Also known as: federalism principle · principles of federalism · federalism
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A structural principle of the U.S. constitutional system under which governmental power is divided between a national sovereign and state sovereigns. Each exercises full authority within its assigned sphere. The national government remains limited to powers granted by the Constitution, and federal action may not intrude on reserved state powers or alter this basic division.
Philip Powell, a U.S. citizen abroad, faces court-martial under an executive agreement with a foreign nation that denies him a jury trial. He challenges the agreement in federal court. The court holds that the agreement cannot override Fifth Amendment protections because the principle of federalism prevents treaties or agreements from altering constitutional limits on federal power.
Pavel Petrov faces ongoing state criminal prosecution for alleged fraud in State A. He files a federal suit seeking to enjoin the proceedings on constitutional grounds. The federal court abstains, citing principles of comity and federalism that require deference to state courts absent bad-faith prosecution or a flagrantly invalid statute.
Piper Patel, director of State A's environmental agency, receives a federal directive requiring her staff to perform inspections under a national manufacturing oversight program using state budgets. She sues, arguing the directive commandeers state officers. The court invalidates the requirement because the principle of federalism prohibits Congress from compelling states to administer federal regulatory programs.
Low-level radioactive waste is generated by many sources and must be isolated from humans for long periods. Historically the Nation relied on a small number of disposal sites. Concern about declining disposal capacity prompted Congress initially to adopt the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980. That statute declared a federal policy that each State is responsible for providing for disposal of waste generated within its borders. It authorized States to enter into regional compacts. That Act contained no penalties for nonparticipation. By 1985, with few operational sites and a looming crisis, Congress enacted the 1985 Amendments. The amendments were based largely on proposals of the National Governors' Association. They embodied a compromise among sited and unsited States. The 1985 Act directs each State to be responsible for disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated within the State. It authorizes States to enter into interstate compacts. For an additional seven years the three existing disposal sites were required to make capacity available for waste from any source. Sited States were permitted to exact graduated surcharges on out-of-region waste. After the transition period approved compacts could exclude out-of-region waste. The Act provides three types of incentives to encourage States to comply with its requirements. The monetary incentives authorize sited States to impose surcharges on out-of-state waste. They require the Secretary of Energy to collect a portion of the surcharge into an escrow account. They permit distribution of that fund to States that achieve the statutory milestones. The access incentives authorize sited States and regional compacts to increase and ultimately deny access to their sites to waste from States that do not meet federal deadlines. The take title provision requires a State that fails to provide for disposal by January 1, 1996. Upon request of the generator or owner of waste, the State must take title to and possession of the waste and be liable for damages suffered by the generator or owner as a result of the State's failure to take possession. The petitioners, New York and two of its counties, sought a declaratory judgment that the three incentives are inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment and with the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, § 4. The District Court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
View casePenelope Price seeks survivor benefits for her child after the father's death. A federal statute denies benefits to children born out of wedlock unless paternity was formally acknowledged. She challenges the statute. The court strikes it down because the principle of federalism bars federal legislation that exceeds enumerated powers by displacing state authority over domestic relations.
Deta Mona Trimble is the illegitimate daughter of Jessie Trimble and Sherman Gordon. Trimble and Gordon lived together in Chicago with Deta Mona from 1970 until Gordon died in 1974 as the victim of a homicide. On January 2, 1973, the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, entered a paternity order finding Gordon to be the father of Deta Mona and ordering him to pay fifteen dollars per week for her support. Gordon thereafter supported Deta Mona in accordance with the paternity order and openly acknowledged her as his child. Gordon died intestate at the age of twenty-eight, leaving an estate consisting only of a 1974 Plymouth automobile worth approximately twenty-five hundred dollars. Shortly after Gordon's death, Trimble, as the mother and next friend of Deta Mona, filed a petition for letters of administration, determination of heirship, and declaratory relief in the Probate Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County. That court entered an order determining heirship, identifying as the only heirs of Gordon his father Joseph Gordon, his mother Ethel King, and his brother, two sisters, and a half brother. The Circuit Court excluded Deta Mona on the authority of section twelve of the Illinois Probate Act. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court on the authority of its earlier decision in In re Estate of Karas. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to consider the arguments that section twelve violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by invidiously discriminating on the basis of illegitimacy and sex.
