Also known as: private clubs
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An organization or establishment not in fact open to the public. Such an entity may limit the rental or occupancy of its noncommercial lodgings to members and may give preference to members without violating fair housing prohibitions on discrimination.
The Lakeside Fellowship owns a lakeside cabin used only for member retreats. When a nonmember family inquires about renting the cabin for a weekend, the club refuses. The refusal is permitted because the club is not open to the public and the lodging serves a noncommercial purpose.
The owners of the Heart of Atlanta Motel argue that their establishment qualifies as a private club exempt from Title II. The court rejects the claim because the motel advertises to the general public and accepts any paying guest without membership requirements.
The appellant, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., owns and operates a 216-room motel located on Courtland Street in Atlanta, Georgia, two blocks from downtown Peachtree Street. The motel is readily accessible to interstate highways 75 and 85 and state highways 23 and 41. It solicits patronage from outside Georgia through national advertising media, maintains over 50 billboards and highway signs, accepts convention trade from outside the state, and approximately 75 percent of its registered guests are from out of state. The motel provides lodging to transient guests along with restaurant facilities and prior to the Act had followed a practice of refusing to rent rooms to Negroes. The United States filed suit against the appellant in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia under Sections 206(a) and 206(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The complaint alleged that the appellant was operating a motel in which it refused to accept Negro guests solely because of their race. The appellant offered no evidence at trial, submitting the case on the pleadings, admissions, and stipulation of facts, though the appellees proved the refusal to accept Negro transients after passage of the Act. The District Court granted the government's motion for summary judgment and issued a permanent injunction restraining the appellant from continuing its discriminatory practices, citing 231 F. Supp. 393. The case reached the Supreme Court on direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1252. The motel is located at the intersection of two major interstate highways and advertises in national magazines and on billboards directed at interstate travelers. Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on July 2, 1964, following extensive hearings before Senate and House committees on bills including S. 1732 and H.R. 7152. The Act's Title II, set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq., provides that all persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation without discrimination on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin. The appellant admitted that 75 percent of its guests come from out of state. The motel's policy of refusing to rent rooms to Negroes has the effect of impeding interstate travel by Negro citizens.
View caseAmbler Realty challenges Euclid's zoning ordinance that places private clubs in the U-3 district alongside apartments and hotels. The ordinance treats the club as a permitted use in that classification, allowing the facility to operate without additional variance.
The Village of Euclid is an Ohio municipal corporation that adjoins and is practically a suburb of the City of Cleveland. Its estimated population is between 5,000 and 10,000, and its area spans from twelve to fourteen square miles, with the greater part consisting of farm lands or unimproved acreage. It lies roughly in the form of a parallelogram measuring approximately three and one-half miles each way and is traversed east and west by three principal highways and two railroads. Ambler Realty Co. owns a tract of land containing 68 acres situated in the westerly end of the village. This tract abuts on Euclid Avenue to the south and the Nickel Plate railroad to the north. Adjoining this tract on both the east and the west, restricted residential plats have been laid out upon which residences have been erected. On November 13, 1922, the Village Council adopted an ordinance establishing a comprehensive zoning plan. The ordinance divides the village into six use districts denominated U-1 to U-6, three height districts denominated H-1 to H-3, and four area districts denominated A-1 to A-4. Appellee's tract is classified as U-2 for the first 620 feet north of Euclid Avenue, U-3 for the next 130 feet, and U-6 for the remainder. Enforcement of the ordinance is entrusted to the inspector of buildings under rules and regulations of the board of zoning appeals. The board holds public meetings, keeps minutes of its proceedings, and possesses authority to interpret the ordinance in cases of practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship, while penalties are prescribed for violations. Ambler Realty Co. filed suit alleging that the tract has been held for years for sale and development for industrial uses for which it is especially adapted. The bill further alleged that unrestricted market value is about $10,000 per acre but limited to residential purposes the value does not exceed $2,500 per acre, that the first 200 feet back from Euclid Avenue has a value of $150 per front foot if unrestricted but not in excess of $50 per front foot if limited to residential uses, and that the ordinance confiscates and destroys a great part of its value while deterring prospective buyers. The bill sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the ordinance. The district court overruled a motion to dismiss on the ground that the suit was premature. The district court held the ordinance unconstitutional and void and enjoined its enforcement.
View caseThe Boy Scouts revoke Dale's membership after learning he is gay. Dale sues under a state public accommodations law. The Court holds that forcing his readmission would significantly burden the organization's expressive message about sexual conduct.
