Also known as: protection orders · protective order · protective orders · restraining order
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A court order issued to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. The order may limit discovery, relieve a prosecutor of disclosure duties, or authorize extraordinary relief such as a temporary restraining order.
Pavel Petrov sued Prism Analytics for breach of contract. During discovery, Prism Analytics moved for a protective order after Pavel sought millions of internal emails. The court found good cause and limited the production to relevant documents only after the parties conferred in good faith.
The prosecutor learned of exculpatory evidence in Parker Phillips's case but obtained a protective order from the tribunal. The order relieved the prosecutor of the duty to disclose the information to the defense because disclosure would endanger a witness.
Pacific Bank, as limited partner, filed a derivative action against the general partner. The partnership appointed a special litigation committee that moved for a temporary restraining order to halt the suit while it investigated. The court granted the extraordinary relief under the statute.
Patrick Phan sought a preliminary injunction against Premier Manufacturing to stop alleged trade secret misuse. The court required Patrick to post a bond in an amount sufficient to cover any damages if the injunction later proved wrongful before granting relief.
Pamela Phillips obtained a protection order against her ex-husband after repeated threats. When police failed to enforce the order during an emergency, Pamela sued the town, claiming the order created a protected property interest in police protection.
Jessica Gonzales obtained a temporary restraining order against her estranged husband in May 1999 in connection with divorce proceedings in a Colorado state court. The order was served on the husband on June 4, 1999. The state trial court modified the terms of the restraining order on June 4, 1999, and made it permanent. The modified order granted the husband limited visitation rights with their three daughters on alternate weekends, for two weeks during the summer, and upon reasonable notice for a mid-week dinner visit. On the evening of June 22, 1999, the husband took the three daughters, ages 10, 9, and 7, from outside the family home without any advance arrangements for visitation that night. Gonzales contacted the Castle Rock Police Department around 7:30 p.m. She showed officers a copy of the restraining order and requested its enforcement and the immediate return of the children. The officers stated there was nothing they could do and advised her to call back if the children did not return by 10:00 p.m. Gonzales made additional calls to the police throughout the night. She called at 8:30 p.m. after speaking with her husband who was at an amusement park in Denver. She called at 10:10 p.m., at midnight, and at 12:10 a.m. when she went to his apartment. Each time she was told to wait or that no immediate action would be taken. When she filed an incident report at the police station around 12:50 a.m., the officer took the report but made no effort to locate the children before going to dinner. At approximately 3:20 a.m. on June 23, 1999, the husband arrived at the police station and opened fire with a semi-automatic handgun. Police shot back, killing him. Inside the cab of his pickup truck, they found the bodies of all three daughters, whom he had already murdered. Gonzales subsequently filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Town of Castle Rock. She alleged that the police department's policy or custom of failing to respond properly to complaints of restraining order violations deprived her of due process. The district court dismissed the complaint. The Tenth Circuit en banc reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseAfter finding evidence of abuse, the court placed Perry Pratt's child under a protective supervision order requiring Perry to cooperate with social services and attend therapy. The order allowed the agency to monitor the home without removing the child.
Maurice M. was hospitalized at three months old with a fractured left femur and other indications of severe physical abuse. Hospital personnel observed respondent Bouknight shaking Maurice and handling him improperly. This led them to notify the Baltimore City Department of Social Services of suspected child abuse. In February 1987, the Department secured a court order removing Maurice from Bouknight's control and placing him in shelter care. Several months later, the shelter care order was modified to return Maurice to Bouknight temporarily. Following a hearing, the juvenile court declared Maurice a child in need of assistance and placed him under the Department's continuing oversight pursuant to a protective supervision order. The order required Bouknight to cooperate with the Department, continue in therapy, participate in parental aid and training programs, and refrain from physically punishing Maurice. Eight months later, the Department returned to juvenile court fearing for Maurice's safety. BCDSS caseworkers related that Bouknight would not cooperate with them and had in nearly every respect violated the terms of the protective order. On April 20, 1988, the court granted BCDSS' petition to remove Maurice from Bouknight's control for placement in foster care. BCDSS officials also petitioned for judicial relief from Bouknight's failure to produce Maurice or reveal where he could be found. The court issued an order to show cause why Bouknight should not be held in civil contempt for failure to produce the child. Maurice was not produced at subsequent hearings. At a hearing one week later, Bouknight claimed that Maurice was with a relative in Dallas. Investigation revealed that the relative had not seen Maurice. The next day, following another hearing at which Bouknight again declined to produce Maurice, the juvenile court found Bouknight in contempt for failure to produce the child as ordered. The court directed that Bouknight be imprisoned until she purged herself of contempt by either producing Maurice before the court or revealing to the court his exact whereabouts. Bouknight's claim that the contempt order violated the Fifth Amendment was rejected by the juvenile court. The Court of Appeals of Maryland vacated the judgment upholding the contempt order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseThe movant must certify a good-faith effort to resolve the dispute without court action and demonstrate good cause that the discovery would cause annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.
Supporting sources
Under Model Rule 3.8(d), a prosecutor may be relieved of timely disclosure duties when the tribunal issues a protective order, typically to safeguard witnesses or sensitive information.
Supporting sources
The Supreme Court has held that a protection order does not create a protected property interest in police enforcement under the Due Process Clause.
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Under Rule 65(c), the movant must give security in an amount the court deems proper to cover costs and damages if the enjoined party is later found to have been wrongfully restrained.
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The order keeps the child in the home while imposing conditions on the custodian, such as cooperation with services and therapy, allowing ongoing agency oversight without removal.
Supporting sources
…order certification on its own motion”). : See Fuller & Stansberry, 1994 Legislature Strengthens Domestic Violence Protective Orders, 23 Colo. Lawyer 2327 (1994) (“The 1994 Colorado legislative session produced several significant domestic abuse bills that strengthened both civil and criminal restraining order laws and…