View casePierce Patterson, a state election official, enforces a state disclosure rule against a federal candidate. Federal law purports to preempt the state rule. Patterson sues to uphold the state requirement. The court upholds the state rule because the principle of federalism limits federal preemption that would displace core state authority over elections without clear constitutional warrant.
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 amended the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the Communications Act of 1934, and other statutes to address the role of soft money and issue advocacy in federal elections. Plaintiffs included a diverse group of entities and individuals such as the National Rifle Association and the American Civil Liberties Union who alleged that BCRA was unconstitutional. Defendants included the Federal Election Commission and the Attorney General of the United States. The case was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and heard by a three-judge panel pursuant to special procedures in BCRA Section 403. The District Court received a voluminous record from the parties and issued a judgment on May 1, 2003, that upheld some provisions of BCRA and invalidated others. All losing parties filed direct appeals to the Supreme Court within ten days, and the Court noted probable jurisdiction on June 5, 2003, ordering expedited briefing and argument on September 8, 2003. More than a century of federal legislation preceded BCRA, beginning with the Tillman Act of 1907 that banned corporate contributions in connection with federal elections. Congress later extended prohibitions to unions, required disclosure of contributions and expenditures, and enacted FECA in 1971 with further amendments in 1974 that imposed contribution limits, expenditure ceilings, and created the FEC. The Supreme Court addressed constitutional challenges to the 1974 amendments in Buckley v. Valeo. After Buckley, the FEC permitted political parties to fund mixed-purpose activities such as voter registration and generic advertising in part with soft money not subject to FECA's source and amount limits. Soft-money fundraising by the national parties grew from $21.6 million in 1984 to $498 million in 2000, with large corporate and union donations often motivated by a desire for access to federal candidates. National parties transferred substantial soft money to state parties, which could use higher percentages for mixed activities under FEC allocation rules. The use of soft money also supported so-called issue ads that avoided express advocacy of a candidate's election or defeat and therefore fell outside FECA's disclosure and source restrictions. These ads frequently aired in the 60 days before federal elections, referred to clearly identified candidates, and were funded by corporations, unions, and tax-exempt organizations using misleading names. A Senate investigation into 1996 federal election practices documented both parties' use of soft money to obtain special access for large donors and the coordination of issue ads with candidates. The District Court compiled extensive evidence from declarations, expert reports, and internal party documents showing that federal officeholders solicited soft-money donations, that parties maintained tallies crediting donors to particular candidates, and that large soft-money contributions were often made to secure influence rather than for ideological reasons.
View casePaul Peterson sues federal agents in federal court for damages after an unlawful search conducted under a cooperative federal-state program. He asserts a direct constitutional claim. The court recognizes the remedy because the principle of federalism does not bar federal courts from providing relief against federal officers even when state procedures are involved.
On the morning of November 26, 1965, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics entered Webster Bivens's apartment in the Bronx. The agents broke open the door, handcuffed Bivens in front of his wife and young children, and thoroughly searched the apartment. They then transported Bivens to the federal courthouse in Brooklyn, where he was interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip search. Several days later Bivens was released on his own recognizance, and he was never indicted or prosecuted for any offense. Bivens filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the six agents in their individual capacities. His complaint sought fifteen thousand dollars in damages from each agent and alleged that the arrest and search were effected without a warrant, that unreasonable force was employed, and that the arrest was made without probable cause. Bivens claimed to have suffered great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering as a result of the agents' conduct. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review the judgment.
View caseThe principle prevents Congress from commandeering state executive officers to administer federal programs. Federal directives that require states to conduct inspections or audits using state personnel and budgets violate this limit because they intrude on powers reserved to the states.
Federal courts must generally abstain from enjoining ongoing state criminal cases out of comity and federalism. Abstention is required absent extraordinary circumstances such as bad-faith prosecution or a statute that is flagrantly unconstitutional with no valid application.
Yes. An individual criminal defendant has standing to assert a Tenth Amendment or federalism-based challenge when federal action exceeds Congress's enumerated powers and intrudes on state authority, provided the defendant shows injury in fact and redressability.
No. Treaties and executive agreements are not co-equal with the Constitution. They cannot authorize action that violates specific constitutional protections or alter basic structural principles such as federalism.
…solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society, and wise appreciation of the great roles [of] the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers.” Griswold v. Connecticut , 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). B The majority acknowledges none of this doctrinal background,…