Also known as: probate proceeding · probate
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A court-supervised process for administering a decedent's estate. The process includes proving a will if one exists, appointing a personal representative, collecting assets, paying claims and expenses, and distributing remaining property to heirs or devisees.
After settlor Diego dies, his probate estate holds only modest cash. Creditors holding large unpaid notes file claims in the probate proceedings. The court orders the trustee of Diego's revocable trust to transfer trust property into the estate to satisfy the shortfall.
Pilar Pena dies owning rural acreage. Her will devises the land to her niece. The probate court admits the will, appoints an executor, and the niece receives title by operation of the devise without any deed from the estate.
Pierce Patterson's estate is being administered in state probate court. A federal tax dispute arises over a claimed marital deduction. The federal court treats the state probate decree as persuasive but not binding on the federal revenue question.
In 1930 a New York resident created a revocable trust that was amended in 1931. The trust directed income from the corpus to his wife for life. It also granted her a general power of appointment. In default of appointment half the corpus passed to the decedent's heirs and half to the wife's heirs. In 1951 the wife executed an instrument that purported to release the general power and convert it into a special power. The decedent died in 1957. His estate claimed a marital deduction for the widow's trust on the federal estate tax return. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction under section 2056(b)(5) of the 1954 Code and assessed a deficiency. The estate petitioned the Tax Court for redetermination. While that proceeding was pending the estate obtained a New York Supreme Court decree declaring the 1951 release a nullity. The Tax Court accepted the decree as controlling and allowed the deduction. A divided Second Circuit affirmed. The companion case involved the estate of a Connecticut decedent who died in 1958. His will directed payment of estate taxes without proration and created a residuary trust granting his wife a general testamentary power of appointment. The Commissioner disallowed part of the marital deduction. The executor then obtained a probate court order applying the state proration statute. The District Court refused to treat the probate decree as binding on federal tax questions. The Second Circuit agreed the decree was not conclusive. The two cases reached the Supreme Court after the Second Circuit panels reached differing conclusions on the effect of the state decrees. Certiorari was granted to resolve the conflict among the circuits.
View casePatrick Phan sues in federal court alleging tortious interference with an expected inheritance. The defendant moves to dismiss under the probate exception. The court denies the motion because the claim seeks damages rather than probate or annulment of a will.
Vickie Lynn Marshall, also known as Anna Nicole Smith, met J. Howard Marshall II in October 1991 and married him on June 27, 1994. J. Howard died on August 4, 1995. Although he had given Vickie substantial gifts and money during their relationship, his will made no provision for her. Vickie maintained that J. Howard had intended to secure her future through a catchall trust. Respondent E. Pierce Marshall, one of J. Howard’s sons, stood as the sole ultimate beneficiary under his father’s estate plan, which consisted of a living trust and a pourover will directing all remaining assets into the trust. In January 1996, while J. Howard’s estate remained subject to probate proceedings in Harris County, Texas, Vickie filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California. In June 1996 Pierce filed a proof of claim in that bankruptcy case asserting that Vickie had defamed him through statements made to the press shortly after J. Howard’s death. Vickie answered and asserted a counterclaim alleging that Pierce had tortiously interfered with her expected gift by imprisoning J. Howard against his wishes, surrounding him with hired guards, making misrepresentations to him, and transferring property contrary to his expressed intentions. The Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment to Vickie on Pierce’s defamation claim. After a trial on the merits it entered judgment for Vickie on her tortious interference counterclaim and awarded her more than $449 million in compensatory damages, less any amount recovered in the Texas probate action, plus $25 million in punitive damages. Pierce then moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the claim belonged exclusively in the Texas probate proceedings. In the Texas Probate Court, Pierce sought a declaration that the living trust and will were valid. Vickie initially challenged the instruments and asserted her own tortious interference claim there but voluntarily dismissed both claims after the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment. Following a jury trial the Probate Court declared the trust and will valid. On review of the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment the District Court rejected the probate-exception argument. The court adopted the Bankruptcy Court’s findings with supplements. It awarded Vickie approximately $44.3 million in compensatory damages together with an equal amount in punitive damages. The Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that the probate exception barred federal jurisdiction because the claim raised questions ordinarily decided by a probate court and because the Texas Probate Court had asserted exclusive jurisdiction over all of Vickie’s claims. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2005.
