Also known as:potentially exculpatory evidences · Brady material · exculpatory evidence
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Evidence whose preservation or disclosure could tend to negate a defendant's guilt or mitigate punishment.
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How its tested
Common Examples
6
Habeas Substitute Lacks Exculpatory Review
U.S. naval forces detained Philip Powell on a floating platform after intercepting his vessel near an armed conflict zone. A federal statute channeled all challenges to a maritime security board that could not consider newly discovered shipping records or crew testimony and lacked power to order release. Powell filed a habeas petition arguing the statute denied meaningful review because the board could not evaluate potentially exculpatory evidence discovered after the initial designation.
Prosecutor Withholds Favorable Lab Report
The prosecutor received a lab analysis showing the pathogen in victims' samples was absent from all kitchen swabs at Penelope Price's hotel. Despite possessing this report, the prosecutor filed charges against Price based solely on guest affidavits. Price's counsel later discovered the withheld analysis and moved to dismiss, arguing the failure to disclose material potentially exculpatory evidence violated due process.
Paula Pierce sought to introduce a reliable out-of-court statement from a witness who had since died, stating that another person admitted committing the charged offense. The trial court excluded the statement under the hearsay rule. Pierce argued on appeal that the strict application of hearsay rules violated due process by excluding trustworthy, critical potentially exculpatory evidence essential to a fair trial.
Counsel Fails to Investigate Exculpatory Records
Pierce Patterson pleaded guilty after his lawyer failed to obtain maintenance logs showing the vehicle brakes had been inspected days before the accident. Patterson later learned the logs would have supported a defense that the other driver's sudden stop caused the collision. He claimed the failure to discover this potentially exculpatory evidence prejudiced his plea decision.
Hill v. Lockhart474 U.S. 52 (1985)
William Lloyd Hill pleaded guilty in an Arkansas trial court to charges of first-degree murder and theft of property. Under the plea agreement the State recommended concurrent prison sentences of 35 years for the murder and 10 years for the theft. Hill signed a written plea statement indicating that he understood the charges and consequences of pleading guilty, that his plea had not been induced by any force, threat, or promise apart from the agreement itself, that he realized the trial judge retained sole power of sentence, and that he had discussed the plea agreement with his attorney and was satisfied with the advice.
At the plea hearing Hill recounted the events giving rise to the charges, affirmed that he had signed and understood the plea statement, reiterated that no threats or promises had been made other than the agreement, and entered guilty pleas to both charges. The trial judge accepted the pleas, imposed the recommended sentences, granted credit for time already served, and told Hill that he would be required to serve at least one-third of his time before becoming eligible for parole.
More than two years later Hill filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. He alleged that his guilty plea was involuntary because of ineffective assistance of counsel in that his court-appointed attorney had told him he would become eligible for parole after serving one-third of his sentence. In fact, because Hill had previously been convicted of a felony in Florida, Arkansas law classified him as a second offender and required him to serve one-half of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole. Hill asked the district court to reduce his sentence to a term that would result in parole eligibility in conformance with his original expectations. The plea statement form completed in connection with the case indicated zero prior convictions.
The District Court denied habeas relief without a hearing. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that parole eligibility is a collateral rather than a direct consequence of a guilty plea. On rehearing the en banc Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court judgment by an equally divided court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the difference between the result reached in the present case and that reached by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Strader v. Garrison.
In his habeas petition Hill did not allege that, had counsel correctly informed him about his parole eligibility date, he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted on going to trial. He alleged no special circumstances that might support the conclusion that he placed particular emphasis on his parole eligibility in deciding whether or not to plead guilty. His mistaken belief that he would become eligible for parole after serving one-third of his sentence would have affected his calculation of the time he likely would serve under the proposed plea agreement. The same mistaken belief would have affected his calculation of the time he likely would serve if he went to trial and were convicted.
Presumption Shifted Without Exculpatory Opportunity
Pedro Pacheco was charged with possessing a controlled substance found in a car he occupied with three others. A state statute created a presumption that all occupants possessed the drugs. Pacheco sought to introduce evidence that one passenger had admitted sole ownership, but the trial court limited his ability to rebut the presumption with this potentially exculpatory testimony.
