Also known as: probative danger · Rule 403 dangers · unfair prejudice
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Countervailing risks that accompany relevant evidence and may justify its exclusion when they substantially outweigh its probative value.
Philip Powell offered a graphic crime-scene photograph to prove the manner of death in a homicide prosecution. The image showed extreme injuries that would likely provoke strong emotional reactions from jurors. The court weighed whether those reactions would substantially outweigh the photograph's value in establishing intent.
Preston Pratt faced charges involving an alleged scheme. The government sought to introduce evidence of an earlier similar transaction to show intent. The trial court assessed whether the jury could reasonably find the prior act occurred and whether any resulting prejudice substantially outweighed the evidence's value on the non-propensity issue.
Penelope Price was charged as a felon in possession. She offered to stipulate to her prior conviction status. The government nevertheless sought to introduce the full record naming the offense. The court evaluated whether the name and nature of the conviction created unfair prejudice that substantially outweighed its probative value on the sole disputed element.
Patrick Phan sought to introduce third-party guilt evidence in his murder trial. The evidence suggested an alternate perpetrator but carried risks of jury confusion over collateral matters. The court balanced the evidence's tendency to create reasonable doubt against dangers of misleading the jury or wasting time.
On the morning of December 31, 1989, 86-year-old Mary Stewart was beaten, raped, and robbed in her home. She later died of complications stemming from her injuries. Holmes was convicted by a South Carolina jury of murder, first-degree criminal sexual conduct, first-degree burglary, and robbery, and he was sentenced to death. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentence, and this Court denied certiorari. Upon state postconviction review, Holmes was granted a new trial. At the second trial, the prosecution relied heavily on the following forensic evidence. Holmes's palm print was found just above the door knob on the interior side of the front door of the victim's house. Fibers consistent with a black sweat-shirt owned by Holmes were found on the victim's bed sheets. Matching blue fibers were found on the victim's pink nightgown and on Holmes's blue jeans. Microscopically consistent fibers were found on the pink nightgown and on Holmes's underwear. Holmes's underwear contained a mixture of DNA from two individuals, and 99.99% of the population other than Holmes and the victim were excluded as contributors to that mixture. Holmes's tank top was found to contain a mixture of Holmes's blood and the victim's blood. The prosecution introduced evidence that Holmes had been seen near Stewart's home within an hour of the time when, according to the prosecution's evidence, the attack took place. As a major part of his defense, Holmes attempted to undermine the State's forensic evidence by suggesting that it had been contaminated and that law enforcement officers had engaged in a plot to frame him. Holmes's expert witnesses criticized the procedures used by the police in handling the fiber and DNA evidence and in collecting the fingerprint evidence. Holmes also sought to introduce proof that another man, Jimmy McCaw White, had attacked Stewart. At a pretrial hearing, Holmes proffered several witnesses who placed White in the victim's neighborhood on the morning of the assault. Holmes proffered four other witnesses who testified that White had either acknowledged that Holmes was innocent or had actually admitted to committing the crimes. One witness recounted that White said he did what they say he did and that he had no regrets about it at all. The trial court excluded Holmes's third-party guilt evidence citing State v. Gregory. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court found no error in the exclusion of Holmes's third-party guilt evidence. This Court granted certiorari.
View casePamela Phillips faced enhanced penalties based on prior convictions. The government introduced the convictions without full details of the underlying conduct. The court considered whether any additional facts would create unfair prejudice that substantially outweighed their value in establishing the sentencing enhancement.
In September 1995, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging petitioner, Hugo Almendarez-Torres, with having been found in the United States after being deported without the permission and consent of the Attorney General in violation of Section 1326. In December 1995, Almendarez-Torres entered a plea of guilty. At a hearing before the District Court accepted his plea, Almendarez-Torres admitted that he had been deported, that he had later unlawfully returned to the United States, and that the earlier deportation had taken place pursuant to three earlier convictions for aggravated felonies. In March 1996, the District Court held a sentencing hearing. Almendarez-Torres argued that his indictment had not mentioned his earlier aggravated felony convictions and that the court therefore could not sentence him to more than two years' imprisonment. The District Court rejected this argument, found applicable a Sentencing Guideline range of 77 to 96 months, and imposed a sentence of 85 months' imprisonment. On appeal the Fifth Circuit rejected Almendarez-Torres's argument and affirmed the sentence. Like seven other circuits, the Fifth Circuit held that subsection (b)(2) is a penalty provision. It simply permits a sentencing judge to impose a higher sentence when the unlawfully returning alien also has a record of prior convictions. The Ninth Circuit had reached the opposite conclusion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the difference among the circuits.
View casePearl Porter testified about an earlier identification. The defense offered evidence that she had suffered a head injury affecting recall. The court assessed whether the memory evidence's probative value on credibility was substantially outweighed by risks of confusing the issues or undue delay.
On April 12, 1982, John Foster was brutally assaulted while on duty as a correctional counselor at the federal prison in Lompoc, California. His attacker beat him repeatedly about the head and upper body with a metal pipe, inflicting numerous and permanently disabling injuries, one of which was a profound loss of short-term memory. Foster spent nearly a month in the hospital recuperating from his injuries, much of that time in a state of semiconsciousness. In an interview during his hospitalization on May 5, 1982, Foster selected respondent James Owens’ photograph from an array of possible suspects and informed FBI Agent Thomas Mansfield that it was respondent who had attacked him. Foster testified that at the time he made these statements, he was certain that his memory was accurate. He also recalled choosing respondent’s photograph from those Mansfield showed him. By the time of respondent’s trial in December 1983, Foster could no longer remember who had assaulted him or even whether he had seen his attacker. Nor could he recall whether any of the prison officials or other persons who visited him in the hospital had ever suggested that respondent had beaten him. A medical expert who testified on behalf of the prosecution explained that Foster’s inability to remember most of the details of the assault was attributable to a gradual and selective memory loss caused by his head injuries. The government introduced evidence of Foster’s May 5, 1982 out-of-court identification at trial. Defense counsel cross-examined Foster, but his memory loss precluded any inquiry into whether he had actually seen his assailant, whether he had an opportunity to see him, or whether hospital visitors had suggested respondent’s name to him.
View caseA court examines the strength of the evidence on a fact of consequence, the availability of less prejudicial alternatives such as stipulations or limiting instructions, and the importance of the fact to the overall case. It also weighs risks of unfair prejudice, jury confusion, misleading effects, undue delay, and cumulative presentation. The balancing occurs under the governing evidence rule that permits exclusion only when the dangers substantially predominate.
An offer to stipulate removes any need for details beyond the fact of conviction itself. Introducing the name and nature of the offense then carries a heightened risk of unfair prejudice that generally exceeds its marginal value when status is the only disputed element. Courts therefore often exclude the full record under the balancing test.
Yes. Even highly relevant evidence may be excluded if the identified dangers substantially outweigh its value.
…“substantially outweighs [any] prejudicial effect,” Fed. Rule Evid. 703, or “the probative value . . . outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice.” People v. Pasch , 152 Ill. 2d 133, 223, 604 N. E. 2d 294, 333 (1992). When this disclosure occurs, “the underlying facts” are revealed to the jury “for the limited purpose of explaining…