The act of affixing or displaying a notice, message, or document in a public place or on property to provide information or express a view. Such posting may raise issues under the Establishment Clause when it involves religious content in public schools or under free-speech doctrines when it occurs on public property.
2
Sense 1
1
in constitutional and property law
The act of affixing or displaying a notice, message, or document in a public place or on property to provide information or express a view. Such posting may raise issues under the Establishment Clause when it involves religious content in public schools or under free-speech doctrines when it occurs on public property.
Examples4
School Display Draws Challenge
A state legislature directs every public school to display a framed copy of the Ten Commandments in each classroom. Parker Phillips, a parent, sues the school district claiming the required posting advances religion. The court holds the posting unconstitutional because its religious character is inherent and cannot be cured by a claimed secular purpose.
Sense 2
2
in corporate and property law
The act of displaying information on a website, bulletin board, or other public medium to provide notice or make materials available to shareholders or the public. This method satisfies delivery or publication requirements when the posting is reasonably accessible and the governing rule permits it.
Examples2
Bulletin Board News Dispute
International News Service copies recent war reports from Associated Press member papers and posts the same stories on its own bulletin boards for sale to subscribers. Associated Press sues for misappropriation. The posting allows simultaneous or earlier distribution to INS readers, depriving AP members of the commercial value of their gathered news.
The act of displaying information on a website, bulletin board, or other public medium to provide notice or make materials available to shareholders or the public. This method satisfies delivery or publication requirements when the posting is reasonably accessible and the governing rule permits it.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Moment of Silence Statute
A state enacts a statute authorizing a daily moment of silence in public schools for meditation or voluntary prayer. Priscilla Parks, a parent, challenges the law as an establishment of religion. The court examines whether the statute's purpose and effect amount to state endorsement of prayer through the required classroom posting of the moment.
Members of a church group display signs near a military funeral reading "God Hates the USA" and "Thank God for Dead Soldiers." Philip Powell, the father of the deceased marine, sues for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court holds that the signs, posted on public land, constitute protected speech on matters of public concern.
Snyder v. Phelps562 U.S. 443 (2011)
Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder was killed in action in Iraq. His father, Albert Snyder, arranged for the funeral to be held in Westminster, Maryland. Members of the Westboro Baptist Church, an unincorporated association founded by Fred Phelps, learned of the funeral through local newspapers and decided to picket it to communicate their belief that God punishes the United States for its tolerance of homosexuality.
On the day of the funeral, Westboro members displayed placards on public land approximately 1,000 feet from the church where the service was held. The signs included messages such as "God Hates the USA," "Thank God for Dead Soldiers," "Pope in Hell," "Priests Rape Boys," "You’re Going to Hell," and "God Hates Fags." The picketing took place for about 30 minutes before the funeral began. The funeral procession passed within 200 to 300 feet of the picketers. Church members also posted an online "epic" that discussed Matthew Snyder’s funeral and criticized his parents.
Albert Snyder filed a diversity action in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland against Fred Phelps, his daughters, and the Westboro Baptist Church. The suit alleged claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy. A jury found for Snyder and awarded $2.9 million in compensatory damages and $8 million in punitive damages.
The district court reduced the punitive damages award to $2.1 million but left the verdict otherwise intact. The Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment, holding that Westboro’s statements were protected by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether the First Amendment shields the church members from tort liability for their picketing speech.
A veterans' group organizes a St. Patrick's Day parade and refuses to allow an Irish-American gay and lesbian organization to march under its own banner. Pedro Pacheco, a member of the excluded group, sues claiming the exclusion violates state antidiscrimination law. The court holds that the parade organizers' decision about which messages to include through participant selection is protected expression.
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB)515 U.S. 557, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 132 L. Ed. 2d 487 (1995)
The South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, an unincorporated association of individuals elected from South Boston veterans groups, has organized the annual St. Patrick's Day-Evacuation Day Parade since 1947. Mayor James Michael Curley granted the Council authority to organize and conduct the parade. Every year since then the Council has applied for and received the sole permit for the event. The parade has at times included as many as 20,000 marchers and drawn up to 1 million spectators. No other applicant has ever applied for that permit.
In 1992 gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendants of Irish immigrants joined together with other supporters to form the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, known as GLIB. GLIB sought to march in the parade to express pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals. The group also wanted to demonstrate that such men and women exist among those descended from Irish immigrants and to express solidarity with similar groups seeking to march in New York's parade. The Council denied GLIB's application. GLIB obtained a state-court order and marched uneventfully among the 10,000 participants and 750,000 spectators that year.
In 1993 the Council again refused GLIB's application. GLIB and some of its members sued the Council, its leader John J. Hurley, and the City of Boston. The suit alleged violations of the Massachusetts public accommodations statute, which prohibits any distinction on account of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation. The state trial court found that the parade had traveled the same basic route for at least the past 47 years. The court also found that the Council had no written criteria and employed no particular procedures for admission. The Council had occasionally admitted groups that simply showed up and did not generally inquire into applicants' messages. The parade contained an eclectic variety of patriotic, commercial, political, moral, artistic, religious, athletic, public service, trade union, and eleemosynary themes.
