Also known as: preclusion rule · preclusion · claim preclusion · issue preclusion
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A body of doctrines that bar relitigation of claims or issues previously decided by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Parker Phillips stood trial for robbery and the jury acquitted him after finding that another person had committed the act. Prosecutors later obtained new witness statements and filed a second indictment charging the same robbery. The court dismissed the new case because the identity issue had already been resolved against the state.
The SEC obtained a final judgment that Platinum Partners knowingly misled investors about bond risks. Several pension funds then sued the same firm for civil fraud arising from the identical offering and moved to bar relitigation of the knowledge element. The court granted the motion because the prior litigation supplied a full and fair opportunity to contest the issue.
Phoebe Park sued in state court for unpaid commissions but the action was dismissed solely because the statute of limitations had run. She refiled the identical claim in federal admiralty court. The federal court permitted the second suit to proceed because the state dismissal was not treated as an adjudication on the merits for claim-preclusion purposes.
Prosperity Investments financed and directed every strategic decision in an earlier suit brought by one of its subsidiaries against a port authority. After the subsidiary lost on the validity of a fee schedule, Prosperity filed its own refund action raising the same methodology issue. The court held Prosperity bound by the prior determination because it had exercised practical control over the first litigation.
Peter Park's estate sued a shipping line under general maritime law after a seaman's death in territorial waters. The defendant argued that an earlier Jones Act recovery by the same estate already resolved the underlying negligence issues. The court examined whether the prior judgment precluded the new unseaworthiness claim arising from the same incident.
Edward Moragne was a longshoreman employed by Gulf Florida Terminal Company. On April 23, 1967, he was killed while working aboard the vessel Palmetto State in the Port of Miami, Florida. A beam supporting hatch covers fell on him during the stowage of a cargo of fertilizer. Petitioner, his widow and representative of his estate, brought suit in the Circuit Court for Dade County, Florida, against respondent States Marine Lines, Inc., the vessel owner. She sought damages for wrongful death and for pain and suffering prior to death. The claims rested on theories of both negligence and unseaworthiness. States Marine removed the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida on diversity grounds under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441. It filed a third-party complaint against Gulf Florida Terminal Company. The complaint asserted that any negligence or unseaworthiness resulted from Gulf's stevedoring operations. Both defendants moved to dismiss the wrongful-death claim based on unseaworthiness. The District Court dismissed the unseaworthiness portion of the complaint, citing The Tungus v. Skovgaard, and certified the order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question whether the Florida wrongful-death statute, Fla. Stat. § 768.01, encompassed unseaworthiness. The state court answered in the negative. On return to the Court of Appeals, that court affirmed the dismissal. Earlier related proceedings in state court had produced an affirmance by the Florida District Court of Appeal, 236 So. 2d 80, and denial of certiorari by the Florida Supreme Court, 239 So. 2d 829. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View casePeak Performance sued a competitor for patent infringement. The competitor had previously lost an infringement suit brought by the same patent holder and now sought to assert invalidity. The court considered whether the earlier judgment estopped the competitor from relitigating validity questions it had a full opportunity to contest.
Respondent University of Illinois Foundation is the owner by assignment of U.S. Patent No. 3,210,767, issued to Dwight E. Isbell on October 5, 1965, for Frequency Independent Unidirectional Antennas, with the application filed on May 3, 1960. The antennas covered are designed for transmission and reception of electromagnetic radio frequency signals used in many types of communications, including the broadcasting of radio and television signals. The patent has been much litigated since it was granted, primarily because it claims a high quality television antenna for color reception. Petitioner Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. manufactures antennas, and respondent JFD Electronics Corp. is a licensee of the Foundation. One of the first infringement suits brought by the Foundation was filed in the Southern District of Iowa against the Winegard Co., an antenna manufacturer. After trial to the court and inquiry under Graham v. John Deere Co., Chief Judge Stephenson held the patent invalid as obvious and entered judgment for the alleged infringer. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit unanimously affirmed, and the Supreme Court denied the patentee's petition for certiorari. The Foundation has filed six infringement actions based on the Isbell patent. In March 1966, well before the ruling in the Winegard case, the Foundation filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois charging a Chicago customer of petitioner Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. with infringing the Isbell patent and U.S. Patent No. Re. 25,740, reissued March 9, 1965, to P. E. Mayes et al. Blonder-Tongue chose to subject itself to the jurisdiction of the court to defend its customer and filed an answer and counterclaim asserting that the patents were invalid, that its antennas did not infringe if valid, and other claims including unfair competition, antitrust, and infringement by JFD models. Trial was to the court, and on June 27, 1968, Judge Hoffman held that the Foundation's patents were valid and infringed, dismissed the unfair competition and antitrust charges, and found claim 5 of the B-T patent obvious and invalid. Before discussing the Isbell patent, Judge Hoffman noted the prior invalidity holding in Winegard but stated the court was free to decide on the evidence before it and determined both patents valid and enforceable. Blonder-Tongue appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the findings that the Isbell patent was valid and infringed, affirmed dismissal of the unfair competition and antitrust counterclaims, affirmed the invalidity of claim 5 of the B-T patent, but reversed the finding that the Mayes patent was valid. Blonder-Tongue sought certiorari, assigning as a primary reason the conflict between the Seventh and Eighth Circuits as to the validity of the Isbell patent, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari, subsequently requesting the parties to discuss whether the holding of Triplett v. Lowell should be adhered to and whether the Winegard determination binds the respondents.
View caseA later plaintiff may invoke issue preclusion offensively against a defendant that lost the identical issue in an earlier suit provided the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate and the application remains fair under all circumstances.
Yes. When a court dismisses an action for failure to prosecute or to obey court orders and the order does not state otherwise, the dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits and bars a subsequent suit on the same claim.
Collateral estoppel binds a nonparty that assumed control over prior litigation in which it held a direct financial or proprietary interest. Once an issue is actually and necessarily decided by a competent court the determination is conclusive in later suits.
…and Procedure § 2522, pp. 244-246 (2d ed. 1995). See also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore , 439 U. S. 322, 335-337 (1979) (issue preclusion absent mutuality of parties does not violate Seventh Amendment, although common law as it existed in 1791 permitted issue preclusion only when there was mutuality). : The…