property damage

In May 1955, Claus H. Henningsen purchased a new 1955 Plymouth Plaza Club Sedan from Bloomfield Motors, Inc., an authorized De Soto and Plymouth dealer for Chrysler Corporation. Mr. Henningsen intended the car as a Mother's Day gift for his wife, Helen Henningsen, and communicated that intention to the dealer. He alone signed a one-page printed purchase-order form. The reverse side contained, in fine six-point script type, a warranty clause limiting the manufacturer's obligation to replacement of defective parts within ninety days or four thousand miles and disclaiming all other warranties, express or implied. The front of the form contained two even smaller paragraphs directing attention to the back-side conditions. The form was a standardized document prepared by the manufacturer and used by all its dealers. No one called the fine-print provisions to Mr. Henningsen's attention, and he did not read them. The car was delivered on May 9, 1955, after the dealer performed the items listed in Chrysler's New Car Preparation Service Guide. On May 19, 1955, while Mrs. Henningsen was driving north on Route 36 in Highlands, New Jersey, at twenty to twenty-two miles per hour on a smooth, paved highway, she heard a loud noise from the front of the car. The steering wheel spun in her hands and the vehicle veered sharply into a highway sign and brick wall. The car had been driven only 468 miles, had required no servicing, and had exhibited no unusual behavior before the accident. An insurance appraiser with eleven years of experience examined the wrecked vehicle and concluded that something in the steering mechanism from the wheel down to the front wheels had broken or dropped off. Plaintiffs also presented expert testimony that the steering failure resulted from a latent manufacturing defect that could not have been discovered by reasonable inspection. The negligence counts against both defendants were dismissed at trial. The case was submitted to the jury solely on the implied-warranty claims. The jury returned verdicts for both plaintiffs against Chrysler Corporation and Bloomfield Motors, Inc. Defendants appealed and plaintiffs cross-appealed from the dismissal of the negligence claim. The Supreme Court of New Jersey certified the matter directly before consideration by the Appellate Division.

In 1984, Terry Foucha was charged by Louisiana authorities with aggravated burglary and illegal discharge of a firearm. Two medical doctors were appointed to conduct a pretrial examination of Foucha. The doctors initially reported that Foucha lacked mental capacity to proceed, but four months later the trial court found Foucha competent to stand trial. The doctors reported that Foucha was unable to distinguish right from wrong and was insane at the time of the offense. On October 12, 1984, the trial court ruled that Foucha was not guilty by reason of insanity. The court found that Foucha was unable to appreciate the usual, natural and probable consequences of his acts, that he was unable to distinguish right from wrong, that he was a menace to himself and others, and that he was insane at the time of the commission of the crimes and presently insane. Foucha was committed to the East Feliciana Forensic Facility until such time as doctors recommend that he be released and until further order of the court. In 1988, the superintendent of Feliciana recommended that Foucha be discharged or released. A three-member panel was convened at the institution to determine Foucha's current condition and whether he could be released or placed on probation without being a danger to others or himself. On March 21, 1988, the panel reported that there had been no evidence of mental illness since admission and recommended that Foucha be conditionally discharged. The trial judge appointed a two-member sanity commission made up of the same two doctors who had conducted the pretrial examination. Their written report stated that Foucha is presently in remission from mental illness but that they cannot certify that he would not constitute a menace to himself or others if released. One of the doctors testified at a hearing that upon commitment Foucha probably suffered from a drug induced psychosis but that he had recovered from that temporary condition. The doctor testified that Foucha evidenced no signs of psychosis or neurosis and was in good shape mentally. The doctor also testified that Foucha had an antisocial personality, a condition that is not a mental disease and that is untreatable. The doctor further testified that Foucha had been involved in several altercations at Feliciana and that he would not feel comfortable in certifying that Foucha would not be a danger to himself or to other people. After it was stipulated that the other doctor would give essentially the same testimony, the court ruled that Foucha was dangerous to himself and others and ordered him returned to the mental institution. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Foucha had not carried the burden placed upon him by statute to prove that he was not dangerous. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the case presents an important issue and was decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court in a manner arguably at odds with prior decisions of this Court.

In 1986, petitioner David H. Lucas purchased two residential lots on the Isle of Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina, for $975,000. He intended to construct single-family homes on the parcels, which at the time were zoned for such use and required no building permit for development. No portion of the lots qualified as a critical area under then-existing coastal zone legislation. Subsequently, in 1988, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act. The legislation established a baseline and prohibited construction of occupable improvements seaward of a line drawn 20 feet landward of that baseline, directly affecting Lucas's parcels by barring any permanent habitable structures. Lucas filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas alleging that the Act's restrictions effected a taking of his property without just compensation. Following a bench trial, the court determined that the prohibition rendered the lots valueless and ordered the state to pay just compensation in the amount of $1,232,387.50. The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the trial court's judgment. It accepted the legislature's findings that new construction threatened public resources and concluded that a regulation designed to prevent serious public harm could not constitute a taking. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision.

In this personal injury action, plaintiff Marilyn S. White alleged that she was a passenger in a truck driven by defendant Robert W. White. They were traveling south on Interstate 35 near the city of Louisville, Texas, when the defendant lost control of his truck, overturning it and causing injury to her body. The petition alleged that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by negligent acts of the defendant. He failed to keep a proper lookout for vehicles properly on the highway. He followed the vehicle in front of him too closely in violation of specific Texas statutes which were pleaded and attached. Robert White drove his vehicle into a space between the divided roadway and failed to keep his vehicle only upon the righthand roadway in violation of another specific Texas statute which was pleaded. He drove his vehicle at a speed that was greater than reasonable and prudent under the circumstances in violation of another specific Texas statute which was also pleaded and attached. The plaintiff pleaded that as a result of said negligent actions she suffered broken bones and other injuries to the body resulting in permanent disability, medical expenses, and lost income with her damages totaling some $200,000.00. The petition further alleged that at the time of the accident the defendants Robert W. White and Edward White were engaged in a joint venture or partnership operating a long-haul truck tractor-trailer. The plaintiff was employed by the defendants to help operate the truck. At the time of the accident she was within the scope of her employment. The defendants failed to carry Workmen’s Compensation Insurance, and that she has elected to proceed in the District Court. Attached to the petition and made a part thereof was the Motor Carrier Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability Certificate of Insurance. The Corporation Commission of Oklahoma certified that Employers Casualty Corporation had issued to Edward White of Fort Cobb, Oklahoma an insurance policy covering the obligations imposed upon the insured by the Oklahoma Motor Vehicle provisions. Employers Casualty Corporation is not a party to this appeal because the cause against it was dismissed without prejudice by the plaintiff. In response to the petition the defendants Robert W. White and Edward White filed special demurrers. They demurred to the petition on the grounds that the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue and that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants. In arguing that the demurrers should be sustained both Robert and Edward White argued that the plaintiff Marilyn S. White lacks the capacity to sue because she is the wife of Robert W. White and under the laws of Texas one spouse may not bring a personal injury action against the other. This fact does not appear on the face of the petition. The defendants also argued that in fact the plaintiff was not their employee but was a co-employer. They relied upon facts which do not appear upon the face of the petition. The trial court sustained the demurrers to the petition and dismissed the case with prejudice. The plaintiff appealed, and the matter came before the Supreme Court of Oklahoma for review.