James Dale entered scouting in 1978 at the age of eight by joining Monmouth Council’s Cub Scout Pack 142. He became a Boy Scout in 1981. Dale achieved the rank of Eagle Scout in 1988 after earning 25 merit badges and being inducted into the Order of the Arrow. In 1989, Dale applied for and received approval for adult membership in the Boy Scouts. He served as an assistant scoutmaster for Troop 73 in Matawan, New Jersey. Around the same time, Dale’s position as co-president of the Lesbian/Gay Alliance at Rutgers University was publicized in a July 1990 newspaper interview. Later that month, the Boy Scouts sent Dale a letter revoking his adult membership. The letter stated that his membership was inconsistent with the values and standards of the Boy Scouts of America. It explained that the organization specifically forbids membership to homosexuals. Dale responded by filing a complaint in New Jersey Superior Court against the Boy Scouts and the Monmouth Council. He alleged that the revocation violated the New Jersey public accommodations statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Boy Scouts. The New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately held that the Boy Scouts is a place of public accommodation subject to the law and that Dale’s expulsion violated the statute. The Boy Scouts petitioned for a writ of certiorari. The United States Supreme Court granted the petition to determine whether the application of New Jersey’s public accommodations law in this case violates the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment right of expressive association.
View caseCleburne Living Center seeks a special use permit for a home for the mentally retarded in an R-3 zone. The city grants permits without special review for private clubs and fraternity houses but demands one for the group home. The differential treatment triggers equal protection scrutiny.
In July 1980, respondent Jan Hannah purchased a building at 201 Featherston Street in Cleburne, Texas. Hannah intended to lease the property to Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (CLC) for use as a group home. The home would house thirteen mentally retarded men and women under constant staff supervision. The building contained four bedrooms and two baths, and CLC planned to add a half bath while complying with all applicable state and federal regulations for an Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded. The site lay in an R-3 Apartment House District. The city's zoning ordinance permitted apartment houses, boarding houses, hospitals, and nursing homes in that district without special permission. However, the ordinance required a special use permit, renewable annually after a public hearing, for hospitals for the insane or feeble-minded. The city classified the proposed group home as a hospital for the feeble-minded and informed CLC that a permit was required. After a public hearing, the City Council voted three to one to deny the application. CLC and its prospective residents filed suit in federal district court against the city and its officials. They alleged that the ordinance and its application discriminated against the mentally retarded in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court upheld the ordinance and the denial. It found that the council's decision was motivated by the residents' mental retardation yet rationally related to legitimate interests such as neighborhood safety and property values. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that mental retardation is a quasi-suspect class and that the ordinance was invalid both facially and as applied. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the equal protection issues raised by the zoning ordinance and its application to the proposed group home.
View caseBoraas and other college students rent a house in Belle Terre. The village ordinance limits occupancy to families or no more than two unrelated persons. The students challenge the rule as applied to their shared rental. The Court upholds the zoning restriction on the number of unrelated occupants.
Belle Terre is a village on Long Island’s north shore consisting of about 220 homes inhabited by 700 people. Its total land area is less than one square mile. The village has restricted land use to one-family dwellings and excludes lodging houses, boarding houses, fraternity houses, or multiple-dwelling houses. The ordinance defines “family” as one or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants. Up to two persons living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family. Appellees the Dickmans own a house in the village. In December 1971 they leased it for an 18-month term to Michael Truman. Bruce Boraas later became a co-lessee. Anne Parish then moved into the house along with three others. These six individuals are students at the nearby State University at Stony Brook, and none is related to the others by blood, adoption, or marriage. When the village served the Dickmans with an Order to Remedy Violations of the ordinance, the owners plus three tenants brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking an injunction and a declaratory judgment that the ordinance is unconstitutional. The District Court held the ordinance constitutional. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. During the litigation the lease expired and was extended. Anne Parish moved out. Thereafter the other five students left, and the owners now hold the home out for sale or rent, including to student groups.
View caseAn organization qualifies when it is not in fact open to the public and provides noncommercial lodgings only to members as an incident to its primary purpose. The exemption allows the club to limit rental or occupancy to members without violating the Act's general prohibitions.
Supporting sources
No. Mere licensing and provision of ordinary public services to a private club that discriminates on the basis of race do not transform the club's conduct into governmental action under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Supporting sources
Courts examine whether the organization is selective in membership and imposes genuine limits on the number of persons who may join. If selection criteria track a protected statutory category or the group holds itself out to the public without meaningful limits, it is treated as a public accommodation rather than a private club.
A state may apply such laws when the organization is large and nonselective, recruits openly, and hosts events open to the public. The regulation must serve the compelling interest of eradicating discrimination and must not significantly impair the group's ability to express its message.
…three classifications: U-2, which included two-family dwellings; U-3, which included apartments, hotels, churches, schools, private clubs, hospitals, city hall and the like; and U-6, which included sewage disposal plants, incinerators, scrap storage, cemeteries, oil and gas storage and so on. Heights of buildings were…