County Court of Ulster County, N. Y. v. Allen442 U.S. 140 (S.Ct.1979)
In March 1973, three adult male respondents and a sixteen-year-old girl were traveling in a Chevrolet on the New York State Thruway when the car was stopped for speeding. Police observed two loaded handguns weighing approximately six pounds in an open handbag on the front floor or seat beside the girl, who admitted the bag belonged to her. A machinegun and heroin were discovered in the trunk after it was pried open.
The four were tried together in Ulster County Court for possession of the handguns and trunk items. The trial judge instructed the jury regarding the statutory presumption that the presence of firearms in the automobile constituted evidence of possession by all occupants. The jury found the three adult males guilty of handgun possession but acquitted everyone of the trunk charges. The convictions were affirmed by the Appellate Division without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals also affirmed.
The respondents sought federal habeas corpus relief in the Southern District of New York. The district court granted the writ on the ground that the presumption could not support the convictions on these facts. The Second Circuit affirmed the grant of the writ, though on the basis that the statute was unconstitutional on its face.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the procedural and substantive issues raised by the lower federal courts' decisions.
Pavel Petrov was charged with deliberate homicide after a bar fight. State law barred evidence of his voluntary intoxication to negate the mental state element. Petrov argued the exclusion prevented him from presenting potentially exculpatory evidence that he lacked the required mens rea due to extreme intoxication, violating due process.
Montana v. Egelhoff518 U.S. 37, 116 S.Ct. 2013, 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996)
On July 12, 1992, respondent James Egelhoff was camping in the Yaak region of northwestern Montana with Roberta Pavola and John Christenson to pick mushrooms. The three sold the mushrooms they had collected and spent the rest of the day and evening drinking in bars and at a private party in Troy, Montana. After leaving the party after 9 p.m. in Christenson's 1974 Ford Galaxy station wagon, the drinking continued, as Egelhoff was seen buying beer at 9:20 p.m. and recalled passing a bottle of Black Velvet with Christenson.
Around midnight, officers of the Lincoln County sheriff's department discovered the station wagon stuck in a ditch along U.S. Highway 2. Pavola and Christenson were in the front seat, each dead from a single gunshot to the head. Egelhoff lay in the rear of the car, alive and yelling obscenities, with a blood-alcohol content of .36 percent measured over an hour later. His .38-caliber handgun lay on the floor near the brake pedal with four loaded rounds and two empty casings, and he had gunshot residue on his hands.
Egelhoff was charged with two counts of deliberate homicide under Montana law requiring that he purposely or knowingly caused the deaths of another human being. At trial he claimed an unidentified fourth person must have committed the murders, that his extreme intoxication rendered him physically incapable of committing them, and that it accounted for his inability to recall the events. The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. § 45-2-203 that it could not consider respondent's intoxicated condition in determining the existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense. The jury found Egelhoff guilty on both counts and the court sentenced him to 84 years' imprisonment.
The Supreme Court of Montana reversed the convictions. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
What distinguishes potentially exculpatory evidence from material exculpatory evidence under Brady?
Potentially exculpatory evidence refers to items whose contents might exonerate the defendant if known or preserved. Brady requires disclosure only when the evidence is both favorable and material to guilt or punishment. Failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence violates due process whether the suppression is intentional or inadvertent.
Supporting sources
Does the government have a duty to preserve all potentially exculpatory evidence?
No. The Due Process Clause does not impose an absolute duty to retain every item that might conceivably be of evidentiary significance. When evidence is lost, courts must assess whether the loss was in bad faith and whether the evidence was of such a nature that its exculpatory value was apparent before destruction.
How does potentially exculpatory evidence factor into habeas review for enemy combatants?
A meaningful substitute for habeas corpus must permit detainees to introduce exculpatory evidence discovered after initial proceedings and to seek release if the evidence undermines the detention justification. A review process that bars new exculpatory evidence or lacks authority to order release fails constitutional standards.
Supporting sources
518 U.S. 37, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 135 L. Ed. 2d 361 (1996)
…to introduce crucial, relevant evidence: " In the absence of any valid state justification, exclusion of this kind of exculpatory evidence deprives a defendant of the basic right to have the prosecutor's case encounter and survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing." 476 U. S., at 690-691 (emphasis added) (internal…