity when it consists only of direct statements of the drafter's subjective intent that contradict the ordinary meaning of the text. Courts may consider surrounding circumstances and other objective evidence, but they will not use after-the-fact testimony to rewrite clear language.
A document that is unambiguous on its face may still be reformed if clear and convincing evidence shows a mistake of fact or law and establishes the donor's actual intention. Direct evidence contradicting plain meaning is admissible for this limited equitable purpose even though it would not create an ambiguity for construction.
The same ordinary-meaning principle governs integrated contracts, statutes, and donative documents. Courts first determine whether the text is clear on its face before deciding whether extrinsic evidence may be considered to interpret or reform it.
When extrinsic facts reveal that the ordinary meaning produces uncertainty, such as multiple people fitting a description or changed circumstances, the language is treated as ambiguous and extrinsic evidence may be used to resolve it.
…Respondent's suggestion would sweep all lawyers under the New York Times rule as officers of the court and distort the plain meaning of the "public official" category beyond all recognition. We decline to follow it. Respondent's characterization of petitioner as a public figure raises a different question. That…