View casePiper Patel sues an estate in federal court within the state probate filing period. The defendant claims the action is untimely under a state statute. The court applies the federal service rule and allows the case to proceed.
On February 6, 1963, petitioner, a citizen of Ohio, filed her complaint in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts, claiming damages in excess of $10,000 for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident in South Carolina, allegedly caused by the negligence of one Louise Plumer Osgood, a Massachusetts citizen deceased at the time of the filing of the complaint. Respondent, Mrs. Osgood's executor and also a Massachusetts citizen, was named as defendant. On February 8, service was made by leaving copies of the summons and the complaint with respondent's wife at his residence, concededly in compliance with Rule 4 (d) (1). Respondent filed his answer on February 26, alleging, inter alia, that the action could not be maintained because it had been brought contrary to and in violation of the provisions of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 197, Section 9. On October 17, 1963, the District Court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the threat to the goal of uniformity of federal procedure posed by the decision below.
View casePierre Poulin, an infant, is domiciled in State X. His guardian petitions to intervene in probate proceedings pending in State Y concerning an aunt's estate. State Y law bars foreign guardians from intervening, so the petition is denied.
In 1974 and 1975, the Ensley Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and seven black individuals filed separate class-action complaints against the City of Birmingham and the Jefferson County Personnel Board. They alleged racially discriminatory hiring and promotion practices in public service jobs including the fire department in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other federal law. After a bench trial in 1976 on some issues and a second trial in 1979 focused on promotion practices but before judgment, the parties negotiated two consent decrees. One was between the black individuals and the City, and the other was between them and the Board. These proposed decrees set forth an extensive remedial scheme including long-term and interim annual goals for the hiring of blacks as firefighters and goals for promotion of blacks within the fire department. The District Court entered an order provisionally approving the decrees and directing publication of notice of the upcoming fairness hearings. Notice of the hearings with a reference to the general nature of the decrees was published in two local newspapers. At that hearing the Birmingham Firefighters Association appeared and filed objections as amicus curiae. After the hearing but before final approval the BFA and two of its members moved to intervene on the ground that the decrees would adversely affect their rights. The District Court denied the motions as untimely and approved the decrees in August 1981. Seven white firefighters, all members of the BFA, then filed a complaint against the City and the Board seeking injunctive relief against enforcement of the decrees. The District Court denied relief. Both the denial of intervention and the denial of injunctive relief were affirmed on appeal in 1983. A new group of white firefighters, the Wilks respondents, then brought suit against the City and the Board. They alleged that because of their race they were being denied promotions in favor of less qualified blacks in violation of federal law. The Board and the City admitted making race-conscious employment decisions but argued that the decisions were required by the consent decrees. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss after trial, concluding that the promotions of the black individuals were in fact required by the terms of the consent decree. On appeal the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that because the Wilks respondents were neither parties nor privies to the consent decrees their independent claims of unlawful discrimination are not precluded. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1988.
View caseFederal courts may adjudicate claims that do not require probate or annulment of a will or administration of estate assets already in state probate custody. Claims seeking only damages or other relief outside the probate court's possession fall outside the probate exception.
Property in a trust revocable at the settlor's death becomes subject to the settlor's creditors and estate administration expenses to the extent the probate estate is inadequate. The probate court may order the trustee to contribute trust assets to satisfy those obligations.
…creditor, the amount of the claim and the court in which the action has been brought has been filed in the proper registry of probate. . . ." Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., c. 197, § 9 (1958). On October 17, 1963, the District Court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment, citing Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co. , 337 U.…