Also known as: preponderance · preponderance standard · more likely than not
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A standard of proof requiring the trier of fact to determine that a contested fact is more likely than not true.
Southern Logic designated Luis to testify that Northern Fiber's nationwide network could not handle advertised traffic volumes. The court assessed whether Luis's experience with small-scale wireless systems made it more likely than not that his specialized knowledge would assist the jury on throughput issues. Finding the proponent had not carried that showing, the court excluded the testimony.
After Pierre Poulin was acquitted of murdering his aunt, the residuary beneficiaries petitioned to bar him from inheriting under her will. The probate court applied the preponderance standard to the civil record and found it more likely than not that Poulin had feloniously and intentionally killed the decedent, denying him any interest.
The prosecution offered evidence that Steve had previously submitted questionable invoices at another nonprofit. The court determined there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably find the prior acts occurred and that their probative value on intent was not substantially outweighed by prejudice, admitting the evidence without a preliminary preponderance finding by the judge.
Evelyn's trust left her downtown office building at 300 Market Street to her grandson Leo, yet she had sold that property and acquired one on River Avenue that she informally called the Market Street building. The court received extrinsic evidence and found it more likely than not that Evelyn intended the River Avenue property to pass to Leo, construing the gift accordingly.
A family court found by a preponderance of the evidence that a juvenile had committed acts that would constitute larceny if done by an adult and ordered confinement. The Supreme Court held that due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in such proceedings, reversing the adjudication reached under the lower civil standard.
During a 1967 adjudicatory hearing conducted pursuant to section 742 of the New York Family Court Act, a judge in New York Family Court found that the twelve-year-old appellant had entered a locker and stolen one hundred twelve dollars from a woman's pocketbook. The petition which charged appellant with delinquency alleged that his act, if done by an adult, would constitute the crime or crimes of larceny. The judge acknowledged that the proof might not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but relied on section 744(b) of the New York Family Court Act, which provides that any determination at the conclusion of an adjudicatory hearing that a juvenile did an act or acts must be based on a preponderance of the evidence. After a subsequent dispositional hearing, appellant was ordered placed in a training school for an initial period of eighteen months, subject to annual extensions of his commitment until his eighteenth birthday, six years in appellant's case. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, First Judicial Department, affirmed without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals then affirmed by a four-to-three vote, expressly sustaining the constitutionality of section 744(b). The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs offered expert opinions that Bendectin caused birth defects based on animal studies and chemical analyses. The court required the proponents to show it was more likely than not that the experts' methods were reliable and would assist the trier of fact on causation before admitting the testimony.
Two minors brought suit against Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, claiming they suffered limb reduction birth defects because their mothers had taken Bendectin, a drug prescribed for morning sickness to about 17.5 million pregnant women in the United States between 1957 and 1982. Limb reduction defects occur in fewer than one birth out of every 1000. Scientists do not know the mechanism by which any teratogen causes such defects. The plaintiffs offered testimony from three groups of experts. One group proposed to testify to a statistical link between Bendectin ingestion during pregnancy and limb reduction defects based on reanalyses of published studies that had reported no such association. A second group proposed to testify that Bendectin causes limb reduction defects in humans because it causes such defects in laboratory animals. A third group proposed to testify based on the similarity of Bendectin's chemical structure to other drugs suspected of causing birth defects. The district court granted summary judgment to Merrell Dow after excluding the plaintiffs' expert testimony. The Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed, and remanded for consideration under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. On remand, the Ninth Circuit examined the affidavits and prior trial testimony of the plaintiffs' experts. None of the experts had studied the effect of Bendectin on limb reduction defects before being hired to testify in this or related cases. None had published his work on Bendectin in a scientific journal. The only review their work had received was by judges and juries. Plaintiffs' epidemiological experts made vague assertions of a statistically significant relationship between Bendectin and birth defects but did not state that the relative risk exceeded two. With the exception of Dr. Palmer, the remaining experts were willing to testify only that Bendectin is capable of causing birth defects. Dr. Palmer alone was willing to testify that Bendectin did cause the limb defects in each of the children, based on his review of the plaintiffs' medical records and his conclusion that Bendectin is a teratogen.
The factfinder must conclude that the proposition is more likely true than not true. This is the ordinary civil standard and is contrasted with the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard used in criminal cases.
Yes. When deciding preliminary questions of admissibility, the judge applies the preponderance standard to determine whether the proponent has shown the necessary foundational facts.
…and I further charge you that such punitive damages may be awarded only in the event that you, the jury, are convinced by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the defendant . . . was motivated by personal ill will, that is actual intent to do the plaintiff harm, or that the defendant. . . was guilty of gross negligence and recklessness and…
…that "[a]ny determination at the conclusion of [an adjudicatory] hearing that a [juvenile] did an act or acts must be based on a preponderance of the evidence." During a subsequent dispositional hearing, appellant was ordered placed in a training school for an initial period of 18 months, subject to annual extensions of his commitment…
…now before us does not require a physician to comply with the informed consent provisions "if he or she can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
…about causation should be weighted, even though the substantive legal standard has always required proof of causation by a preponderance of the evidence
…warranty as to both defendants was properly placed in the hands of the jury. In our judgment, the evidence shown, as a matter of preponderance
The trial court need not find by a preponderance that the defendant committed the prior act. The evidence is admissible if a jury could reasonably find the act occurred, provided the probative value on a non-propensity issue is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.
The court must establish the donor's actual intention by a preponderance of the evidence and then construe the text in accordance with that intention.
Due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt when a juvenile faces potential loss of liberty for acts that would be criminal if committed by an adult.
The proponent must demonstrate it is more likely than not that the expert's specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact, that the testimony rests on sufficient facts or data, and that the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods reliably applied to the facts.