The trial court concluded that the parade was a public accommodation because of the lack of genuine selectivity in choosing participants. It found that GLIB had been excluded because of its members' sexual orientation. The court ordered that GLIB participate on the same terms as other groups. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the trial court's findings that the parade lacked any specific expressive purpose and that exclusion rested on sexual orientation.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review petitioners' claim that the state courts' application of the public accommodations law violated their First Amendment rights.
Does posting a defamatory statement on a public website satisfy the publication element even if the plaintiff never sees it?
Yes. Publication requires only that the defendant intentionally or negligently communicate the statement to at least one third party. Placing the statement on a public-facing portal or forum makes it accessible to prospective users and satisfies the element regardless of whether the plaintiff ever logs in or reads the words.
Is a single email to department chairs enough to constitute publication when the memo later reaches students?
Yes. Sending the memo to multiple chairs is an intentional communication to third parties. Subsequent negligent handling that exposes the memo to additional readers continues the publication chain. One other person is sufficient. Mass circulation is not required.
International News Service v. Associated Press248 U.S. 215 (1918)
The Associated Press is a cooperative organization incorporated under New York law. Its members are proprietors or representatives of about 950 daily newspapers. It gathers news worldwide through its own correspondents, exchanges with members, and other means at an annual cost of approximately $3,500,000 assessed upon the members.
Each member agrees that news received through the service is for exclusive publication in a designated newspaper and place. No other use is permitted. No member shall furnish the news in advance of publication to any non-member. Each member also supplies its local news exclusively to the Associated Press.
International News Service is a New Jersey corporation engaged in gathering and selling news to approximately 400 subscribing newspapers under contracts. Its annual operating cost exceeds $2,000,000. The two organizations compete directly in the distribution of news throughout the United States. The newspapers they serve likewise compete in their respective districts.
International News Service obtained Associated Press news by copying from bulletin boards and early editions of newspapers published by Associated Press members on the East Coast. It transmitted the material by telegraph to its own western subscribers for publication. It sometimes rewrote the dispatches while using the same facts. It also obtained news before publication by bribing employees of Associated Press member newspapers and by inducing members to violate the by-laws.
The bill was filed in the District Court for the Southern District of New York. The District Court granted a preliminary injunction against bribing employees and inducing by-law violations. It declined to enjoin the copying from bulletins and early editions. The Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the existing injunction. On the complainant's appeal, it modified the decree to add an injunction against bodily taking of the news until its commercial value as news had passed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
J. I. Case Co. mails proxy materials to shareholders that allegedly contain misleading statements about a merger. Pablo Perez, a shareholder, brings a derivative suit alleging violation of the securities laws. The court recognizes an implied private right of action so that shareholders can enforce the proxy rules through litigation.
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak377 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1964)
Respondent owned 2,000 shares of common stock of J. I. Case Company acquired prior to the merger. He brought a civil action based on diversity jurisdiction. Respondent sought to enjoin a proposed merger between Case and the American Tractor Corporation on grounds including breach of the fiduciary duties of the Case directors, self-dealing among the management of Case and ATC, and misrepresentations contained in the material circulated to obtain proxies.
The complaint was in two counts. The first count was based on diversity and claimed a breach of the directors' fiduciary duty to the stockholders. The second count alleged a violation of § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 with reference to the proxy solicitation material.
The injunction was denied and the merger was consummated. Successive amended complaints were filed. The case was heard on the two-count complaint.
The allegations included that petitioners solicited proxies for a special stockholders’ meeting at which the merger was to be voted upon. The proxy solicitation material was false and misleading in violation of § 14(a) and Rule 14a-9. The merger was approved by a small margin of votes and would not have been approved but for the false and misleading statements. Case stockholders were damaged thereby.
The District Court held that as to the federal count it had no power to redress the alleged violations of the Act but was limited solely to the granting of declaratory relief thereon under § 27 of the Act. The court held the Wisconsin security for expenses statute applicable to both counts except the declaratory portion of Count 2. It ordered respondent to furnish a bond in the amount of $75,000. Upon his failure to do so, the court dismissed the complaint save that part of Count 2 seeking a declaratory judgment.
On interlocutory appeal the Court of Appeals reversed on both counts. It held that the District Court had the power to grant remedial relief and that the Wisconsin statute was not applicable. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question of whether § 27 of the Act authorizes a federal cause of action for rescission or damages to a corporate stockholder with respect to a consummated merger authorized pursuant to a proxy statement alleged to contain false and misleading statements violative of § 14(a) of the Act.
When does posting information on a corporate website satisfy notice requirements to shareholders?
Posting satisfies the requirement when the information is made generally available by a method permitted under the governing statute or rule, such as the corporation's website. Actual awareness by individual shareholders is unnecessary if the posting meets the accessibility standard.
Does posting news on a bulletin board destroy the originator's property interest in that news?
No. Even when member papers post stories on public boards, the commercial value of timely, exclusive distribution remains protectable. Unauthorized copying and simultaneous posting by a competitor constitutes misappropriation.
472 U.S. 38 (1985)
…in judgment). In Stone v. Graham , 449 U. S. 39 (1980) ( per curiam ), for example, we held that a statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in public schools violated the Establishment Clause, even though the Kentucky Legislature asserted that its goal was educational. We have not interpreted the first…