Also known as:principle of comity · comity principles · comity · international comity · judicial comity
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A doctrine requiring courts of one sovereign to show deference and respect to the judicial proceedings and laws of another sovereign. The doctrine typically results in abstention from interference with ongoing state actions absent extraordinary circumstances such as bad-faith prosecution. It also supports recognition of foreign support orders and substitution of full-faith-and-credit commands for earlier discretionary practices.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Federal Abstention From State Prosecution
Pavel Petrov faces ongoing state criminal charges in state court for alleged fraud. He files a federal suit seeking to enjoin the prosecution on constitutional grounds. The federal court declines to issue the injunction because the state proceeding remains active and no showing of bad-faith harassment appears in the record.
Divorce Decree Recognition Across States
Priscilla Parks obtains a divorce decree in State A while her spouse resides in State B. State B later questions the decree's validity when child-support issues arise. The court in State B extends recognition to the State A decree rather than treating the states as independent foreign sovereignties.
In 1916 petitioner Williams married Carrie Wyke in North Carolina and lived with her there until May 1940. In 1920 petitioner Hendrix married Thomas Hendrix in North Carolina and lived with him there until May 1940. At that time both petitioners went to Las Vegas, Nevada.
On June 26, 1940, each filed a divorce action in the Nevada court. The defendants in those actions entered no appearance and were not served with process in Nevada. Service by publication was made for Thomas Hendrix and a North Carolina sheriff delivered process to Carrie Williams in North Carolina. The Nevada court granted Williams a divorce on August 26, 1940, on the ground of extreme cruelty after finding that he had been a bona fide resident of Clark County for more than six weeks. The Nevada court granted Hendrix a divorce on October 4, 1940, on the grounds of wilful neglect and extreme cruelty after making the same finding as to her residence.
Petitioners married each other in Nevada on October 4, 1940, and thereafter returned to North Carolina where they lived together until the indictment was returned. They were tried and convicted of bigamous cohabitation under § 4342 of the North Carolina Code, and each was sentenced for a term of years to a state prison. At trial they pleaded not guilty and offered exemplified copies of the Nevada divorce decrees and their subsequent marriage, contending the decrees were valid in North Carolina.
The State contended that the Nevada decrees were not entitled to recognition because the defendants had not been served in Nevada and had not appeared there. The trial court instructed the jury that a Nevada divorce decree based on substituted service would not be recognized in North Carolina. The trial court also instructed the jury that petitioners bore the burden of satisfying the jury of the bona fides of their Nevada residence. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the convictions. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Piper Patel secures a money judgment in State X against a corporate defendant. The defendant relocates assets to State Y. The State Y court enforces the judgment as a matter of right rather than exercising discretion to ignore obligations created under another state's laws.
Baker v. General Motors Corp.522 U.S. 222, 246 (1998)
Ronald Elwell worked as an engineering analyst for General Motors Corporation from 1959 until 1989. For fifteen years he was assigned to the Engineering Analysis Group studying the performance of GM vehicles in product liability litigation, particularly those involving fires. He assisted GM lawyers in defending such suits.
Beginning in 1987 the Elwell-GM employment relationship soured. GM and Elwell first negotiated an agreement under which Elwell would retire after serving as a GM consultant for two years. When the time came for Elwell to retire, however, disagreement again surfaced and continued into 1991. A month later Elwell sued GM in a Michigan County Court alleging wrongful discharge and related tort and contract claims. GM counterclaimed that Elwell had breached fiduciary duties by disclosing privileged and confidential information and misappropriating documents.
Following a hearing, the Michigan trial court on November 22, 1991, enjoined Elwell from consulting or discussing with or disclosing to any person any of General Motors Corporation's trade secrets, confidential information or matters of attorney-client work product relating in any manner to the subject matter of any products liability litigation whether already filed or to be filed in the future which Ronald Elwell received, had knowledge of, or was entrusted with during his employments with General Motors Corporation. In August 1992 the parties settled for an undisclosed sum. They jointly submitted a stipulated permanent injunction that the Michigan court entered without further hearing. The injunction comprehensively enjoined Elwell from testifying, without the prior written consent of General Motors Corporation, either upon deposition or at trial, as an expert witness, or as a witness of any kind, and from consulting with attorneys or their agents in any litigation already filed, or to be filed in the future, involving General Motors Corporation as an owner, seller, manufacturer and/or designer of the product(s) in issue. The separate settlement agreement stated that court-ordered testimony would in no way form a basis for an action in violation of the Permanent Injunction or this Agreement.
In February 1990 Beverly Garner died when the engine of her 1985 Chevrolet S-10 Blazer caught fire after a Missouri highway collision. Her sons Kenneth and Steven Baker filed a wrongful-death product liability suit against GM in Missouri state court in September 1991. They alleged a defective fuel pump caused the post-collision fire. GM removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds. GM defended on the merits that the fuel pump was not faulty and that impact injuries alone caused the death. The Bakers sought to depose Elwell and call him at trial. GM objected on the basis of the Michigan injunction. After in camera review of the injunction and settlement agreement the Missouri federal district court permitted Elwell's deposition and trial testimony. The court relied on alternative grounds that Missouri public policy favored disclosure of relevant nonprivileged information and that the injunction was modifiable.
At trial Elwell testified in support of the Bakers' fuel-pump defect claim. He identified a 1973 internal GM memorandum concerning fuel-fed engine fire risks. The jury returned an $11.3 million verdict for the Bakers. The district court entered judgment on the verdict. The Eighth Circuit reversed. It held that Elwell's testimony should not have been admitted because the Michigan injunction controlled. Missouri's public policy favoring full faith and credit outweighed any disclosure policy. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the full faith and credit requirement stops the Bakers from obtaining Elwell's testimony in their Missouri action.
Phuong Pham, a State A resident, is served with process while temporarily in State B. State B asserts jurisdiction over her property located there. The court recognizes that each state possesses exclusive sovereignty over persons and property within its territory under established principles of public law.
Pennoyer v. Neff95 U.S. 714, 732–33 (1878)
In February 1866, J.H. Mitchell obtained a judgment in an Oregon circuit court against Neff for less than $300 in an action for attorney services.
At that time, Neff resided outside Oregon, received no personal service of process, and made no appearance in the case. The judgment was entered by default following constructive service by publication as authorized by the Oregon Code for non-resident defendants possessing property within the state.
The Oregon Code also provided for attachment of a non-resident's property in money actions. No such attachment occurred with respect to the land at issue. Instead, after the judgment, an execution issued, leading to a levy on the land and its sale at a sheriff's auction.
Pennoyer purchased the property at that sale and received a sheriff's deed. Separately, in 1866, the United States issued a patent to Neff for the same tract of land under the Donation Law of Oregon, which Neff valued at $15,000. Neff then brought suit against Pennoyer in the circuit court to recover possession of the premises based on his patent title.
The lower court held the Oregon judgment invalid because of deficiencies in the affidavits used to obtain the publication order and to prove publication occurred. The Supreme Court of the United States granted review to consider the validity of the state court judgment and the resulting sheriff's sale.
Patricia Patel sues her former spouse in federal court for tort damages arising from alleged interference with child custody. The federal court dismisses the action because it would require issuance of a custody decree, an area reserved to state tribunals with specialized expertise.
Ankenbrandt v. Richards504 U.S. 689 (1992)
In September 1989 Carol Ankenbrandt, a citizen of Missouri, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on behalf of her daughters L. R. and S. R. against Jon A. Richards and Debra Kesler, both citizens of Louisiana.
The complaint alleged that Richards, the divorced father of the children, and Kesler, his female companion, had committed acts of sexual and physical abuse against the daughters and sought monetary damages. Federal jurisdiction rested solely on the diversity-of-citizenship provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
One month earlier, on August 9, 1989, a juvenile court in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, had entered a judgment under state child-protection statutes that permanently terminated Richards' parental rights on account of the alleged abuse and permanently enjoined him from any contact with the children.
On December 10, 1990, the District Court granted the respondents' motion to dismiss. The court cited In re Burrus for the proposition that the whole subject of domestic relations belongs to the laws of the States and invoked the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction. It also relied on the abstention principles of Younger v. Harris to dismiss the complaint without prejudice.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to three questions concerning the existence and scope of any domestic relations exception and the propriety of Younger abstention in the case.
Paula Pierce obtains a tax judgment in State C against a corporate taxpayer. The taxpayer moves assets to State D. The State D court treats the judgment as creating an obligation enforceable as of right rather than as a matter of optional comity between independent sovereignties.
Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co.296 U. S. 268, 277 (1935)
Milwaukee County, a county and citizen of Wisconsin, brought suit in the District Court for Northern Illinois against M.E. White Company, a corporation and citizen of Illinois, to recover on a judgment for $52,165.84. This judgment had been duly recovered and entered against the appellee in the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, a court of general jurisdiction. The judgment arose from taxes duly assessed against the appellee under Wisconsin statutes upon income received from its business transacted within the state under state license.
The district court dismissed the cause on the ground that the suit was in substance brought to enforce the revenue laws of Wisconsin and thus could not be maintained in the district court in Illinois. This case comes here under § 239 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. 346, on certificate of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The certificate presents a question of law concerning which the instructions of this Court are desired for the proper decision of the case.
The question certified asks whether a United States District Court in Illinois, having jurisdiction of the parties, should entertain jurisdiction of an action based upon a valid judgment for over $3,000 rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction in Wisconsin against the same defendant, where the judgment was predicated upon an income tax due to Wisconsin.
When may a federal court abstain from hearing a state-law claim under principles of comity?
A district court may abstain from hearing a proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11 in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for State law. This authority is expressly preserved by 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) and rests on principles of federalism.
How does the full faith and credit clause relate to earlier principles of comity?
The full faith and credit clause substituted a constitutional command for the former discretionary practice of comity. It altered the status of the states from independent foreign sovereignties to integral parts of a single nation. As a result, a valid judgment from one state must be enforced in another even if the forum state would not entertain the underlying suit.
Does principles of comity permit recognition of foreign-country support orders?
Yes. A tribunal may recognize and enforce a support order from a foreign country or political subdivision on the basis of comity. When doing so the tribunal may apply its own procedural and substantive provisions and may receive evidence or communicate with the foreign tribunal under the act's discovery and communication sections.
95 U.S. 714 (1878)
…an elementary principle, that the laws of one State have no operation outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity; and that no tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions. "Any exertion of authority of this sort…